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Preface 
 
This DPsych in counselling psychology portfolio is comprised of three sections: a 
doctoral piece of research, a combined case study and process report, and a journal 
article. Whilst they are distinct pieces of work, a common theme connects them; 
they all explore adults’ experiences of anxiety. An overview of the three sections is 
presented below. I conclude this Preface by reflecting on how the common theme 
relates to my own experiences of becoming a counselling psychologist.   
 
Section A: Doctoral Research 
 
In this section, I present my doctoral research which explores the lived experiences 
of adults (aged eighteen and over) with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). 
Although GAD is the most frequent anxiety disorder and the second most frequent 
psychiatric disorder in clinical settings (Wittchen, Kessler, Beesdo, Krause, Höfler, & 
Hoyer, 2002), it is significantly under-detected and under-treated (Wittchen & 
Jacobi, 2005). Clinicians often struggle to recognise the symptoms as belonging to 
GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007); a difficulty compounded by the various ways in 
which individuals with GAD present for treatment (Timulak & McElvaney, 2018) as 
well as its high rate of comorbidity. The lack of empirical literature on the lived 
experience of GAD arguably hinders our understanding of it further. This study 
sought to address this gap in the literature and thus contribute to our understanding 
of GAD. Eight participants with a formal diagnosis of GAD were interviewed and 
data were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). 
Developed themes reflect the participants’ internal struggles (e.g., with uncertainty, 
absence of perceived control, and fundamental negative self-perceptions) and how 
they manage these. They also explore how their interpersonal relationships have 
been affected by GAD. The findings’ implications for counselling psychology and the 
wider context are discussed as well as suggestions for future research.  
 
Notably, whilst this research was driven by a strong desire to understand these 
adults’ experiences and to give them a voice, its conception stemmed from my own 
encounters with GAD. My first clinical placement during my counselling psychologist 
training was in a local, private sector counselling service. My first client presented 
with emetophobia and feared long car journeys. However, it soon became apparent 
that his anxiety and worry extended beyond these specific foci; they were 
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generalised across a wide variety of topics. I consequently began researching GAD 
as, at the time, my professional awareness and understanding of GAD was 
significantly limited, and I needed to formulate his presenting difficulties and 
consider how best to approach therapy with him. This experience highlighted the 
potential complexities and difficulties that can arise in identifying, understanding, 
and working therapeutically with potential GAD. However, my perceptions of GAD 
as confusing and mysterious were initially triggered by a close friend’s experiences. 
Her mental health team have mentioned GAD to her, and she has previously met 
GAD diagnostic criteria on the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-Item scale (GAD-7; 
Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006). This left her questioning whether a 
diagnosis of GAD "applies" to her, and I wonder whether this influenced why she 
self-identifies as having "generalised anxiety". However, her mental health team 
letters refer to "mixed anxiety and depressive disorder". My friend, feeling confused, 
asked her psychiatrist for clarification. Her psychiatrist does not think she has 
"straightforward GAD", adding "I don’t think it’s as simple as that". Ultimately then, 
my interest in this research topic also derived from a personal desire, both as a 
counselling psychologist and as a friend, to better understand GAD.  
 
Section B: Combined Case Study and Process Report 
 
The second section brings the reader to the clinical component of the portfolio, 
where a combined case study and process report is presented. It describes a piece 
of clinical work I conducted during the final year of my counselling psychologist 
training, whilst working in a specialist fatigue service. The client, who I refer to as 
Daniel throughout to protect his anonymity, presented with exaggerated fatigue and 
severe anxiety. Anxiety is a maintaining factor for fatigue (Fernie & Murphy, 2009), 
thus our primary focus was on helping Daniel identify, challenge, and relate to his 
anxiety more effectively. To achieve these aims, both "traditional" cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) 
interventions were used. In this piece of work, I consider how theory informed these 
interventions and reflect on our therapeutic relationship, including challenges that 
arose and my responses to these. I have chosen to present this particular case 
because it marked a turning point in how I conceptualise and consequently 
approach anxiety in my clinical work.   
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Section C: Journal Article 
 
In the final section, I present a journal article that draws on the study presented in 
Section A. It focuses on one of the four developed super-ordinate themes: "Battling 
with uncertainty", which captures participants’ difficulty tolerating uncertainty and 
consequent absence of perceived control. This super-ordinate theme was chosen 
because it illustrates some of the fundamental internal challenges faced by 
participants. These findings are therefore deemed crucial in aiding our 
understanding of GAD. The implications of the findings for counselling and clinical 
psychologists, counsellors, and psychotherapists who may assess and work with 
adults with GAD are discussed. I have chosen to submit this article to the Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, thus it has been formatted according to this 
journal’s submission guidelines. This journal was chosen for several reasons. The 
article discusses key findings from a study that shares this journal’s commitment to 
furthering the psychological understanding of persons in relation to self, world, 
others and time (as well as material objects and spatiality). Furthermore, it is the 
phenomenological journal with the highest impact factor. I believe that the findings 
have significant implications for all clinicians who may encounter adults with GAD, 
and I hope that the journal’s high impact factor and wide, global audience renders 
the findings accessible to as many clinicians as possible. Finally, and again in line 
with this journal’s commitment, I hope this article encourages clinicians to consider 
GAD from a phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology in the mental health 
field is synonymous with the pure clinical descriptions of symptoms. However, 
phenomenology considers phenomena as they are experienced, without reference 
to their psychological origins or causal statements (Denys, 2011). I believe this 
perspective is crucial in maximising our understanding of GAD and validating 
individuals’ experiences of it.  
 
Personal Reflections 
 
My training to become a counselling psychologist has been a long, challenging, 
exciting, and humbling process that, linking with this portfolio’s common theme, has 
often caused me significant anxiety. Echoing the research participants’ apparent 
self-doubt, I believe that this level of anxiety was associated with self-pressure and 
self-doubt; pressure to be the ‘perfect’ therapist, and thoughts of not being cut out 
for this career. However, with growing experience in nurturing clinical placements, I 
have learnt to practice what I preach and to accept and be content with being ‘good 
15 
 
enough’, not just in my role as a counselling psychologist but personally too. 
Echoing both the piece of clinical work presented in Section B of this portfolio and 
some of the research participants’ narratives, I am also trying to form a new 
relationship with my own anxiety. As opposed to fighting and trying to rid myself of 
it, I am trying to notice and accept it for what it is: an uncomfortable but essential 
emotion that does not need to govern my self-perceptions, decisions and 
behaviours. As Rollo May (1977) wrote: 
 
"We still cling to the illogical belief that mental health is living without anxiety. Anxiety 
is essential to the human condition" (p. 3).  
 
"Anxiety indicates vitality. Like fever, it testifies that a struggle is going on within the 
personality. So long as this struggle continues, a constructive solution is possible. 
When there is no longer any anxiety, the struggle is over, and depression may ensue" 
(p. 4).  
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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is the most frequent 
anxiety disorder and the second most frequent psychiatric disorder in clinical 
settings (Wittchen, Kessler, Beesdo, Krause, Höfler, & Hoyer, 2002), it is 
significantly under-detected and under-treated (Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). There is 
also a lack of empirical literature on the lived experience of GAD. Considered 
together, this information highlights the need for a greater understanding of GAD. 
This study sought to address the gap in the literature, and thus contribute to this 
need, by exploring the lived experience of adults with GAD. Potential participants 
with a formal diagnosis of GAD were recruited via purposive sampling. Initial 
telephone screenings were conducted, during which they completed the 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman, Zuellig, 
Kachin, Constantino, Przeworski, Erickson, & Cashman-McGrath, 2002). A 
minimum total score of 7.67 was required to meet this questionnaire’s GAD 
diagnostic criteria. Eight participants who met this requirement participated in one 
semi-structured interview. Data were analysed using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) and four super-ordinate themes were developed. 
"Battling with uncertainty: What’s going to happen next?" captured participants’ 
difficulty tolerating uncertainty and consequent absence of perceived control over 
their life-worlds. "A struggle for autonomy: You either let it get a hold of you, or you 
get a hold of it" captured participants’ continuous struggle for perceived control over 
their senses of self, as GAD takes over. "GAD and interpersonal relations: Worrying 
about what others think" explored the interactions between participants’ experiences 
of GAD and their relationships with others. "The need to create meaning amid 
uncertainty and loss: GAD is an eye-opener" explored participants’ attempts to 
locate meaning within their distress in order to tolerate the uncertainty, torment, and 
losses GAD has caused. The findings are discussed in relation to existing literature. 
Their implications for counselling psychology and the wider context are then 
considered as well as suggestions for future research.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1   Overview 
 
This study explored the lived experiences of adults (aged eighteen and over) with a 
formal diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). The following sections 
provide the context and rationale for this research.  
 
1.2   Defining GAD and key concepts 
 
1.2.1   GAD 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) classification 
system is more widely used to diagnose GAD than the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) system (Hazlett-Stevens, 2008). The following history of GAD’s 
diagnostic criteria is consequently confined to the DSM system. Both systems’ 
current diagnostic criteria are then presented.  
 
GAD as a diagnostic label first appeared in the third edition of the DSM (DSM-III; 
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980) as a residual category, meaning that 
a diagnosis of GAD was only possible if the individual did not meet diagnostic 
criteria for any other DSM-III anxiety disorder (Hazlett-Stevens, 2008). The 
fundamental feature was persistent anxiety. Additional symptoms such as anxious 
apprehension (including worry), physiological arousal, and hypervigilance that 
persisted for at least one month, were also required (APA, 1980). This set of criteria 
had one of the lowest diagnostic reliabilities of the mood and anxiety disorders 
(Andrews, Mahoney, Hobbs, & Genderson, 2016). 
 
GAD became a separate diagnostic category when DSM-III was revised seven 
years later (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987). In accordance with supporting data, DSM-III-R 
made worry the central feature of GAD. To meet diagnostic criteria, unrealistic and 
excessive worry or anxiety about two or more life circumstances had to be present 
for a minimum of six months (APA, 1987). This minimum duration was more 
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consistent with GAD’s chronic nature. Despite these improvements, the vague 
somatic criteria remained with individuals requiring six out of eighteen varied 
symptoms to meet diagnosis (APA, 1987).  
 
Investigations found that individuals with GAD were more likely than those without 
GAD to have trouble controlling their worries (Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 
1989). Difficulty controlling worry therefore became a diagnostic criterion in the 
fourth edition of the DSM (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Whether worries were considered 
unrealistic or not had little discriminatory ability, thus this criterion was dropped 
(Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2004). It was also acknowledged that individuals with 
GAD could have pervasive worry regardless of how many life areas were affected, 
thus the requirement for two or more life circumstances was removed (Mennin et al., 
2004). The six-month minimum duration was retained.  
 
GAD diagnostic criteria were fundamentally unchanged from DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
to the fifth edition (DSM-V; APA, 2013) despite the Obssessive-Compulsive 
Spectrum, Posttraumatic, and Dissociative Disorders Work Group’s proposed 
modifications (Andrews, Hobbs, Borkovec, Beesdo, Craske, Heimberg, Rapee, 
Ruscio, & Stanley, 2010). They suggested that the terms generalised worry 
disorder, major worry disorder, and pathological worry disorder more accurately 
capture GAD’s main clinical feature: excessive worry. They also proposed reducing 
GAD’s minimal duration from six to three months on the premise that it may be 
difficult for individuals, especially children, to recall whether their worry was 
excessive six months ago. To improve the criteria’s discriminant validity, they 
proposed that only two associated symptoms: restlessness and muscle tension 
should be retained in DSM-V because these are the only symptoms specific to 
GAD. Finally, they argued that the addition of the following four behavioural 
symptoms could significantly improve the diagnostic reliability of GAD: avoidance, 
overpreparation, procrastination, and reassurance seeking. These symptoms have 
been shown to be associated with GAD (Andrews et al., 2010). Despite Dugas, 
Charette, and Gervais’ (2018) argument that these suggestions may have increased 
the diagnostic validity and reliability of GAD, none were retained in DSM-V.  
 
DSM-V (APA, 2013) then, defines GAD as a chronic condition (six-month minimum 
duration) involving excessive worry and anxiety about a number of everyday events 
or activities, on more days than not. Individuals with GAD find it difficult to control 
their worrying. A diagnosis of GAD requires at least three (one for children) of these 
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six somatic symptoms: restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge, being easily 
fatigued, difficulty concentrating or mind going blank, irritability, muscle tension, and 
sleep disturbance (i.e., difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless, unsatisfying 
sleep). The worry, anxiety, or physical symptoms must cause clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning. Such distress or impairment must not result from direct physiological 
effects of a substance (e.g., drug, medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., 
hyperthyroidism), nor be better explained by another psychiatric disorder. Although 
worry is common among individuals with anxiety disorders, GAD is distinguished 
from other Axis I anxiety disorders because the worry is not confined to topics 
related to these specific disorders. For example, individuals with social anxiety 
disorder mainly worry about how others perceive them, while those with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) may worry about whether they locked the front door or 
whether they are somehow contaminated (Dugas et al., 2018).  
 
DSM-V also contains "associated features supporting diagnosis" (APA, 2013). 
These include trembling, twitching, feeling shaky, or muscle aches which may 
accompany muscle tension. Somatic symptoms, including sweating, nausea, and 
diarrhoea may also be experienced as well as an exaggerated startle response.    
 
The tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World 
Health Organization [WHO], 1992) uses broader diagnostic criteria. It defines GAD 
as: 
 
"Anxiety that is generalised and persistent but not restricted to, or even strongly 
predominating in, any particular environmental circumstances (i.e. it is "free-floating")" 
(WHO, 1992). 
 
Associated somatic symptoms include trembling, muscle tension, sweating, and 
dizziness (WHO, 1992).  
 
Slade and Andrews (2001) analysed Australian National Mental Health Survey data 
from a sample of 10,641 adults in the Australian population and found that although 
the weighted prevalence of twelve-month GAD was almost identical when defined 
by DSM-IV (2.6%) and ICD-10 (3.0%), less than half of those diagnosed by one 
system were also diagnosed by the other. This raises concerns about both systems’ 
reliability.  
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1.2.2   Worry 
 
Worry first gained attention in psychological inquiry in test anxiety literature. Morris 
and Liebert (1970) identified that test responses comprised two distinct factors. 
Their termed worry factor captured self-evaluated negative cognition about test 
performance.  
 
In the late 1970s, research began that considered worry in its own right. In his study 
of the psychological aspects of insomnia, Borkovec (1979) observed that many 
individuals who had difficulty sleeping experienced intrusive, negative cognitions at 
bedtime; a process he named worrying. Since then, Borkovec and colleagues have 
extensively investigated the nature of the worry process. Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, and DePree (1983) initially offered a tentative definition of worry that has 
become widely accepted in GAD research (Clark & Beck, 2010): 
 
"Worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental 
problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility 
of one or more negative outcomes. Consequently, worry relates closely to fear 
processes" (Borkovec et al., 1983, p. 10).  
 
In 1994, Borkovec amended this definition to capture how "worry is a predominantly 
verbal-linguistic attempt to avoid future aversive events" (p. 7) rather than a focus 
on imagery.  
 
Although worry has been labelled the cognitive component of anxiety (O’Neill, 
1985), research has demonstrated that worry is a specific construct that is 
distinguishable from a larger subset of cognitive components of anxiety and can be 
studied in its own right (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Zebb & Beck, 
1998).  
 
Despite this distinction, individuals with GAD do not always use the term worry to 
describe their worries. Some describe them as fears or anxiety (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007).  
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1.2.3   Worry in GAD is unique 
 
Although individuals with GAD worry about the same topics all humans worry about 
at times, they tend to worry about most things, most of the time. They can get 
locked into a vicious worry cycle that is difficult to disengage from. In contrast, 
individuals without GAD tend to worry in response to a specific trigger and have a 
subjective sense of greater control over their worrying; rendering it (generally) time-
limited (Wilkinson, Meares, & Freeston, 2011). Furthermore, individuals with GAD 
consistently worry more about minor matters, such as which book to read or what 
brand of oven to buy than both nonclinical individuals and those with other anxiety 
disorders (Brown, Moras, Zinbarg, & Barlow, 1993; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001). 
They also tend to worry more about unlikely or remote future events such as their 
plane crashing or how they will pay their unborn child’s university fees (Dugas, 
Freeston, Ladouceur, Rhéaume, Provencher, & Boisvert, 1998).  
 
1.2.4   Distinguishing between existential anxiety, neurotic anxiety and fear 
 
Although anxiety is a universal human emotion (Simpson, Neria, Lewis-Fernández, 
& Schneier, 2010), a universally accepted definition does not exist (Barlow, 2002). 
Furthermore, anxiety is so closely related to fear that the two terms are often used 
interchangeably (Rachman, 2013). DSM-V defines anxiety as "anticipation of future 
threat" and fear as "the emotional response to real or perceived imminent threat" 
(APA, 2013). In light of these brief definitions and unclear distinctions, I refer to 
existential theory.  
 
In his book The Concept of Anxiety, which was first published in 1844, the 
existential philosopher Kierkegaard describes anxiety as the "possibility of freedom" 
(as cited in May, 2015). He asserts that the distinctive characteristic of humans is 
the range of possibility and our capacity for self-awareness of possibility. He 
compares these possibilities to unknown roads that lie ahead and explains that 
when we confront them, this evokes anxiety (as cited in May, 2015). Put another 
way, possibility passes over into actuality but in between lies anxiety. Selfhood 
(sense of identity) relies on the individual’s capacity to confront anxiety and move 
forward despite it (May, 2015). Anxiety involves inner conflict. Kierkegaard asserts: 
"anxiety is a desire for what one dreads" (as cited in May, 2015). In every 
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experience, the individual wishes to move forward, actualising his or her possibilities 
but simultaneously wishes not to. Kierkegaard distinguishes between "normal" and 
"neurotic" anxiety. An individual with "normal" anxiety moves forward despite this 
conflict, actualising his or her freedom, whereas someone with neurotic anxiety 
remains in a "shut in" condition, sacrificing freedom. This involves processes of 
blocked awareness, inhibition, and other common neurotic responses to anxiety (as 
cited in May, 2015). All humans experience anxiety because it is possible to create 
oneself and one’s daily activities. If no possibilities existed, humans would not 
experience anxiety (May, 2015). Existential anxiety then, is an anxiety that belongs 
to human existence itself, not to an abnormal state of mind, as in neurotic and 
psychotic anxiety (Tillich, 2000).  
 
Similarly, the existential philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich (2000) defines 
existential anxiety as the existential awareness of nonbeing. Humans are therefore 
always anxious. Tillich identified three types of existential anxiety: the anxiety of 
death, the anxiety of meaninglessness, and the anxiety of condemnation. All are 
interwoven with each other but usually one type dominates in a given moment. Like 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between existential and neurotic anxiety, Tillich explains 
that in neurotic anxiety possibilities are not actualised because actualisation of 
being implies the acceptance of nonbeing and its anxiety.  
 
Tillich (2000) also distinguishes between existential anxiety and fear. He explains 
that fear has a definite object that can be confronted, analysed, and struggled with. 
In other words, it can be acted upon. Anxiety, in contrast, does not have an object, 
or rather its object is the negation of every object, meaning that it cannot be acted 
upon. The only object is the threat itself but not the source of the threat because the 
source is "nothingness" (nonbeing). Although fear and anxiety can be distinguished, 
they cannot be separated (Tillich, 2000). Fear is being afraid of something, for 
example, a pain, rejection from others, or the moment of dying. In the anticipation of 
the threat originating in things, it is not the negativity which these things will bring 
that frightens the individual but the anxiety about the implications of this negativity. 
Tillich illustrates this distinction using the fear of dying. Fear relates to the 
anticipated event of being killed by illness or an accident, and thus suffering and 
loss. Anxiety refers to the absolute unknown after death; the threat of nothingness 
(nonbeing). The anxiety of not being able to preserve one’s being underlies every 
fear and is the frightening element in it. Humans are consequently driven to 
establish objects of fear that can be acted upon (Tillich, 2000).  
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1.3   Literature review 
 
1.3.1   GAD prevalence 
 
The tendency for studies to use different GAD diagnostic criteria, as well as 
numerous changes to the criteria sets themselves, makes it difficult to reliably draw 
comparisons between data on GAD prevalence. Many large-scale epidemiological 
studies in the United States (US) for example, were conducted using DSM-III or 
DSM-III-R criteria (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Furthermore, studies employ 
different methods and prevalence estimates. Some studies consider point 
prevalence (the number of individuals in a given population who have the disorder 
at a particular point in time), while others are based on lifetime prevalence (the 
number of individuals who have had the disorder at some time in their life). Some 
studies also report estimates of lifetime morbid risk. This is the number of 
individuals who will eventually develop the disorder at some time in their life, 
regardless of whether they have a lifetime history at the time of assessment 
(Kessler, Petukhova, Sampson, Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 2012). Ultimately, 
prevalence figures are estimates that must be interpreted and compared with 
caution.  
 
Despite this warning, Dugas and Robichaud (2007) argue that general population 
prevalence rates in the US have remained relatively uniform across community-
based studies. The twelve-month prevalence of GAD among adults in the general 
US population is 2.9%, while the adult lifetime prevalence and lifetime morbid risk 
are 4.3% and 9%, respectively (Kessler et al., 2012).  
 
Europe’s median twelve-month general population prevalence is 1.7% (Lewis-
Fernández, Hinton, Laria, Patterson, Hofmann, Craske, Stein, Asnaani, & Liao, 
2010). Twelve-month prevalence rates are higher for individuals of European 
descent than those of non-European descent (Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010).  
 
The National Health Service (NHS) estimates that GAD affects up to 5% of the 
United Kingdom (UK) population (NHS, n.d.). According to the 2014 Adult 
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS), 5.9% of adults (aged sixteen and over) living 
in England were identified as having GAD in the week prior to interview. GAD was 
the most commonly identified common mental disorder. Common mental disorders 
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were based on ICD-10 diagnostic criteria and also included depressive episode, 
phobias, OCD, and panic disorder (McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 
2016). It is noteworthy that the studies represented in this survey only included 
individuals living in private housing, thus this figure may underestimate GAD’s 
actual adult prevalence in England. Moreover, a different figure may have been 
obtained if the survey applied DSM-V criteria.  
 
Studies have demonstrated that females are twice as likely as males to experience 
GAD (Seedat et al., 2009; Vesga-López, Schneier, Wang, Heimberg, Liu, Hasin, & 
Blanco, 2008). Gender differences in England reached statistical significance in the 
2014 APMS with an estimated 4.9% prevalence in males, compared to 6.8% in 
females (McManus et al., 2016). Various possible explanations for this difference 
have been proposed including hormonal differences, cultural pressures, and a 
higher proportion of females than males reporting anxiety (Roe-Sepowitz, Bedard, & 
Thyer, 2005).  
 
With regards to prevalence across age groups, Kessler et al. (2012) found that 
GAD’s prevalence in the US peaks in middle age (with a median onset age of 30) 
and declines across the later years of life. Furthermore, they reported that an 
estimated 69-74% of all lifetime cases of GAD in the US have first onsets in the 18 
to 64 age range. The 2014 APMS reported that GAD was more common in 
individuals living in England aged 16 to 64 than in previous years of the survey, as 
well as being more common in 16 to 64-year-olds than in those aged 65 or older 
(McManus et al., 2016). Current NHS website information differs, stating that GAD 
is more common in individuals aged 35 to 59 (NHS, n.d.). The fact that NHS 
statistics are based on the entire UK population not just those living in England may, 
at least partially, account for this difference. Despite indications that GAD is less 
common in older adults, the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam found that GAD 
may be the most common anxiety disorder among those aged 55 and older 
(Beekman, de Beurs, van Balkom, Deeg, van Dyck, & van Tilburg, 2000).  
 
In terms of GAD’s prevalence in clinical settings, Maier, Gänsicke, Freyberger, Linz, 
Heun, and Lecrubier (2000) found that among individuals from fourteen countries 
(including England, France, Brazil and the US) who visited their physicians for a 
psychological difficulty, 25% had a diagnosis of pure GAD (no comorbid disorders). 
Wittchen (2002) reported that in the US, GAD is the most common anxiety disorder 
in primary care; present in 22% of primary care patients who report anxiety 
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problems. In a more recent US study involving fifteen primary care clinics, 7.6% of 
the 965 randomly sampled patients had GAD (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, Monahan, 
& Löwe, 2007). GAD is the most frequent anxiety disorder and the second most 
frequent of all psychiatric disorders in clinical settings (Wittchen, Kessler, Beesdo, 
Krause, Höfler, & Hoyer, 2002). 
 
1.3.2   Comorbidity 
 
Over 90% of individuals who meet criteria for GAD in a given year also have at least 
one other psychiatric diagnosis (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Mood disorders such 
as major depressive disorder (MDD) and dysthymia are the most common comorbid 
conditions, but over 50% of individuals with GAD have an additional anxiety disorder 
as well (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Similar findings have been reported in Europe 
alone. Wittchen and Jacobi (2005) analysed community studies conducted in 
sixteen European countries and found that comorbidity with MDD was present in 
three out of five cases, with a similar proportion having other anxiety disorders 
alongside GAD.  
 
GAD has also been found to co-occur with personality disorders. Findings from the 
Harvard/Brown Anxiety Research Project; a longitudinal follow-up study of DSM-III-
R defined anxiety disorders, indicated that 37.7% of participants with GAD had at 
least one personality disorder. Avoidant, obsessive-compulsive, and dependent 
types were the most common (Dyck, Phillips, Warshaw, Dolan, Shea, Stout, 
Massion, Zlotnick, & Keller, 2001). Grant, Hasin, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Ruan, and 
Huang (2005) investigated the co-occurrence of DSM-IV personality disorders 
among individuals in the US general population with current DSM-IV mood or 
anxiety disorders, as well as those seeking treatment for one, and found that 60.6% 
of those with GAD met personality disorder criteria.  
 
GAD also frequently co-occurs with physical health conditions, particularly 
gastrointestinal problems such as irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) (Hazlett-Stevens, 
2008). Sareen, Cox, Clara, and Asmundson (2005) examined data from the US 
National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) and found that GAD was associated with 
gastrointestinal diseases (i.e., ulcers, hernia, stomach problems, liver, or kidney 
disease), only after adjusting for the effects of other anxiety disorders and MDD. 
Drews and Hazlett-Stevens (2008) investigated 391 undergraduate psychology 
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students using self-report diagnostic measures and questionnaires. Sixteen 
participants met criteria for both GAD and IBS. Gros, Antony, McCabe, and Swinson 
(2009) found that individuals with a principal diagnosis of GAD had the highest rate 
of comorbid IBS: 25.8%, compared to those with a principal diagnosis of panic 
disorder, social anxiety disorder, OCD, specific phobia, or MDD. Individuals with 
GAD reported more severe and frequent IBS symptoms.  
 
An association between GAD and heart problems also exists. GAD increased the 
risk of all-cause and cardiovascular disease mortality in Vietnam veterans (Phillips, 
Batty, Gale, Deary, Osborn, MacIntyre, & Carroll, 2009). It substantially increased 
the rate of subsequent cardiac problems in individuals with stable coronary artery 
disease; an association that could not be explained by disease severity, health 
behaviours, or biological mediators (Martens, de Jonge, Na, Cohen, Lett, & 
Whooley, 2010). 
 
GAD also co-occurs with chronic pain conditions such as backache, joint pain and 
migraines, medically unexplained somatic symptoms, and sleep disorders (Nutt, 
Argyropoulos, Hood, & Potokar, 2006).  
 
GAD’s high rate of comorbidity has led some anxiety disorder experts to question 
whether GAD is an independent disorder or a prodromal condition that promotes the 
development of other anxiety or mood disorders (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007).  As 
already highlighted, MDD is one of the most common comorbid disorders with GAD 
and they have a shared genetic origin (Kendler, Gardner, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2007). 
These findings have promoted suggestions that GAD and MDD should be combined 
under the umbrella term distress disorders (Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & 
Castonguay, 2013). The contention that GAD is not a unique diagnostic entity has 
been refuted by ample evidence (Newman et al., 2013). For example, when lifetime 
prevalence is considered, rates of comorbidity among individuals with GAD are 
similar to those present in individuals with other anxiety disorders (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007). Research has also shown that the onset of GAD does not 
systematically precede or follow the onset of comorbid conditions (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007), including MDD (Kessler, Gruber, Hettema, Hwang, Sampson, & 
Yonkers, 2008). Furthermore, order of onset between GAD and MDD does not 
affect GAD’s progression (Kessler et al., 2008).  
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1.3.3   GAD aetiologies  
 
Numerous theories of GAD’s cause, development, and maintenance exist. Although 
Dugas et al. (2018) suggest that psychological, socio-cultural, and biological factors 
all play a role, Beesdo, Pine, Lieb, and Wittchen (2010) argue that more research is 
required to understand these factors’ specific contributions. Each factor domain is 
explored in the following sections. 
 
1.3.3.1   Psychological models 
 
Only psychological models supported by empirical evidence are included in the 
following subsections. 
 
1.3.3.1.1   Attachment theory 
 
According to Bowlby (1973), attachment is a relational emotion regulation system 
and attachment processes are therefore central to our understanding of anxiety. 
Bowlby theorised that during the initial period of human evolution, genetic selection 
favoured secure attachment behaviours because they increased the likelihood of 
primary caregiver-infant proximity which, in turn, increased the likelihood of infant 
survival.  
 
He observed that the attachment and fear systems are particularly activated in times 
of perceived threat. To increase their chances of survival during these instances, 
the child seeks proximity to and protection from the attachment figure (the child’s 
primary caregiver, not necessarily the birth parent). Reduction of the child’s anxiety 
relies on this figure being available to protect the child from harm and to offer 
comfort. According to this theory then, adult anxiety may derive from childhood 
experiences that leave the individual uncertain of the availability of a protective 
figure in times of perceived threat.  
 
Section 1.3.3.2.2 explores insecure attachment as a potential risk factor for the 
development of GAD in more detail, including supporting empirical evidence.  
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1.3.3.1.2   Avoidance model of worry and GAD 
 
Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar’s (2004) avoidance model of worry and GAD 
proposes that worry is a cognitive response that, in the short-term, allows 
individuals with GAD to avoid experiencing distressing negative emotions and 
concurrent autonomic arousal to otherwise unavoidable perceived internal and 
external threats. Specifically, catastrophic mental images are replaced by less 
emotionally distressing, less somatically activating verbal-linguistic activity. The 
removal of aversive and fearful images, and consequent dampening of negative 
affect, negatively reinforces worry. Worry is further reinforced by positive beliefs 
including beliefs that worry aids problem-solving, motivates performance, and 
facilitates avoidance of future negative outcomes. These beliefs are, in turn, 
reinforced when aversive events do not occur or are effectively managed (Borkovec 
et al., 2004). However, in the long-term, worry is thought to maintain anxiety by 
disrupting the probable beneficial impact of naturally occurring exposure to feared 
stimuli. Threat associations are consequently maintained (Stapinski, Abbott, & 
Rapee, 2010).  
 
Empirical support for the model includes evidence supporting the notion that worry 
is primarily a verbal-linguistic process (Behar & Borkovec, 2005). Borkovec and 
Roemer (1995) found that individuals with GAD believed that worry functions as a 
distraction from more emotional topics, suggesting that worry is used to avoid 
emotional processing and that it is reinforced by such positive beliefs. Despite these 
findings, Stapinski et al. (2010) argue that additional empirical data is required to 
build a strong evidence base for the model as mixed results from previous studies, 
together with their own findings, highlight the need for clarification concerning the 
mechanisms involved in the maintenance of threat associations and worry in GAD.  
 
1.3.3.1.3   Emotion dysregulation (ED) model 
 
Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, and Fresco (2002, 2005) criticise the avoidance model of 
worry and GAD because it fails to address what makes the emotional experience so 
aversive that it prompts the individual with GAD to engage in avoidance strategies 
such as worry. They suggest that ED may be integral in GAD’s development. Their 
ED model (Mennin et al., 2002, 2005) contains four key dysregulation processes: 
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heightened emotional intensity, poor emotional understanding, negative reactivity to 
emotions (e.g. fear of emotions), and maladaptive management strategies. Mennin 
et al. (2002, 2005) suggest that individuals with GAD experience and express their 
emotions, particularly negative emotions, more easily and intensely than those 
without GAD. Being overly expressive of negative emotions on a frequent basis may 
lead to criticism and rejection from others which, in turn, may elicit higher levels of 
negative affect. They theorise that individuals with GAD can struggle to identify and 
differentiate between primary emotions such as fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and 
joy, and therefore cannot obtain useful information from their emotional 
experiences. Instead, they are left feeling overwhelmed and confused. Together, 
these two processes may lead individuals with GAD to experience all emotions as 
aversive, becoming anxious when they occur. Associated reactions may include 
extreme hypervigilance for perceived threats and activation of negative beliefs about 
emotions. They suggest that these three processes make it difficult for the individual 
to manage their emotions in a manner appropriate to the environmental context. 
They propose that individuals with GAD have two types of emotional regulation 
deficit. One is difficulty modulating their emotional experience and/or expression. 
Intense emotions that are misinterpreted as dangerous may contribute to this 
difficulty. The second is extensive employment of control mechanisms such as 
avoidance and blunting which serve to decrease their emotional experience. This is 
where worry enters the model; as an attempt to cognitively control the regulatory 
problems associated with subjectively averse emotional experience.  
 
Findings from three studies by Mennin et al. (2005) provide preliminary support for 
this model. In the first, Individuals with GAD reported higher levels of emotional 
intensity and negative emotional expressivity than controls. GAD individuals also 
had significantly greater difficulty identifying and describing their emotions than 
controls and were less able to understand their emotional experiences. GAD 
individuals reported more negative beliefs concerning activated emotions, including 
fears about the consequences of their experiences and the need to control them. 
This was also the case for MDD, anger, and positive emotions, not just anxiety. 
Finally, ED was found to effectively predict GAD; more than 75% of individuals with 
GAD were correctly identified. Mennin et al. emphasise the significance of this 
finding as there were no items on the emotion regulation scales that measured GAD 
symptoms. One key limitation of this study is the fact that participants were 
diagnosed via self-report. Secondly, potential comorbidity was not examined, thus 
other emotional difficulties could have caused the ED deficits. The second study 
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consequently compared a clinical sample of individuals with GAD to a community 
control group. Similar findings were produced, but participants with GAD did not 
report greater attention to emotions than controls. This may suggest that attention to 
emotions is not a fundamental variable in the model. The third study attempted to 
begin delineating the processes involved in ED by experimentally inducing negative 
emotions. Participants with GAD had greater levels of self-reported physiological 
anxiety symptoms in response to the negative emotion inductions than controls. 
Following this induction, participants with GAD had more difficulty understanding 
and accepting their emotions and believed that they had less influence over them. 
These findings suggest that individuals with GAD find it difficult to manage their 
physiological reactions to negative emotions which may, in turn, motivate them to 
worry to escape distress.  
 
Mennin et al. (2005) acknowledge that although findings from other studies also 
provide support for their model, ED’s specificity to GAD remains unclear; ED has 
also been associated with other psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, additional 
investigation is needed to understand the causal links between each of the four ED 
processes as well as the relationship between ED and worry.   
 
1.3.3.1.4   Contrast avoidance model of worry 
 
Newman and Llera’s (2011) contrast avoidance model of worry posits that worry 
may not enable emotional avoidance per se. Instead, Newman and Llera propose 
that individuals with GAD use worry as a coping strategy because it is more 
comfortable for them to experience the chronic distress associated with worry - 
which enables them to perceive that they are prepared for the worst outcome - than 
it is to experience a shift from a positive to a negative emotion. They believe that 
individuals with GAD use worry to avoid a negative affect contrast (a shift from a 
positive to a negative emotional state) but not a positive one. Their model derives 
from a review of cognitive psychology literature on affective contrast theory, which 
states that the impact of an emotional experience is determined by its degree of 
contrast with the preceding affective state (Bacon, Rood, & Washburn, 1914), 
together with their own findings. This led them to theorise that individuals with GAD 
have developed a stronger aversive reaction and are even more sensitive to 
negative emotional contrasts than individuals without GAD, and that avoidance of 
negative emotional contrast positively reinforces their worry (Newman & Llera, 
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2011). To test this theory, they replicated their previous study (Llera & Newman, 
2010a) and found that participants with GAD reported finding worry more helpful 
than neutral or relaxation conditions at helping them cope with the negative 
emotions evoked by watching film clips. Ironically, participants with GAD also rated 
their total level of negative affect as being significantly higher than the control group 
(Llera & Newman, 2010b). Newman and Llera assert that these findings highlight 
that participants with GAD found the avoidance of negative emotional contrast 
helpful rather than avoidance of negative emotion per se. They suggest that this 
may be fundamental in understanding why individuals with GAD neither avoid nor 
process negative emotions.  
 
Further research is required to identify elements of the model and risk factors that 
are unique to GAD, as theories for other psychiatric disorders posit similar 
mechanisms (Newman et al., 2013).  
 
1.3.3.1.5   Cognitive model of GAD 
 
The cognitive model proposed by Dugas and colleagues asserts that intolerance of 
uncertainty (IU) is fundamental to GAD’s development and maintenance (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007). Dugas and Robichaud (2007) define IU as "a dispositional 
characteristic that results from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 
implications" (p. 24). They suggest that it contributes to the other three main 
components of the model: positive beliefs about worry, negative problem 
orientation, and cognitive avoidance, and that all four components maintain worry. 
Negative problem orientation refers to a set of beliefs about one’s cognitive 
approach to problem-solving, such as doubting one’s problem-solving abilities, 
finding perceived problems threatening, and negatively appraising the problem’s 
outcome. Cognitive avoidance refers to strategies employed to avoid threatening 
cognitions and unpleasant autonomic activation, such as automatic avoidance of 
threatening mental images, suppressing worrisome thoughts, and avoiding 
situations that may trigger worry.   
 
A growing body of evidence supports this model (see literature review by Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007). IU and negative problem orientation predicted GAD symptom 
severity in a clinical sample of individuals with GAD (Dugas, Savard, Gaudet, 
Turcotte, Laugesen, Robichaud, Francis, & Koerner, 2007). However, findings from 
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other studies indicate that IU is not a phenomenon specific to GAD; it also appears 
to characterise OCD (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Tolin, Abramowitz, 
Brigidi, & Foa, 2003).  
 
1.3.3.1.6   Metacognitive model of GAD 
 
Wells’ (1995, 1999, 2004, 2005) metacognitive model places negative 
metacognitive beliefs about worry and the resultant meta-worry (worrying about 
worry) as central in GAD’s development and maintenance. The model posits that 
when individuals are initially faced with an anxiety-provoking situation, positive 
beliefs about worry are produced (e.g., believing that worry will help them cope with 
the situation). Wells (2005) termed this process Type 1 worry. During Type 1 worry, 
negative beliefs about worry are activated (for Wells’ numerous theories on how 
negative beliefs about worry develop, see Wells, 1995). Individuals with GAD begin 
to believe that their worry is uncontrollable and inherently dangerous, and 
consequently begin worrying about worry. Wells (2005) termed this meta-worry 
Type 2 worry. Type 2 worry is posited to be associated with numerous ineffective 
coping strategies, aimed at avoiding worrying via attempts to control behaviours, 
cognitions, and emotions (Wells, 1999, 2004). Engaging in these strategies 
prevents the individual from experiencing events that may provide evidence to 
disconfirm the belief that worry is uncontrollable and dangerous. Furthermore, the 
coping strategies employed by individuals with GAD to control their cognitions and 
worry (e.g., thought suppression) are often unsuccessful. These individuals may 
consequently lose confidence in their ability to control their worry, thus reinforcing 
the belief that worrying is uncontrollable and dangerous (Wells, 1999). Meta-worry 
also increases anxiety symptoms. If individuals misinterpret these symptoms as 
further confirmation that worrying is uncontrollable and dangerous, meta-worry is 
maintained (Wells, 2005). 
 
Empirical support for the model is mixed. The specificity of negative beliefs about 
worry and meta-worry to GAD remains unclear. While several studies have 
demonstrated that individuals with GAD experience more negative beliefs about 
worry and meta-worry than individuals without an anxiety disorder diagnosis (Davis 
& Valentiner, 2000; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004; Wells, 2005), others have shown that 
individuals with GAD experience similar levels of negative beliefs about worry and 
meta-worry as those with OCD (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) and panic 
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disorder (Wells & Carter, 2001). Furthermore, no longitudinal work has examined 
any components of the model, even though the model attempts to conceptualise the 
fundamental mechanisms involved in GAD’s development and maintenance (Behar, 
DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009).  
 
1.3.3.2   Socio-cultural factors 
 
1.3.3.2.1   Adverse life events (ALEs) 
 
Newman et al. (2013) assert that experiencing ALEs can make the individual 
question their perception of the world as predictable and safe. This results in a 
continuous state of anxiety that enables the individual to feel prepared for other 
potentially unpredictable events. Bateson, Brilot, and Nettle (2011) argue that ALEs 
serve to increase the individual’s vulnerability to potential threats in one or more 
ways which, in turn, induces anxiety. For example, if someone experiences a 
financial crisis, they are vulnerable to numerous potential situations such as 
insufficient funds to cover living expenses.  
 
Findings from several studies support this proposed causality. Kendler, Hettema, 
Butera, Gardner, and Prescott (2003) assessed stressful life events that were 
blindly rated on the following dimensions: humiliation, entrapment, real or imagined 
loss of a person, health, material objects, or respect in the community, and danger. 
Onsets of pure GAD were predicted by higher ratings of loss and danger.  
 
Hoven et al. (2005) conducted a survey of 8236 New York public school students in 
grades four to twelve with the aim of determining prevalence and correlates of 
probable anxiety and depressive disorders, six months after the September 11, 
2001, terror attack. Higher levels of exposure to the attack corresponded with higher 
prevalence for all probable anxiety and depressive disorders, including GAD, 
suggesting that there is a relationship between level of exposure to trauma and 
likelihood of childhood GAD. However, this finding must be interpreted with caution 
due to the unavailability of pre-event prevalence rates for the sampled population. 
Furthermore, this study used a diagnostic assessment measure designed for 
screening purposes, not diagnosis, thus this finding is restricted to probable, as 
opposed to definite, cases of GAD (Hoven et al., 2005).  
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A recent US study tested the hypothesis that ALEs are associated with increased 
risk of anxiety disorder onset and produced similar findings. Of the 1321 participants 
with GAD, 916 had experienced at least one ALE three years prior to GAD onset, 
suggesting that ALEs do play a role. Injury, and illness or death of a family member 
or close friend had the strongest associations with GAD onset (Miloyan, Bienvenu, 
Brilot, & Eaton, 2018).  
 
1.3.3.2.2   Family environments and parenting styles 
 
In addition to one-off or infrequent ALEs, negative familial experiences, that are 
often more chronic in nature, are potential risk factors for the development of GAD 
(Newman et al., 2013).  
 
Insecure attachment is one such factor. Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall (1978) 
developed the Strange Situation: a validated method of determining an infant’s 
attachment behaviours to his/her primary caregiver. During the procedure, the 
infant’s responses to the sequence of episodes detailed in Table 1.1 below, are 
observed. 
 
Results of the Strange Situation categorise infant behaviours into three attachment 
styles: secure attachment, anxious-ambivalent insecure attachment, and anxious-
avoidant insecure attachment. During the Strange Situation, the securely attached 
infant engages with the stranger if their caregiver is nearby, cries when their 
caregiver leaves the room, happily reunites with their caregiver when he/she returns 
and does not engage with the stranger if the caregiver is not nearby. Ainsworth et 
al. (1978) theorise that secure attachment is marked by both a positive, close 
relationship with the primary caregiver (who responds appropriately to the infant’s 
needs), and the infant’s willingness to independently explore his/her surroundings. 
In contrast, the anxious-ambivalent infant becomes distressed when the stranger 
enters the room, regardless of whether the caregiver is nearby or not. They exhibit 
extreme anxiety and distress when their caregiver leaves the room. However, when 
the caregiver returns, the infant is resistant to reuniting with them. Ainsworth et al. 
propose that infants with this insecure attachment style have inconsistent or 
intrusive caregivers, and thus likely experience affective fluctuations in response to 
their caregiver’s inconsistent behaviour. Uncertainty about whether their needs will 
be met, together with the distress evoked by their consequent affective fluctuations, 
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may lead children with anxious-ambivalent attachment to experience continuous 
internalised anxiety as a way of preparing themselves for their caregiver’s 
unpredictability (Newman et al., 2013). Finally, during the Strange Situation, the 
anxious-avoidant infant does not show interest in any of the adults in the room, 
regardless of which adults are present. They tend to avoid or ignore the caregiver, 
whether the stranger is nearby or not. Ainsworth et al. theorise that these infants are 
rejected by their caregivers. Despite the anxiety triggered by this rejection, these 
infants develop the belief that their caregivers will not respond to their signals of 
distress and need, and therefore avoid communicating their affect.  
 
Episode 
number 
Brief description of episode Episode duration 
1 Observer introduces caregiver and infant to 
experimental room, shows caregiver where to sit, shows 
infant toys, then leaves 
30 seconds 
2 Caregiver is non-participant while infant explores. If 
necessary, play is stimulated after two minutes 
3 minutes 
3 Stranger enters. First minute: Stranger silent. Second 
minute: Stranger converses with caregiver. Third minute: 
Stranger approaches infant. After three minutes, 
caregiver leaves unobtrusively 
3 minutes 
4 Stranger lets infant play but offers comfort if needed. 
Episode shortened if infant becomes too distressed 
3 minutes or less 
5 Mother greets and/or comforts infant. Stranger then 
leaves. Caregiver tries to settle infant again in play. 
Caregiver then leaves saying "bye-bye" 
3 minutes or more 
6 Caregiver leaves infant alone in the room. Episode 
ended if infant is too distressed 
3 minutes or less 
7 Stranger enters the room, greets infant and then 
pauses. Stranger sits or comforts infant if infant is upset. 
Episode ended if infant is too distressed 
3 minutes or less 
8 Caregiver enters, greets and picks infant up. Meanwhile, 
stranger leaves unobtrusively 
3 minutes 
 
Table 1.1   Episodes of the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978) 
 
Cassidy (1995) drew from Bowlby’s (1973) attachment theory to hypothesise that 
GAD can develop in insecurely attached children because, no matter what the 
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source of their anxiety, the child may lack confidence that their caregiver will be 
available to reduce the child’s anxiety in times of threat. This leads to negative 
interpersonal perceptions (e.g., fear of rejection) in adult interpersonal relationships 
(Cassidy, Lichenstein-Phelps, Sibrava, Thomas, & Borkovec, 2009).  
 
Numerous studies have shown that children with insecure attachments to their 
primary caregiver are at risk of developing GAD (see literature review by Hudson & 
Rapee, 2004), but few have examined the relationship between specific attachment 
styles and GAD development (Newman et al., 2013). Mickelson, Kessler, and 
Shaver (1997) examined data from the NCS and found that GAD was positively 
associated with both anxious-avoidant and anxious-ambivalent attachment, and 
negatively associated with secure attachment. Similarly, in a Dutch sample of 12 to 
14-year-olds, those who classified themselves as securely attached had the lowest 
GAD scores. Participants who classified themselves as ambivalently attached had 
higher GAD scores than those who classified themselves as avoidantly attached 
(Muris, Meesters, van Melick, & Zwambag, 2001). In contrast to this last finding, a 
prospective study examined the degree to which new GAD episodes could be 
predicted by preceding attachment patterns in adult females. Angry-dismissive 
attachment (a subdivision of anxious-avoidant attachment, in which individuals are 
mistrustful of others, exhibit anger, and have little desire for close interpersonal 
relationships) was most strongly associated with new GAD episodes (Bifulco, Kwon, 
Jacobs, Moran, Bunn, & Beer, 2006).  
 
There appears to be a lack of conclusive evidence about which of the two insecure 
attachment styles is more predictive of GAD development. Newman, Shin, and 
Zuellig (2016) propose a possible explanation; the existence of subgroups within 
GAD who identify with distinct insecure attachment styles, whereas Newman et al. 
(2013) suggest that both ambivalent attachment and inconsistent parenting may 
play a role in GAD’s development.  
 
Other studies have demonstrated that high levels of enmeshment with the primary 
caregiver characterise the childhood experiences of adults with GAD (Cassidy et al., 
2009; Peasley, Molina, & Borkovec, 1994). In this context, enmeshed caregiver-
child relationships are marked by role reversal, in which the child attends to their 
caregiver’s needs without necessarily having their own needs met in return (Dugas 
et al., 2018). Children are emotionally ill-equipped to adopt this role. The child’s fear 
is compounded by having to care for their unavailable attachment figure. Moreover, 
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it is unlikely that an attachment figure unable to care for themselves would instil a 
sense of security in the child. High levels of enmeshment are thus particularly likely 
to result in enduring anxiety (Cassidy et al., 2009).  
 
Negative parenting behaviours have also been associated with GAD’s development. 
Controlling behaviours such as love withdrawal, isolating, or shaming the child 
invalidate the child’s emotions and experiencing. This may undermine the child’s 
emotional development, thus contributing to emotion regulation difficulties, negative 
contrast avoidance, and heightened anxiety symptoms (Newman et al., 2013). 
Cassidy et al. (2009) found that retrospective reports of maternal and paternal 
coldness and rejection were associated with adult GAD, while in a Dutch community 
sample of adolescents, perceived parental behavioural and psychological control 
was associated with self-reported GAD symptoms (Wijsbroek, Hale, Raaijmakers, & 
Meeus, 2011). However, this latter finding must be interpreted with caution because 
it is unclear whether the participants’ primary caregivers did become more 
controlling in response to their child’s GAD symptomology, or whether cognitive 
threat biases (a common characteristic of GAD) increased the participants’ 
perceptions of controlling behaviour (Newman et al., 2013; Wijsbroek et al., 2011).  
 
GAD in children and adolescents has been associated with harsh parental discipline 
(Shanahan, Copeland, Costello, & Angold, 2008), over-protection, and pressure 
(Beesdo, Pine, et al., 2010; Nordahl, Wells, Olsson, & Bjerkeset, 2010). Newman et 
al. (2013) propose that the combination of these three parental behaviours may 
impede the child’s development of autonomy and communicate that he/she is 
incapable of handling challenging situations without parental intervention. If children 
internalise this message of being unable to cope with unanticipated negative events 
and the resultant affect fluctuations, they may anticipate all potential negative 
events to ensure that they are emotionally prepared for all possibilities.  
 
1.3.3.2.3   Childhood physical or sexual abuse 
 
Physical or sexual abuse may cause the child to develop an aversion to emotional 
contrast due to the unpredictability of when the next abusive act will occur. 
Continuous negative affect becomes more comfortable for the individual than 
repeated fluctuations between euthymic and negative emotional states (Newman et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, abusive experiences may cause the child to develop beliefs 
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that the world is a dangerous place and that they have little control over what 
happens to them (Cougle, Timpano, Sachs-Ericsson, Keough, & Riccardi, 2010).  
Safren, Gershuny, Marzol, Otto, and Pollack (2002) examined the prevalence of 
self-reported childhood physical or sexual abuse in a sample of adults presenting for 
treatment of panic disorder, Social anxiety disorder, or GAD. 25% of participants 
with a primary diagnosis of GAD reported childhood histories of sexual or physical 
abuse, compared to 18% of those with pure GAD. This study’s narrow demographic 
and low sample size (149 participants, 28 of whom had a primary diagnosis of GAD) 
not only makes it difficult to reliably compare these findings with others but also 
prevents examination of whether the association between GAD and childhood 
abuse is due to physical or sexual abuse. A more recent study aimed to address 
these limitations by examining the unique relationships between anxiety disorders, 
including GAD, and childhood physical and sexual abuse, using data from the NCS-
Replication. Childhood history of physical or sexual abuse was associated with 
increased risk of lifetime GAD. GAD was uniquely associated with sexual abuse 
after controlling for physical abuse, but it was not uniquely associated with physical 
abuse after controlling for sexual abuse (Cougle et al., 2010).  
 
1.3.3.2.4   Family history of anxiety disorders 
 
In McLaughlin, Behar, and Borkovec’s (2008) study, 53% of individuals with GAD 
reported having at least one family member with an anxiety disorder, suggesting 
that family history of anxiety disorders is a risk factor for GAD development.  
 
Hettema, Neale, and Kendler (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of family and twin 
studies and found that GAD has significant familial aggregation that is modestly 
explained by genes. Moreover, a significant number of participants with GAD had 
first-degree relatives (i.e., a parent, sibling, or child) with GAD. Similarly, Beesdo, 
Pine, et al. (2010) found that parental GAD is a risk factor for GAD development. 
However, they also argue that parental GAD is not a risk factor for GAD alone; it is 
shared among all anxiety disorders.  
 
This last point raises the question of specificity; does having a relative with GAD 
increase the risk for GAD specifically or any anxiety disorder? Coelho, Cooper, and 
Murray (2007) found that GAD in participants did not independently predict GAD in 
their first-degree relatives, suggesting an absence of specificity. Rapee (2012) 
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proposes that less clear specificity for family aggregation of GAD may be attributed 
to GAD’s lower diagnostic reliability. 
 
1.3.3.3   Biological factors 
 
1.3.3.3.1   Genetic predisposition 
 
Several twin studies have examined the relative contribution of genetic 
predisposition in GAD’s aetiology. Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, and Eaves 
(1992) conducted a twin study involving 1033 female twin pairs and reported low 
heritability of GAD (19%-30%). Similarly, a later study that included male and 
female twins also estimated that heritability plays a relatively modest role; in the 
15%-20% range, with no effects of gender-specific genes detected (Hettema, 
Prescott, & Kendler, 2001). A slightly higher but still moderate estimate of GAD’s 
heritability (37.9%) was found in a study of middle-aged male twin pairs from the 
Vietnam Era Twin Registry (Scherrer, True, Xian, Lyons, Eisen, Goldberg, Lin, & 
Tsuang, 2000). As already mentioned, Hettema, Neale, and Kendler (2001) 
reported that genetics play a modest role in the familial aggregation of GAD. 
Considered together, these findings indicate that while genetic predisposition may 
play some role in GAD’s aetiology, environmental factors appear to play a 
predominant role (McLaughlin et al., 2008).  
 
1.3.3.3.2   Neurocognitive factors 
 
Neuroimaging studies have implicated various neural structures and circuitry in 
GAD’s pathophysiology. One group of researchers reported several brain metabolite 
findings across two studies. Individuals with GAD had elevated concentrations of N-
acetylaspartate/creatine in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared to 
controls; suggesting prefrontal cortical hypermetabolism in GAD (Mathew, Mao, 
Coplan, Smith, Sackeim, Gorman, & Shungu, 2004). GAD individuals had 
decreased choline and creatine plus phosphocreatine concentrations in the white 
matter of the centrum semiovale, suggesting that centrum semiovale hyperactivity 
characterises GAD (Coplan, Mathew, Mao, Smith, Hof, Coplan, Rosenblum, 
Gorman, & Shungu, 2006).  
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Etkin, Prater, Schatzberg, Menon, & Greicius (2009) found increased amygdala 
grey matter volume in adult individuals with GAD, suggesting hyperresponsivity of 
this limbic structure which mediates negative affect reactions, particularly fear. 
Similarly, Schienle, Ebner, and Schäfer (2011) found that relative to controls, adult 
participants with GAD had enlarged amygdala and right dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex volumes. Furthermore, participants’ self-reported symptom severity positively 
correlated with dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex volumes. 
These brain regions are associated with anticipatory anxiety, worry, and emotion 
regulation. Schienle et al. assert that it is unclear whether these volume 
abnormalities indicate a genetic predisposition for GAD, or a consequence of GAD-
specific behaviour such as chronic worrying.  
 
In contrast, Hettema, Kettenmann, Ahluwalia, McCarthy, Kates, Schmitt, Silberg, 
Neale, Kendler, and Fatouros (2012) propose that their findings provide preliminary 
support for the notion that GAD, and its genetic risk factors, are correlated with 
volumetric and spectroscopic changes in fear-related limbic structures (i.e., the 
amygdala and hippocampus) and their connections with the frontal cortex. They 
found that lifetime GAD is associated with increased creatine levels in the 
amygdala, smaller left hippocampal volume, and reduced fractional anisotropy (the 
degree of directional dependence of a diffusion process) in the uncinate fasciculus 
which connects the amygdala and frontal cortex.  
 
These tentative findings and opposing interpretations indicate that further work is 
required to understand the relationship between GAD development and 
neurocognition, including research that investigates whether certain neurocognitive 
abnormalities are associated with GAD’s genetic risk specifically or internalising 
disorders (characterised by a tendency to express distress within the self, not with 
others) in general (Hettema et al., 2012).  
 
1.3.4   GAD’s impact on the individual and society 
 
It is impossible to discuss the numerous ways GAD can affect the individual 
experiencer or wider society. Indeed, beyond complications such as GAD’s high 
rates of comorbidity and the difficulty in reliably assessing GAD’s diagnostic criteria, 
the reported experiences of individuals who meet criteria, vary greatly (Timulak & 
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McElvaney, 2018). I therefore provide a snapshot of GAD’s impact (see section 
1.3.8 for personal accounts of GAD). 
 
Dugas and Robichaud (2007) argue that GAD’s interference with daily life is often 
underestimated because, compared to other anxiety disorders, most individuals with 
GAD do not display marked behavioural interference, nor do they necessarily 
appear distressed or impaired by their symptoms. Instead, individuals with GAD 
tend to experience subtle yet equally persistent interferences (e.g., difficulty 
enjoying a weekend social event with friends because they are worried about the 
upcoming working week) that are equally detrimental to the individual’s quality of life 
(Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Indeed, GAD is a pervasive condition that often lasts 
more than ten years, with a relapse rate of over 50% (Holaway, Rodebaugh, & 
Heimberg, 2006).  
 
GAD interferes with work productivity (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), with one study 
reporting that approximately 33% of individuals with GAD showed a decrease in 
work productivity of at least 10%, with 11% reducing their productivity by half due to 
their GAD symptomology (Wittchen, Carter, Pfister, Montgomery, & Kessler, 2000).  
 
GAD is also independently associated with increased risks of lifetime suicidal 
ideation and lifetime suicide attempts (Thibodeau, Welch, Sareen, & Asmundson, 
2013). 
 
Individuals with GAD have one of the highest rates of healthcare use across the 
anxiety disorders and psychiatric disorders generally. In the NCS, 66% of 
individuals with GAD reported accessing professional help for their symptoms 
(Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994). Similarly, in the Australian National 
Survey of Mental Health and Well-being, 57% of individuals with GAD reported 
seeking help from healthcare professionals. Only 14% of these individuals consulted 
a mental health specialist (Hunt, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2002). Indeed, Dugas and 
Robichaud (2007) assert that individuals with GAD are more likely to consult 
medical specialists such as physicians, cardiologists, or gastroenterologists than 
mental health professionals, which often results in numerous unnecessary, costly 
medical tests.  
 
Despite its association with frequent healthcare use, GAD is significantly under-
detected and undertreated (Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). In the 2014 APMS, 48% of 
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individuals who met diagnostic criteria for GAD were receiving treatment. 30% were 
receiving medication only, 11% were receiving both medication and psychological 
therapy, and 7% were receiving psychological therapy only (McManus et al., 2016). 
These findings prompted me to review the mental health support available for 
individuals with GAD.  
 
1.3.5   Mental health support for adults with GAD 
 
This study’s inclusion criteria consisted of individuals aged eighteen and over, thus 
the following review is of available mental health support for this demographic only.  
 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) advocates a stepped-
care approach to GAD treatment in the UK (NICE, 2011). Current NICE clinical 
guidelines (NICE, 2011) recommend one of three "initial, low-intensity psychological 
interventions" for individuals aged eighteen and over with a diagnosis of GAD, 
whose symptoms have not improved following psychoeducation about GAD and 
active symptom monitoring. The options include an individual, non-facilitated self-
help course via book or computer program lasting five to fourteen weeks, an 
individual, guided self-help course supported by a trained practitioner, or six, weekly 
psychoeducational groups with other individuals with GAD, run by trained 
practitioners. All three interventions are informed by cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) principles. In cases where the individual’s symptoms are causing significant 
distress or initial treatment has not worked, NICE (2011) recommend either 
individual, "high-intensity" psychological intervention or drug treatment. One of two 
high-intensity psychological interventions are recommended: CBT for GAD or 
applied relaxation. In terms of pharmacological interventions, NICE primarily 
recommends the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) sertraline because it 
is the most cost-effective. However, it is not licensed for the treatment of GAD in the 
UK (NICE, 2017). If sertraline proves ineffective, the guidelines state that an 
alternative SSRI or a serotonin-noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor (SNRI) (e.g., 
paroxetine, venlafaxine) may be offered instead. If the individual is intolerant of 
SSRIs or SNRIs, pregabalin is recommended. The guidelines warn against 
prescribing a benzodiazepine for treating GAD, except as a short-term measure (up 
to 2-4 weeks) during a crisis. Antipsychotic use is also warned against (NICE, 
2011).  
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CBT is the most widely recognised psychological treatment of adult GAD (Timulak & 
McElvaney, 2018). It has been found to be more effective than waiting list controls, 
and slightly more effective than non-CBT therapies (Cuijpers, Sijbrandij, Koole, 
Huibers, Berking, & Andersson, 2014; Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013). 
However, not all clients benefit from CBT (Timulak & McElvaney, 2018). For 
example, in Hanrahan et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis of cognitive therapy for 
pathological worry in adults with GAD, 43% of participants were not classed as 
recovered, twelve months post-treatment. Different psychological therapy modalities 
and complementary therapies are consequently being developed and trialled with 
individuals with GAD. Some of these are discussed in the following two sections.  
 
1.3.6   Recent quantitative studies of adult GAD 
 
Advanced online searches of the British Library EThOS catalogue, ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses database, and City, University of London’s library using 
the terms generalised anxiety disorder, adults, and quantitative, led me to ample 
quantitative studies of adults with GAD, conducted within the past five years. Due to 
the volume of studies, I present a synopsis of this research. To decide which studies 
to include, I initially wrote a summary of each study in my research journal and then 
grouped them by research topic. My main objective was to highlight the stark 
imbalance between the amount of quantitative and qualitative literature on GAD, 
thus I did not believe it necessary to employ specific inclusion criteria. However, in 
order to provide a broad synopsis, I wanted to include every quantitative research 
topic. One or two studies (if there was significant study design variation within the 
broader, shared topic) on each topic were consequently selected at random.  
 
A substantial body of recent quantitative research has investigated potential 
underlying psychological processes and neuroanatomical mechanisms involved in 
GAD’s development and maintenance.  
 
Whittaker-Bork (2013) conducted a systematic literature review to investigate how 
IU, negative metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance are associated with, 
or predict worry severity and GAD in both clinical and non-clinical adult populations. 
Findings concerning IU’s potential unique role in predicting worry and GAD status 
were inconsistent, suggesting that it may also be present in other psychiatric 
disorders. In contrast, negative metacognitive beliefs were found to be a significant 
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and unique predictor of GAD as well as a significant mediator between worry and 
GAD. There was minimal evidence supporting the notion that experiential avoidance 
is an important construct in the development and maintenance of worry and GAD. 
However, a degree of evidence did indicate that there is an association between 
experiential avoidance, worry, and GAD, suggesting that experiential avoidance is a 
shared vulnerability factor among all psychiatric disorders. She also conducted a 
prospective study that examined the relative and unique contributions of three 
psychological models (the cognitive model of GAD, the metacognitive model, and 
the acceptance-based model) in predicting worry and GAD over time in a non-
clinical sample. Across the three models, only negative metacognitive beliefs about 
the danger of worry predicted worry and GAD, in addition to other known predictors 
(i.e., daily hassles and positive metacognitive beliefs about worry) which were 
controlled for. This finding suggests that metacognitive theory may increase our 
understanding of the factors responsible for worry and GAD maintenance.  
 
Webster (2016) investigated whether the relationship between ED and GAD is 
mediated by resilience. She also sought to contribute to the literature demonstrating 
that ED is a predictor of GAD development. 187 participants were recruited through 
online social media platforms, anxiety self-help groups, and forums. Participants 
completed six online questionnaires measuring resilience, ED, worry, GAD 
symptoms, and MDD. Based on their Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-Item scale 
(GAD-7) scores, participants were split into high and low GAD symptomology 
groups. Participants in the high GAD symptomology group had significantly higher 
ED scores, lower resilience scores, and were less likely to engage in adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies. ED was also a significant predictor of GAD 
symptomology. Although resilience was not found to mediate between ED and 
GAD, it partially mediated the relationship between ED and worry. This may indicate 
that different mechanisms underlie the pervasive worry seen in GAD, and GAD 
symptoms generally.   
 
Moon and Jeong (2015) evaluated alterations in white matter volume and its 
correlation with GAD symptom severity and duration in adults. Twenty-two 
individuals with a formal diagnosis of GAD and twenty-two age-matched, non-GAD 
controls participated. Individuals with GAD showed significantly reduced white 
matter volume, particularly in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is involved in 
cognitive functions including attention, working memory, and emotion regulation, the 
anterior limb of the internal capsule, which mediates anxiety, attention, working 
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memory, and association brain functions, and the midbrain. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex volume was negatively correlated with GAD participants’ GAD-7 scores. 
Females had significantly less orbitofrontal cortex volume than males. This region 
plays an important role in regulating anxiety and fear, integrating the senses, and 
social functioning. Moon and Jeong hypothesise that this gender difference is 
related to gender differences in GAD prevalence rates. They assert that together, 
these findings aid our understanding of the neuroanatomical mechanisms 
associated with the cognitive and emotion dysfunctions seen in GAD.  
 
Numerous recent studies have investigated the efficacy of available psychological 
treatments, including novel approaches, with a growing number focusing solely on 
older adults with GAD. This makes sense considering evidence indicating that GAD 
is the most common anxiety disorder in this age group.  
 
Underwood (2014) conducted a meta-analysis to evaluate the comparative 
effectiveness of numerous psychological treatments for pathological worry in GAD. 
Metacognitive-based CBT consistently showed superior effectiveness over all other 
treatments. However, most individuals who received psychological treatment still 
reported pathological worry post-treatment, even though clinicians assessed that 
they no longer met GAD diagnostic criteria. This finding may suggest that current 
treatments do not sufficiently address GAD’s underlying worry mechanisms, thus 
post-treatment worry may be a GAD relapse predictor.  
 
The rationale for integrating motivational interviewing (MI) with standard CBT in the 
treatment of GAD stems partly from observations that individuals with GAD hold 
positive beliefs about the value of worry and are consequently reluctant to relinquish 
it (Westra, Arkowitz, & Dozois, 2009). Westra, Constantino, and Antony (2016) 
conducted a randomised control trial (RCT) comparing the efficacy of CBT alone to 
MI-CBT. MI-CBT participants demonstrated a steeper rate of worry decline and 
general distress reduction than CBT-only participants. There were twice as many 
dropouts in the CBT-only group than the MI-CBT group. The odds of no longer 
meeting GAD diagnostic criteria were five times higher at twelve-months post-
treatment for MI-CBT participants than CBT-only participants. The researchers 
suggest that these findings further support the use of MI-CBT for GAD. They also 
highlight the importance of training therapists to recognise and respond to in-
session signs of resistance and ambivalence using MI principles including empathy, 
collaboration and preservation of client autonomy.  
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Although earlier studies have demonstrated that CBT-only is a less effective 
treatment of GAD in older (aged 55 and over) adults (Gould, Coulson, & Howard, 
2012; Hunot, Churchill, Teixeira, & Silva de Lima, 2007), Hall’s (2016) meta-analysis 
of 14 RCTs of CBT for GAD in older adults demonstrated that CBT is effective. 
However, there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that CBT is superior over 
other evidence-based psychological treatments.  
 
Miloyan, Byrne, and Pachana (2014) assert that diagnosis and treatment of GAD in 
older adults is particularly challenging, arguing that this is partly due to insufficient 
understanding of age influences on symptom presentation and diagnostic status. 
They consequently investigated the number and type of symptoms that best predict 
GAD across the lifespan by splitting participants into four age groups: 18-29, 30-44, 
45-64, and 65-98. Participants in each group were further divided into GAD and 
non-GAD worriers. They found that a distinct set of symptoms predicted GAD in 
each age group. Changes in the type and number of symptoms and 
sociodemographic variables that predicted GAD occurred gradually across the 
lifespan, with the fewest symptoms and sociodemographic variables predicting GAD 
in the 65-98 group. In this group, difficulty concentrating, feeling dizzy, and low 
personal income were all positive predictors of GAD. The researchers suggest that 
under-diagnosis of GAD in older adults may be partly attributed to their finding that 
this age group tend to endorse fewer symptoms that are qualitatively different. 
 
1.3.7   Recent qualitative studies of adult GAD 
 
The same search processes were replicated but this time for qualitative studies of 
adults with GAD conducted since 2013. Seven results were produced – a 
substantially lower figure than quantitative studies.  
 
Five studies investigated participants’ experiences of various GAD treatment 
processes and outcomes. One explored physiotherapists’ perceptions of their 
treatment for individuals with GAD, and one investigated the experiences of male 
partners of women with GAD. Each is summarised below.  
 
Golfinopoulos (2013) conducted semi-structured interviews with six adult females 
with a diagnosis of pure GAD, primarily exploring their experiences of combining an 
evidence-based psychological therapy (either CBT, acceptance and commitment 
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therapy, rational emotive behavioural therapy, exposure and response prevention, 
interpersonal psychotherapy, behavioural therapy, or cognitive therapy) with a 
complementary therapy (massage or yoga). Data were analysed using thematic 
analysis. All participants experienced GAD symptom relief once they had combined 
a weekly session of massage therapy or twice-weekly yoga with weekly 
psychological therapy sessions, attributing this to beliefs that the combined 
treatments complemented one another and addressed the whole person. 
 
Johansson, Michel, Andersson, and Paxling (2015) explored seven participants’ 
experiences of non-adherence (started treatment but did not complete it) to a 
guided, internet-delivered CBT program for GAD, with the aim of developing a new 
theory of how non-adherence occurs in internet-delivered psychological treatments. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted, and data were analysed using 
grounded theory. Their developed theory asserts that there is an incompatible 
relationship between participants’ perceptions of treatment (i.e., length of weekly 
text modules and exercises, difficulty understanding complex content, perceived 
therapist attitudes) and factors in their daily lives (i.e., how well the effort required to 
complete treatment fitted into their daily lives).  
 
Jonsson and Kjellgren (2017) investigated participants’ experiences of a twelve-
session flotation-REST (restricted environmental stimulation technique) program, 
during which the individual floats on their back in salt-saturated water in a dark, 
soundproof isolation tank. This treatment has been found to alleviate GAD 
symptoms (Kjellgren, Sundequist, Norlander, & Archer, 2001). Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with nine participants with GAD (as defined by self-report 
measures), after program completion. Data were analysed using the empirical 
phenomenological psychological method. As treatment progressed, deep 
physiological and psychological relaxation states were achieved. Thought 
processes also appeared to calm down with one participant commenting "when I 
float, it is just one thought at a time, not thousands" (p. 55).  
 
The following two studies used participants from the Westra et al. (2016) RCT 
presented in section 1.3.6. Morrison, Constantino, Westra, Kertes, Goodwin, and 
Antony (2017) used video-assisted interviews to investigate the treatment 
experiences of ten female participants (five from each treatment condition) who 
exhibited notable change ambivalence during an early therapy session. Data were 
analysed using a blended model of grounded theory and consensual qualitative 
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research. The findings appear to support the theory of resistance as an in-session, 
reciprocal process triggered by client perceptions of therapist beliefs and 
behaviours. 
 
Macaulay, Angus, Khattra, Westra, and Ip (2017) conducted post-therapy, semi-
structured interviews exploring experiences and explanations of shifts in therapy 
with eight participants who had achieved and maintained recovery from GAD at 12-
month follow-up. Data were analysed using a modified grounded theory approach. 
Participants experienced an increased sense of control over their anxiety and worry, 
and associated behaviours, including problematic relationship patterns and 
ineffective attempts to control uncertain or uncontrollable situations. Perceived shifts 
derived from new affective and relational therapeutic experiences that enabled 
participants to perceive themselves as active agents of change with the power to 
make choices across contexts, beyond therapy. These experiences included the 
therapist helping them to make sense of their problematic behaviours in terms of 
their former, perceived adaptive function as well as developing the participants’ 
capacities to differentiate emotions and respond adaptively.  
 
Danielsson, Scherman, and Rosberg (2013) conducted semi-structured interviews 
with ten physiotherapists working in psychiatry or primary healthcare. Data were 
analysed using qualitative content analysis. The resultant main category captured 
the notion that physiotherapy works through immediate, tangible bodily experiences 
that help individuals with GAD to endure anxiety instead of fighting it and to discern 
and understand different bodily sensations. This encourages an embodied self-trust 
in which anxiety is conceptualised as part of oneself rather than overflowing oneself. 
 
Lima (2013) explored the experiences of eight male partners of females with GAD, 
via semi-structured interviews. Data were analysed using the constant comparative 
method of grounded theory. All eight participants described altered, negative 
perceptions of their female partners from initial meeting to time of interview, 
including a decreased ability to cope with their partners’ GAD symptoms. 
Participants experienced a reduction in social activities, partly attributing this to the 
guilt they felt in response to their partners’ discomfort in social situations. 
None of these studies focused solely on the lived experience of GAD. Although 
Golfinopoulos (2013) did enquire about participants’ GAD onsets and believed 
causes, she primarily explored their experiences of combined therapies with the aim 
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of highlighting effective, alternative GAD treatments. In fact, I could not find any 
empirical research that has exclusively explored the lived experience of GAD. 
 
1.3.8   Published (or self-published) personal accounts of GAD 
 
An increasing number of individuals with GAD are publishing personal accounts of 
their experiences via various mass media resources, all of which help to provide 
insights into GAD. Here, I present a snapshot of three accounts.  
 
As part of Project UROK (an inclusive community committed to ending the stigma 
and isolation associated with mental illness in teenagers and young adults), the 
actor, writer, and producer Wil Wheaton posted a video on YouTube, talking about 
his experiences of GAD and chronic depression (Wheaton, 2015). He describes 
being unaware of how his "mental illness" was affecting him until he had been 
"suffering" from it for "easily" fifteen to twenty years. He sought help from a 
psychiatrist six or seven years ago following a negative experience at a crowded 
airport. He describes "freaking out" at the thought of missing his flight and wanted to 
cancel his upcoming show instead of remaining at the airport. His wife had observed 
how he would repeatedly make such "irrational decisions". After almost two weeks 
of starting prescribed medication, he felt like he was on his way to leading a "normal 
life" in which he was not "constantly worrying about things".  
 
Zoe McWilliams wrote a blog post for Mind. She describes being "finally" diagnosed 
with GAD and panic attacks in 2007 after "countless doctors’ appointments". 
Following her father’s death, she began having thoughts such as "how could dad, at 
the age of 56, not be here anymore? How will I cope without him?". These thoughts 
gradually took over her life until her anxiety felt so overwhelming that she thought 
she was "going mad" (McWilliams, 2016). Now, she describes going through 
periods of feeling "absolutely fine" and then: 
 
"BANG, like a bolt out of the blue, the thoughts, the anxiety, the panic, it appears from 
nowhere as if almost to say; ‘here I am, don’t forget about me’, and so the cycle 
continues" (McWilliams, 2016).  
 
Rachel Hawkins was diagnosed with GAD in 2015. She wrote a blog post for The 
Huffington Post UK. She writes about wanting to remain open and honest about 
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how her mental health affects her daily life, stating that this is not only cathartic but 
hopefully helps "break down the stigma" (Hawkins, 2017). She summarises her 
experience of GAD: 
 
"Generalised anxiety disorder is scary. It makes your fears and your worries seem 
real. At its worst, it has left me feeling irritable, tense, and exhausted. Exhausted from 
the incessant worry, exhausted from the constant ‘what if’s?’ circling my brain" 
(Hawkins, 2017).  
 
1.4   Study rationale and contribution to counselling psychology 
 
Despite the growth in self-publishing, literature (especially empirical research) 
investigating the lived experiences of adults with GAD is limited. This paucity is 
concerning considering GAD’s high prevalence rates, together with evidence that it 
is often under-diagnosed and under-treated. Dugas and Robichaud (2007) assert 
that clinicians often struggle to recognise the symptoms as belonging to GAD; a 
difficulty compounded by the various ways in which individuals with GAD present for 
treatment as well as GAD’s high rate of comorbidity. Even when GAD is correctly 
diagnosed, treatment is not always effective. Considered together, this information 
highlights the need for a greater understanding of GAD.   
 
This study sought to address the gap in the literature, and thus contribute to this 
need, by answering the following question: what is the lived experience of adults 
with a formal diagnosis of GAD? My aim was to understand how these individuals 
make sense of their lived experience. 
 
Exploration of this topic will enable clinicians, including counselling psychologists, to 
develop a greater understanding of the lived experience of GAD which, in turn, will 
increase their ability to correctly identify GAD in adults and effectively support 
individual treatment needs. By giving these individuals a voice and increasing 
awareness of GAD, I hope that more adults with suspected GAD are encouraged to 
seek help from clinicians, particularly mental health professionals, sooner.   
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1   Rationale for a qualitative perspective 
 
In selecting a qualitative paradigm, it was fundamental to consider the answers 
qualitative research would provide my research question. Qualitative research aims 
to be exploratory, producing rich descriptions of experience that contain meaning. 
Unlike quantitative research, it is not interested in establishing causal relationships, 
universal laws or ‘truths’, but rather seeks to describe and understand how 
phenomena are experienced by individuals and how they make sense of their 
experiences (Finlay, 2011; Willig, 2013). The qualitative paradigm consequently 
coincides with my research aim of understanding how adults with a formal diagnosis 
of GAD make sense of their lived experience. 
 
2.2   Employing a phenomenological approach 
 
A phenomenological approach was employed because it argues that in order to 
understand individuals and their worlds, attention must be paid to their conscious, 
lived-experiences (Cooper, 2017). Lived experience can be defined as an active, 
passive living through of experience (van Manen, 2017). A phenomenological 
research question asks: what is this lived experience like? (van Manen, 2017). This 
approach consequently aligns with my research aim of understanding the lived 
experience of adults with GAD. Before introducing my chosen data collection 
method and method of analysis, I elaborate on the philosophical and psychological 
perspectives of phenomenology that informed my research strategy.  
 
2.2.1   What is phenomenology? 
 
Phenomenology, in contemporary terms, is the philosophy initiated by Edmund 
Husserl at the start of the twentieth century. It is the study of activities of 
consciousness, and the objects that present themselves to consciousness. In basic 
terms, consciousness is the medium between a person and the world (Giorgi, 
2012). In 1874, Franz Brentano proposed that all objects (phenomena) are 
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correlated with an act of consciousness. The object (phenomenon) in question can 
therefore be examined in relation to the act of consciousness being directed 
towards it. He named this principle intentionality (Brentano, 1995). Husserl 
incorporated the notion of intentionality into his philosophical method (Giorgi, 2012). 
In this method, Husserl was interested in consciousness as such. Human 
consciousness was perceived, like objects, to be mere presences (phenomena). To 
conduct phenomenological research from a psychological perspective, he adapted 
his method to coincide with psychologists’ interest into how acts of human 
consciousness relate to a specifically human, social world. While the objects of 
consciousness are still perceived as phenomena in his phenomenological 
psychology method, the acts of consciousness to which they are related are 
construed as belonging to a human, social world-related consciousness (Giorgi, 
2007). Phenomenology does not dictate to phenomena, but rather seeks to 
understand how phenomena present themselves to consciousness (Giorgi, 2012). 
For phenomenologists, there is no thing-in-itself, there are only experienced 
phenomena. The experience of a phenomenon, as opposed to the perception that 
the phenomenon itself exists, relies on the phenomenon appearing to the 
experiencer (Giorgi, 2017). Indeed, Giorgi (2017) describes the key meaning of 
phenomenon as "that which appears to someone" (p. 104).  
 
In 1936, Husserl introduced the notion of the Lebenswelt or life-world (Husserl, 
1936/1970). Also known as the world of everyday life it is: 
 
"The total sphere of experiences of an individual which is circumscribed by the 
objects, persons, and events encountered in the pursuit of the pragmatic objectives of 
living. It is a "world" in which a person is "wide-awake", and which asserts itself as the 
"paramount reality" of his life" (Wagner, 1970, p. 320).   
 
As humans, we engage in the life-world; doing, being and experiencing. This 
engagement is largely pre-reflective, meaning that we do not often reflect on what 
our experience means because we are in, what Husserl termed, the natural attitude, 
where experiences are lived through (Finlay, 2011). Referring back to Husserl’s 
application of intentionality, a focus on the life-world highlights the intentional 
relationship between conscious, meaning-making humans, and the taken-for-
granted, humanly relational (inter-subjective) world, which is full of meanings 
(Todres, Galvin, & Dahlberg, 2007). Todres et al. (2007) describe how this relational 
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reality means that "there is no objective world in itself, nor an inner, subjective world 
in itself; there is only a world-to-consciousness" (p. 55). 
 
Taking the life-world concept further, Todres et al. (2007) describe its holistic 
quality; it is full of interrelated dimensions. They explain how several theorists 
further developed Husserl’s consideration of the life-world constituents, each person 
differing slightly in how they named and divided them up. My method of data 
collection was semi-structured interviews. My interview schedule was informed by 
five of Ashworth’s (2003, 2015) life-world dimensions, which he calls fractions to 
emphasise that they are mutually entailed. The sixth life-world dimension, that of 
material objects, was developed by van den Berg (1972).  
 
In the following two sub-sections, I explain why my interview schedule was informed 
by the concept of life-world dimensions and introduce the six dimensions I included. 
I then detail the process of choosing my method of data analysis: interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA).  
 
2.2.2   Use of life-world dimensions  
 
Ashworth (2015) argues that phenomena are not free-floating. Any experience is 
"inevitably interwoven with the rest of the individual’s life-world" (p. 20). He 
proposes that in any life-world, there are necessary fractions (dimensions). My 
participants’ lived experiences of GAD are intertwined with these life-world 
dimensions, thus to understand their lived experiences, I had to examine their life-
worlds. Ashworth proposes that actively investigating the life-world dimensions 
enriches the descriptions of the phenomenon in question. As Giorgi (2012) 
suggests, descriptions are required to understand how phenomena present 
themselves to consciousness. I therefore decided to consider the phenomenon of 
GAD within the context of the participants’ life-worlds, and with reference to the 
following dimensions. The exact phrasing of the interview questions is discussed in 
section 2.4.3.   
 
Selfhood: This fraction addresses how the experienced phenomenon affects the 
individual’s sense of self (Ashworth, 2015). A person’s sense of self is inevitably 
part of sociality; it is informed by our interactions with others (Ashworth, 2003). I 
therefore asked participants two questions based on selfhood; one concerning 
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participants’ perceived sense of self, and one concerning their perceptions of how 
others perceive them.  
 
Sociality: This fraction considers how others are implicated in an experience, and 
whether the individual’s experience affects their interpersonal relationships 
(Ashworth, 2015).  
 
Embodiment: This fraction addresses how the individual’s experience relates to 
their feelings about their own body; the body as lived (Ashworth, 2003).  
 
Temporality: This fraction considers how the individual’s sense of time is affected 
by their experience of the phenomenon in question (Ashworth, 2003).  
 
Material objects: This dimension addresses how the individual’s experience relates 
to their perceptions of material objects (van den Berg, 1972).  
 
Spatiality: This fraction is concerned with how the experienced phenomenon 
relates to the individual’s perceptions of the geography of the places (situations) 
they frequent and act within (Ashworth, 2003). This geography is not just physical. 
There are social norms and multiple meanings associated with situations (Ashworth, 
2015).  
 
These particular dimensions were chosen for several reasons. It would have been 
impractical to ask questions based on every proposed dimension across theorists. It 
was also important to consider the length and exact phrasing of the interview 
questions. Certain dimensions were disregarded due to their associated question 
properties; they were too lengthy or contained connectives; both of which may have 
confused participants. While I did assume that the chosen lifeworld dimensions 
would be relevant and of interest to the phenomenon of GAD across participants, 
my overarching aim was to remain open to their life-world experiences in their 
entirety (Finlay, 2011). Moreover, I held in mind the phenomenological perspectives 
that influenced my research design. The phenomenological researcher must first 
engage in the phenomenological epoché. This means that the researcher monitors 
and restrains all knowledge that is not based on the acts of consciousness being 
considered (Giorgi, 2017). I therefore restrained personal assumptions that a 
particular included dimension or set of dimensions would be dominant in the life-
world context of GAD (Ashworth, 2015).  
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2.2.3   Use of IPA 
 
In this section, I discuss the process of choosing IPA. I have not discussed the 
claims IPA’s founders make about its theoretical underpinnings in phenomenology 
and hermeneutics here, as this merits separate discussion. 
 
In selecting the method of data analysis, it was important for me to consider the 
types of information concerning the participants’ lived experiences the method 
would provide. 
 
Grounded theory was considered but quickly discarded. It aims to construct theories 
about the phenomenon in question (Charmaz & Henwood, 2008). More specifically, 
grounded theorists are interested in how an individual’s actions contribute to the 
way in which he/she manages a particular social situation. This research aim 
assumes that social events and processes have an objective reality, while 
simultaneously assuming that the individual’s interpretation of events shape their 
consequences (Willig, 2013). Grounded theory was discarded for two reasons. Its 
assumptions contradict the phenomenological perspective that there is no thing-in-
itself only experienced phenomena (Giorgi, 2017), and that experiencing is pre-
reflective (Finlay, 2011). Furthermore, I felt it important to give voice to my 
participants’ idiographic lived experiences of GAD, particularly considering the fact 
that very little research has been conducted with this aim. I did not wish to construct 
a new, socially or psychologically contextualised theory of GAD that would provide 
an explanatory framework with which to understand this phenomenon (Willig, 2013).  
 
Foucauldian discourse analysis was discarded for similar reasons. This approach 
argues that phenomena are constructed through language and other symbolic 
practices. It therefore seeks to understand how discursive constructions and 
practices influence the ways in which individuals experience themselves and their 
world (Willig, 2013). Like grounded theory, these assumptions contradict the 
phenomenological perspective that, as humans, we do not think about or 
phenomenologically reflect on our experiences while we live them. Rather, as soon 
as we reflect on a lived experience, the living moment has already gone, and we 
can only retrospectively try to recover the experience and then reflect on the 
primordiality of what the experience was like in that moment and how it gave itself to 
our consciousness (van Manen, 2017). I wanted to understand what the 
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participants’ lived experiences of GAD are like. To achieve this aim, the participants’ 
raw moments of lived experience were brought into focus through their retrospective 
descriptions. My goal was to orient these descriptions to the lived meanings that 
arise in their lived experiences (van Manen, 2017). I did not wish to understand how 
their experiences are (retrospectively) constructed through language.  
  
My consideration of phenomenological perspectives, together with my commitment 
to giving voice to the participants’ idiographic lived experiences, narrowed my focus 
towards two methods of analysis: IPA and reflective lifeworld research.  
 
IPA is idiographic; it is committed to the detailed examination of the particular case. 
It can inform us of the meaning of an experience for the particular individual (Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). As already mentioned, experiencing is largely pre-
reflective. Participants are therefore privileged concerning what they experienced, 
but not necessarily its meaning. Participants describe their experiences from the 
perspective of everyday life; from the perspective of the natural attitude (Giorgi, 
2008). To identify the meanings expressed in my participants’ descriptions, my own 
acts of consciousness were required to understand the data. Furthermore, I aimed 
to understand the data from a psychological perspective (Giorgi, 2017). 
Interpretation is employed in IPA to identify the meanings (Smith et al., 2009). As 
opposed to the descriptive attitude, which does not add or subtract anything from 
the description, but rather describes what presents itself precisely as it presents 
itself, interpretation involves adding in another factor such as a theoretical 
perspective, assumption, or hypothesis to account for the data (Giorgi, 1992). IPA’s 
founders do stress however, that researcher interpretations must remain grounded 
in the participants’ descriptions (Smith et al., 2009).  
 
As discussed further in section 2.2.4 below, IPA has been criticised for claiming to 
be a phenomenological approach despite not being based in the method of 
philosophical phenomenology (Giorgi, 2010, 2011). In contrast, reflective lifeworld 
research is rooted in philosophical phenomenology (Dahlberg, Dahlberg, & 
Nyström, 2007). The aim of reflective lifeworld research is to allow the phenomenon 
in question and its meanings to be illuminated and understood. To achieve this, the 
researcher adopts an open, bridled attitude towards the phenomenon (Dahlberg et 
al., 2007). Openness involves having the patience to allow the phenomenon to 
reveal its complexity rather than imposing an external structure on it (e.g., theories 
or models). Bridling refers to managing the natural attitude so that the researcher’s 
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assumptions and pre-understandings of the phenomenon can be interrogated. This 
enables the phenomenon’s otherness to present itself to consciousness (Dahlberg 
et al., 2007). Reflective lifeworld research can highlight the essential, and therefore 
general, structure of meanings that constitute the phenomenon in question. Without 
these characteristics and consequent meanings, the phenomenon would be an 
entirely different phenomenon. Like IPA, this approach can also highlight the 
individual meanings contained within this general structure that particularise the 
phenomenon as a whole (Dahlberg et al., 2007).  
 
I spent considerable time weighing up the pros and cons of both methods. 
Reflective lifeworld research appealed to me because it is based on philosophical 
phenomenology and is therefore more truly phenomenological (Giorgi, 2010, 2011; 
van Manen, 2017). Furthermore, it can highlight the general structure of the 
meanings of GAD (the lived experience of GAD) as well as the individual meanings 
that particularise GAD as a whole. However, analysis is less structured than IPA 
and heavily relies on researcher intuition (Dahlberg, Drew, & Nyström, 2001). As a 
novice qualitative researcher, relying on my own intuition in the absence of a 
systematic analytic method felt too unsettling.  
 
IPA not only enabled me to identify the meaning of each participant’s lived 
experience (and thus corresponded with my research aim), its systematic analytic 
method also provided me a sense of comforting guidance. Moreover, IPA 
acknowledges that, as a counselling psychologist in training, I inevitably interpreted 
the data from a psychological perspective. These three factors governed my 
decision to employ IPA over reflective lifeworld research. 
 
2.2.4   Giorgi’s critique of IPA’s theoretical underpinnings 
 
While I believe my decision to employ IPA was appropriate because it corresponded 
with my research aim, I also believe it necessary to acknowledge the criticisms 
IPA’s founders have faced in claiming that its theoretical underpinnings stem from 
continental philosophical phenomenology and hermeneutics.  
 
Giorgi (2010) criticises IPA’s founders for claiming that IPA is phenomenological 
because "it involves detailed examination of the participant’s lifeworld" and "is 
concerned with an individual’s account of an object or event, as opposed to an 
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attempt to produce an objective statement of the object or event itself" (Smith & 
Osborn, 2003, p. 51). Giorgi (2010) argues that these content descriptions of 
phenomenology are insufficient in the absence of a theoretical justification of how 
IPA is related to the method of philosophical phenomenology. Giorgi (2011) argues 
that there is no reference in IPA to the bracketing of the natural attitude, which is the 
main meaning of the phenomenological reduction (epoché). The term bracketing 
can be misleading as it implies leaving something outside, but it means to monitor 
and restrain all prior knowledge and assumptions of the phenomenon in question. In 
the natural attitude, it is assumed that the phenomenon exists. Bracketing the 
natural attitude involves considering the phenomenon as it appears to 
consciousness, without affirming that it exists in the way that it presents itself 
(Giorgi, 2007). IPA’s founders do refer to bracketing in their analytic strategy, but 
only in the context of bracketing ideas developed from the analysis of a previous 
case to treat the next case in its own terms (Smith et al., 2009). Giorgi (2011) 
argues that analyses cannot claim to be phenomenological if they do not employ the 
phenomenological reduction because the reduction is the entrée to the 
phenomenological domain. 
 
Referring back to content descriptions of phenomenology, Giorgi (2011) criticises 
IPA’s founders for claiming that IPA is a phenomenological approach because it is 
concerned with "lived experience", "examination of meanings", and "experience 
expressed in its own terms" (p. 205). Giorgi argues that these terms are too generic; 
they are not exclusive to phenomenology. Smith et al. (2009) also describe 
phenomenological research and IPA as inductive. Phenomenology is not inductive, 
it is intuitive and descriptive (Giorgi, 2011).  
 
With regards to hermeneutics, Giorgi (2011) argues that IPA’s founders do not 
clarify in sufficient detail how IPA is influenced by the hermeneutic tradition. Instead, 
Giorgi suggests that IPA’s founders are attempting to be hermeneutically eclectic, 
drawing (limited and general) influence from different aspects of Schleiermacher, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer’s conceptualisations of hermeneutic inquiry. From 
Schleiermacher, Smith et al. (2009) draw upon the notion that the interpretative 
researcher can offer a perspective to the author’s textual narrative that the author 
him/herself may not know. From Heidegger, Smith et al. acknowledge that 
phenomenology may be hermeneutic in the sense that the researcher’s own 
interpretation is required to understand the phenomenon as it appears to human 
consciousness. Heidegger acknowledged that interpretation should initially focus on 
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the phenomenon as it presents itself, which can then inform the interpreter’s 
preconceptions about the phenomenon (Smith et al., 2009). Finally, Smith et al. 
highlight shared similarities concerning the relationship between interpretation and 
preconceptions, acknowledged by both Heidegger and Gadamer. Smith et al. 
however, disagree with Gadamer’s belief that nothing can be known about the 
author of the narrative based on the text. Giorgi criticises Smith et al. for appealing 
to Gadamer as a basis for IPA because Gadamer later explained that he was not 
writing for the human sciences.  
 
Ultimately, Giorgi (2011) criticises IPA’s founders for the way they seem to refer to 
philosophical phenomenology and the hermeneutic tradition only when they feel that 
the ideas relate to IPA. He proposes that IPA was developed of its own accord as 
opposed to being formulated based upon these philosophical traditions.   
 
2.3   Epistemological standpoint 
 
Outlining my epistemological position is challenging due to the opposing 
perspectives of phenomenology that informed my data collection method, and IPA; 
my method of analysis. For example, IPA focuses on subjectivity (Smith et al., 
2009), while the phenomenological position focuses on intersubjectivity; we live in a 
humanly-relational world that contains shared meanings (Todres et al., 2007). IPA 
focuses on reflective (conscious) thought (Smith et al., 2009), while the 
phenomenological position argues that experience is pre-reflective; experiencing is 
lived through and taken-for-granted. It is not consciously reflected upon by the 
experiencer (Finlay, 2011).  
 
Outlining my epistemological position is further confounded by my consideration of 
the phenomenological epoché. In the phenomenological epoché (reduction), the 
objective reality of the phenomenon is bracketed; the lived experience of the 
phenomenon is purely considered as it presents itself as opposed to questioning 
whether the phenomenon itself exists in the way that it presents itself (Giorgi, 2017). 
If there is no thing-in-itself, only experienced phenomena, there is no ontology - 
what there is to be known about the nature of the world; our being and existing, or 
epistemology - how and what we can know about the nature of the world (Willig, 
2013). The phenomenological position then, stays within the confines of experience. 
It does not make an existential or reality affirmation (Giorgi, 2008). As all knowledge 
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stems from presuppositions, it could be argued that phenomenology seeks what is 
prior to knowledge (Berguno, 1998).  
 
The phenomenological position rejects Objective Thought, which argues that we 
can gain knowledge of the world by dissecting it into units of analysis, measuring 
these units, and by establishing causal links between them. In Objective Thought, 
anything that cannot be explained in causal terms is deemed insignificant (Berguno, 
2015). Using an example to compare objective thought with the phenomenological 
position, in Objective Thought the human body is perceived as an object of 
investigation, while from a phenomenological perspective, the human body is 
perceived as a unique person who actively engages with his/her surroundings 
(Berguno, 2015; Carr, 2005). The phenomenological position then, argues that 
where an individual is situated in the world (their interactions with others, their active 
engagement with their surroundings), is what constitutes what can be known about 
that individual’s world (Carr, 2005). 
 
For the purposes of this research, I align myself with the phenomenological 
epistemological position because its assumptions correspond with my research 
question and aim; a focus on understanding what the lived experience of adults 
diagnosed with GAD, is like. As Giorgi (2008, p. 3) states: "to limit oneself to 
experiential claims is to stay within the phenomenal realm." In addition, this study’s 
idiographic commitment highlights the phenomenological perspective of human 
uniqueness; it acknowledges that the phenomenon of GAD may be experienced 
differently by each participant. Lastly, this study’s consideration of the life-world 
concept, and more specifically how participants’ lived experiences are inevitably 
intertwined with the life-world dimensions (Ashworth, 2015), corresponds with the 
phenomenological perspective that to understand an individual’s experience of the 
world, you have to examine their pre-reflective interactions with the everyday, 
perceptual life-world; the world that we all share (Carr, 2005).  
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2.4   Research plan 
 
2.4.1   Initial telephone screening 
 
The primary purpose of the initial telephone screening was to ensure that interested 
individuals all met the same GAD diagnostic criteria. Potential participants were 
asked the questions on the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire IV (GAD-Q-
IV; Appendix 1). The GAD-Q-IV was developed by Newman, Zuellig, Kachin, 
Constantino, Przeworski, Erickson, and Cashman-McGrath (2002). To meet this 
questionnaire’s diagnostic criteria, a minimum total score of 7.67 was required, in 
line with Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, and Fresco’s (2014) recommendations 
(see Appendix 2 for the scoring system). The GAD-Q-IV was chosen due to its 
clinical validity and the quickness and ease with which it can be administered 
(Moore et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2002). Whilst I acknowledge that this 
quantitative measure contradicts the phenomenological perspective of taking 
participants’ declarations of GAD at face value, it was employed to minimise 
potential errors at the data collection stage. If, for example, it became evident during 
an interview that the participant was not describing GAD, I would not have been 
able to include their data. I needed to ensure, to the best of my ability, that I was 
investigating the phenomenon I claimed to be investigating.  
 
2.4.2   Data collection method 
 
Semi-structured interviews were employed because they enabled me to collect rich 
descriptions of the participants’ lived experiences, first-hand. They provided 
opportunity to discuss participants’ lived experiences in the context of the six 
chosen life-world dimensions, whilst simultaneously allowing participants to speak 
freely and elaborate. This enabled me to enquire after additional descriptions that 
arose (Smith et al., 2009).  
 
2.4.3   Developing the interview schedule 
 
In devising the interview schedule, considerable time was spent revising the number 
of questions and their exact phrasing. To make data analysis possible, I needed to 
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obtain rich, concrete descriptions that could be visualised. Questions therefore 
needed to be open and concise. As previously discussed, experiencing is pre-
reflective, thus it was important not to enquire directly about meaning.  
 
With these two considerations in mind, I devised the initial schedule (Appendix 3). I 
decided to ask a broad opening question to encourage participants to begin telling 
their narratives. To obtain rich, concrete descriptions, it was important to keep 
participants focused on concrete events. Prompt questions that I could repeatedly 
ask throughout each interview were therefore devised. These also functioned to 
make participants feel heard and valuable. Next, I devised questions for each of the 
six chosen life-world dimensions. These questions were the most difficult to devise 
because I needed to ensure that I was enquiring about the dimensions in a way that 
made sense to participants whilst also ensuring that the questions were sufficiently 
open yet concise. Upon reading through the completed initial schedule several 
times, it became apparent that there were too many life-world dimension questions. 
Three considerations led me to this observation. I considered the questions’ ability 
to elicit concrete detail and believed that asking multiple questions on each 
dimension had the potential to confuse participants, thus increasing the likelihood of 
the interview coming to a halt or participants’ use of abstract words. Furthermore, 
several life-world questions asked participants to reflect on the present versus the 
past. This was the case for several dimensions, not just temporality. My research 
supervisor cautioned that participants often find questions on time particularly 
difficult to understand. For the temporality question, I consequently decided to 
enquire about both past and future as opposed to specific future times (e.g., the day 
ahead, next week). In terms of selfhood, both revised questions asked participants 
how this dimension has changed ‘"over time" as opposed to multiple questions that 
enquired into "now" versus "then". I ensured that questions concerning the other 
four life-world dimensions did not explicitly ask about time. I hoped that these 
changes would make the questions easier to understand. My final consideration 
was interview duration. Ultimately, interview duration is influenced by the number of 
interview questions.  
 
The final schedule (Appendix 4) consequently contained one question per life-world 
dimension, except for the dimensions of selfhood and temporality which both 
contained two questions. The rationale for asking two questions for selfhood has 
already been explained. Regarding temporality, I wanted to understand how 
participants’ lived experiences relate to their senses of both past and future. The 
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final schedule was used with both practice participants. As explained in section 
2.4.4 below, I made an additional revision following practice participant feedback.   
 
The term everyday anxiety when referring to GAD, was used throughout each 
interview because I inferred that it may be easier for participants to repeatedly hear; 
an assumption supported by one of my practice participants.  
 
2.4.4   Practice telephone screening and interview 
 
Although I cannot technically claim to have conducted pilot work because the 
individuals involved did not meet inclusion criteria, it was useful to practice both the 
screening and interview, and to obtain feedback. Two personal acquaintances 
participated in these run throughs. My objectives were to ascertain whether the 
GAD-Q-IV and interview questions made sense, and whether the interview schedule 
enabled me to gain concrete, rich descriptions within an appropriate time frame. 
Despite the more informal contact, full consent and debrief procedures were 
followed with both participants.   
 
Lola1 participated in the telephone screening. I did not calculate her total GAD-Q-IV 
score as the purpose of practicing was not to determine whether she met this 
measure’s criteria for a diagnosis of GAD. Lola self-reported being "severely 
anxious", a description that was backed up by formal letters from psychiatrists which 
she voluntarily showed me. In her feedback, she felt that the meaning of the word 
bothered, which appeared in several questions, was unclear; she was unsure if it 
was asking her whether she had experienced the symptoms described or whether 
she had been negatively affected by them. I kept this in mind going forward with the 
full-scale study but decided to read out the questions exactly as phrased initially, to 
ensure consistent application of the questionnaire across individuals. Lola had 
consented to participate in the interview immediately after GAD-Q-IV completion, 
but due to time constraints, we did not have a complete run through. Lola therefore 
chose to read through my revised interview schedule in its entirety and later 
provided written feedback. She commented that the questions flowed well but was 
unsure what concretely meant in the question: what is it, concretely, that you worry 
about? Concretely was consequently replaced by exactly going forward. In 
                                                          
1 Not her real name 
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response to my opening question, she suggested that it would be useful for me to 
explicitly inform participants before the interview begins that the questions get more 
specific, to minimise the possibility of participants feeling pressured to say 
everything they want to immediately. I applied this suggestion going forward.  
 
Hayley2 participated in the full, face-to-face interview which lasted thirty minutes. 
She informed me that she could not remember her general practitioner (GP) 
specifically diagnosing her anxiety as GAD but commented, "it must be". Hayley 
reported feeling anxious talking so openly about herself, at times finding it difficult to 
answer the questions in-depth despite reporting that she understood them. I 
wondered whether her heightened anxiety was partly due to the fact that we knew 
each other but had not been in contact for some time. Nevertheless, her feedback 
highlighted the importance of making my participants feel as comfortable and 
valuable as possible. She commented that the term everyday anxiety was more 
relatable than GAD. This term was consequently used in the full-scale study.  
 
2.5   Recruitment 
 
2.5.1   Sampling plan and sample size 
 
Purposive sampling was employed because I wanted to gain insight into the lived 
experience of a particular phenomenon: GAD. Participants were consequently 
required to have a formal diagnosis of GAD, rendering the sample homogenous 
(Smith et al., 2009). They also had to be aged eighteen or over. No other 
demographic restrictions were applied. Individuals currently undertaking any form of 
psychological therapy were excluded on the basis that their participation in this 
study could influence the therapeutic process. Individuals with co-morbid diagnoses 
were not excluded due to GAD’s high rates of comorbidity, which were discussed in 
the Introduction chapter.  
 
In line with IPA’s idiographic commitment and Smith et al.’s (2009) 
recommendations for professional doctorate research, a minimum sample size of 
eight participants was deemed sufficient. I decided that if saturation (no new 
                                                          
2 Not her real name 
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developed themes) had not been reached after analysing eight participants’ data, 
and time permitted, I would continue recruiting, ideally until saturation was achieved.  
 
2.5.2   Recruitment procedure 
 
I initially paid Anxiety UK to advertise my research flyer (Appendix 5) on their 
website. This yielded no responses. I also posted the flyer on their Facebook page. 
This yielded interest from one individual but after introducing myself and sending 
her the participant information sheet (Appendix 6) via email, she stopped contact.    
 
Meanwhile, I asked local services such as doctors’ surgeries, libraries, cafés, and 
community centres if I could place a hard copy of the flyer on billboards. Most 
services granted permission, but this method also yielded no interest. 
 
I then advertised the flyer on my own Facebook profile and asked Facebook friends 
to share my post. This method yielded interest from one individual but after she did 
not answer her phone on two mutually-agreed occasions, she messaged to explain 
that she was "too nervous" to talk via phone and contact stopped.  
 
Finally, I advertised the flyer on local community, selling, and advertising Facebook 
groups as well as on the following Facebook pages: Mind, Rethink Mental Illness, 
and Time to Change. I also placed a hard copy of the flyer on noticeboards 
throughout the Rhind building at City, University of London. Through these methods, 
I was placed in contact with twenty-four potential participants, seven of whom 
stopped correspondence after receiving more information about what participation 
would involve. I lost contact with two more individuals after explaining that the 
interview would need to occur face-to-face, not via telephone. Six potential 
participants were excluded because they did not meet inclusion criteria. 
 
The remaining nine interested individuals who met criteria completed the telephone 
screening. All nine met the minimum required total score on the GAD-Q-IV. One 
potential participant withdrew from the study on the day of her arranged interview, 
stating that her anxiety had gotten worse. I thanked her for participating thus far and 
emailed her the list of relevant support contacts (Appendix 7) should she wish to 
access additional, professional support.  
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The initial recruitment process lasted seven months, between June 2016 and 
January 2017. I decided to analyse the eight participants’ data before determining 
whether to continue recruiting. Between January and March 2017, two more 
females expressed interest in participating. I thanked them, explained that I had 
provisionally recruited a sufficient number of participants, and asked if I could 
contact them should the need to recruit further participants arise. Both individuals 
stated that they were happy to be re-contacted.  
 
Aware that only one male had participated thus far, I decided to recruit specifically 
for another male participant in September 2017 to see whether any new themes 
developed. I re-advertised the research flyer on the same Facebook community and 
advertising groups I had previously used. One male expressed interest but after 
sending him the information sheet, I did not hear from him again. I decided to stop 
recruiting at this point. I had already obtained rich, plentiful data and was aware of 
the time frame left to complete the write up. Furthermore, as I was not investigating 
potential gender differences, the unequal gender balance was not deemed 
detrimental to the study’s outcome.  
 
2.6   Participants 
 
Seven females and one male participated in this study. Relevant participant 
information is detailed in Table 2.1 below. Participant number depicts the order in 
which they were interviewed.  
 
Participant 
number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Participant 
pseudonym 
Emma Sandy Rob Marie Kirsty Shelley Sarah Chloe 
Gender F F M F F F F F 
Age (at time 
of interview) 
34 46 39 34 24 35 31 27 
Interview 
duration (to 
the nearest 
minute) 
69 80 64 80 38 86 89 81 
 
Table 2.1   Relevant participant information 
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2.7   Procedure 
 
2.7.1   Initial contact and telephone screenings 
 
Interested individuals were initially sent the participant information sheet. I asked 
them to contact me if they were still interested in participating or finding out more 
about the study, after reading it. A telephone conversation was arranged with those 
still interested, during which I provided relevant background information about 
myself, the study’s purpose, what participation would involve, how their data would 
be stored and used, and the outcome of the findings. I then ensured that potential 
participants met inclusion criteria and answered any questions they had. It was 
important from this first verbal contact to make potential participants feel valuable. I 
therefore stressed the importance of this research and their potential contribution. It 
was equally important however, to ensure that they did not feel coerced into 
participating, thus I stressed their right to withdraw at any time without consequence 
or need to provide a reason.  
 
Individuals who were still interested in participating and met this study’s criteria 
completed the telephone screening. Before asking the questions on the GAD-Q-IV, I 
explained its format, the rationale for its use, and stressed that if they did not meet 
this measure’s criteria for a diagnosis of GAD this did not imply that their previous, 
formal diagnosis of GAD is incorrect, nor did the screening represent a formal 
diagnosis of GAD. I wrote their answers on a hard copy of the GAD-Q-IV to make it 
easier to calculate their total score. Following GAD-Q-IV completion, I informed 
them that I would phone them back immediately after calculating their total score. I 
also informed them that their answers and scores would not be used in the 
research. After determining their total score, the answer sheet was destroyed. All 
nine individuals met the minimum required total score and wished to participate in 
the face-to-face interview with myself. Dates, times, and interview locations were 
mutually agreed. If any individuals had not met GAD-Q-IV criteria, they would have 
been thanked for participating thus far but not invited to participate in the interview.  
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2.7.2   Data collection 
 
Four interviews took place at participants’ homes, in the relatively neutral space of 
living room or kitchen. Two interviews were conducted at participants’ workplaces, 
and two took place in my living room. For the interviews conducted in my home, I 
ensured that the participant and I were alone, to protect their anonymity. The two 
interviews that took place at participants’ workplaces were conducted in quiet offices 
without interruption. Most interviews conducted in participants’ homes also 
proceeded without interruption; the only exception being one participant whose 
partner briefly disturbed us twice because her young son was upset that she was 
out of sight. During these interruptions, the interview and recordings were paused. 
To ensure participants’ and my own personal safety, details regarding the time and 
location of each interview were left in a sealed envelope with my parents, whom I 
live with. These were destroyed upon my return. For the two interviews that 
occurred in my home, I contacted my parents once I was certain that the participant 
had driven away from the house, to confirm that they could return.  
 
Before each interview began, I asked the participant to re-read the information sheet 
and provided opportunity to answer any questions. Meanwhile, I tested the two 
digital audio recorders used to record the interview, to ensure that they were 
working properly. I hoped that these introductory interventions would make the 
participants feel more at ease. The only demographic data I obtained was the 
participant’s age. I invited each participant to choose their own pseudonym, all of 
whom did so. I re-explained that the interview would begin with a broad opening 
question followed by more specific questions. I sought participants’ consent to use 
the term everyday anxiety when referring to GAD in the interview, explaining the 
rationale for this. All participants consented to this term’s use. I also offered each 
participant the opportunity to read through the interview schedule prior to 
commencing the interview. Again, I hoped that this would make the participants feel 
more at ease. Two participants briefly skim-read the schedule, the others declined. 
Once the participant was happy to proceed to interview, I reminded them of the 
limits of anonymity; that I would only break anonymity if I was made aware of 
danger to the participant’s or another individual’s personal safety. Once I received 
verbal confirmation that the participant understood these limits, we both read and 
signed two copies of the consent form (Appendix 8). Throughout each interview, I 
called the participant by their pseudonym, as I felt that this made the interaction 
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suitably personal whilst reassuring them that I was upholding anonymity from the 
onset.  
 
After the interview, once the recordings were stopped, the participant was thanked 
and invited to attend a verbal debrief with me to discuss their experience of being 
interviewed. Two participants chose not to participate in this verbal debrief due to 
time constraints. All participants were given a written debrief (Appendix 9) and the 
list of relevant support contacts should the need to access additional support arise.  
 
All recordings and transcripts were stored on a password protected, encrypted 
(using VeraCrypt software) laptop, with all file names identifiable by participant 
pseudonym only. Any potential identifiers within the transcripts and write-up were 
removed or changed. The two recorders and my copies of the consent forms were 
stored in two locked cabinets at home which only I had access to; one contained the 
recorders, the other, consent forms.  
 
2.8   Transcription 
 
As already discussed, the main aim of IPA is to interpret the meanings inherent in 
the participants’ accounts, thus Smith et al. (2009) suggest that a detailed 
transcription of the prosodic features of an interview such as non-verbal 
communication and pauses is not necessary. I however, felt it important to include 
these details so that an informed linguistic and psychological analysis could be 
conducted. Dialectical phrases were transcribed verbatim. Non-verbal 
communication was included as text in square parentheses. Pauses were indicated 
by an ellipsis mark, while words stressed by participants were highlighted in bold. I 
transcribed the interviews in order of participant number.  
 
2.9   Analytic strategy 
 
I rigorously followed the six steps suggested by Smith et al. (2009), not only 
because of the comfort this systematisation provided, but also to ensure that a 
critical other or interested researcher could check this study’s findings or replicate it 
(Giorgi, 2010). IPA’s founders have been criticised for their lack of apparent 
definitive clarity concerning IPA’s analytic process (Giorgi, 2010, 2011). Giorgi 
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(2011) argues that to meet the scientific criterion of replicability, the method of 
analysis must have fixed steps and a fixed order. He proposes that despite this 
requirement, there is scope for flexibility concerning the steps’ implementation. My 
implementation of these steps is detailed below.  
 
2.9.1   Reading and re-reading 
 
Starting with the first participant I interviewed, I sought to re-familiarise myself with 
the participant’s life-world by listening to the audio recording whilst reading the 
transcript. This simultaneous process was repeated several times. Smith et al. 
(2009) suggest that this step allows the researcher to become more aware of the 
overall structure of the interview, including how the participants’ narratives are 
presented and connected throughout. My initial observations were noted in my 
research journal because I felt it important to monitor and restrain my evoked 
reactions and ideas so that I could remain fully immersed with the data in its 
entirety.   
 
2.9.2   Initial noting 
 
My aim here was to produce a "comprehensive and detailed set of notes and 
comments on the data" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 83). Explorative comments were 
noted for each paragraph of the participant’s narrative before moving onto the next. 
The purpose of this was to minimise the possibility of superficial reading. These 
comments were handwritten in the right-hand margin of the transcript (see sample 
transcript as Appendix 10). In line with Smith et al.’s (2009) suggestions, I began by 
noting descriptive comments which captured the explicit content of the participant’s 
disclosures. More interpretative notes were then made which importantly remained 
grounded in the participant’s account. Linguistic comments captured the way in 
which language was used to present content and meaning, including non-verbal 
communication, repetition and use of metaphor. Finally, conceptual comments 
captured the overarching patterns of meaning. Descriptive comments were noted in 
black, with linguistic and conceptual comments in red and green respectively.  
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2.9.3   Developing themes 
 
Themes capturing the psychological concepts present in each section of exploratory 
comments were then developed. Each theme took the form of a brief statement or 
phrase. These were noted in the left-hand margin of the transcript. As Smith et al. 
(2009) indicate, theme development involved my psychological interpretations, but 
remained grounded in the participant’s descriptions. Although themes were located 
at particular points in the transcript, their significance within the whole account was 
also considered.  
 
2.9.4   Searching for connections across themes 
 
The themes were then listed chronologically on a separate Word document. 
Alongside each theme, I noted the frequency with which it appeared. The document 
was then printed to facilitate the process of looking for patterns and connections 
between themes. In line with Smith et al.’s (2009) suggestions, I explored several 
connections, moving themes around to form clusters of related themes. Abstraction 
involved "putting like with like and developing a new name for the cluster" (Smith et 
al., 2009, p. 96). Subsumption occurs "where an initial theme itself acquires a super-
ordinate status as it helps bring together a series of related themes" (Smith et al., 
2009, p. 97). Super-ordinate themes were developed using both abstraction and 
subsumption. Themes were discarded at this stage if they were too vague, or if 
other themes better captured the participant’s descriptions. Frequency was also 
considered, but following caution from Smith et al., themes were not discarded 
purely for their infrequency because frequency is not the sole indicator of 
significance.  
 
Once I was satisfied that my developed super-ordinate themes best appeared to 
represent the meanings within the participant’s account, I compiled a graphic 
representation of them (Appendix 11). Under each super-ordinate theme, supporting 
themes were listed and annotated with a brief participant quote and corresponding 
transcript location.  
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2.9.5   Moving to the next case 
 
The steps described in sections 2.9.1 – 2.9.4 were repeated for each participant’s 
transcript, in order of participant number. In line with IPA’s idiographic commitment, 
each transcript was reviewed in its entirety before moving to the next. With each 
new transcript review, I monitored and restrained ideas evoked by prior case 
analyses, allowing for the development of new themes. 
 
2.9.6   Looking for patterns across cases 
 
To facilitate the process of looking for patterns across cases, I lined up each 
participant’s graphic representation of super-ordinate themes on the floor. All eight 
participants shared the same three super-ordinate themes. Although supporting 
themes varied amongst participants, these commonalities aided the process of 
identifying connections. I then repeated the processes of abstraction and 
subsumption described in section 2.9.4 whilst simultaneously considering the 
potency of each theme.  
 
This process resulted in an overall table of super-ordinate themes for the group 
(Appendix 12). This indicated how themes were nested within super-ordinate 
themes, with evidence across participants for each theme.  
 
2.10   Ethical considerations 
 
Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at City, University of London (see Appendix 13 for the approval letter).  
 
Certain measures implemented to ensure informed consent, participant anonymity, 
and the personal safety of the participants and myself across data collection and 
analysis have already been acknowledged in sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 and are not 
repeated here.   
 
My decision to recruit via my personal Facebook account increased the possibility of 
individuals known to me, responding to my research flyer. This occurred with one 
individual who I thanked for expressing interest before explaining that due to ethical 
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concerns, and the potential impact her participation could have on the data (e.g., 
researcher bias), she could not participate.    
 
I decided not to offer participants monetary reward for participating. Both participant 
and researcher should benefit from participating, thus rendering it unnecessary to 
offer monetary incentive. Furthermore, the offer of money may have resulted in 
potential difficulties concerning participant withdrawal or strengthened the sense of 
power differential between participants and myself.  
 
Throughout this research, sensitivity to the participants’ welfare took precedence. I 
was aware that participation may cause emotional and psychological discomfort. 
This possibility was addressed in several ways. The term everyday anxiety when 
referring to GAD was used throughout each interview on the premise that this term 
may be easier for participants to repeatedly hear. Participants were informed 
verbally and in writing that they did not have to answer any questions they did not 
want to, both during the telephone screening and interview. On occasions when 
participants exhibited potential signs of distress (e.g., verbal disclosures of feeling 
anxious), I asked them whether they felt comfortable to continue or wished to take a 
break. Throughout recruitment and participation, I strove to make participants feel 
heard and valuable. I invited them to attend a verbal debrief with me after the 
interview as well as establishing ongoing access to support via a list of relevant 
professional support services and further contact with myself and my supervisor, 
should the need arise. One participant emailed me prior to our arranged interview 
disclosing her detailed history. She reported wanting me to have as much 
information as possible to help me with the research. I replied to her email, thanking 
her for disclosing this information while gently informing her that I would only be 
able to use the information she discloses during the interview going forward.  
 
In terms of participants’ right to withdraw, Smith et al. (2009) recommend offering 
participants a time-limited right to withdraw, for example, until data analysis begins. I 
felt uncomfortable employing this restriction. Although I applied my own 
interpretations to account for the data, these eight individuals offered their narratives 
freely and generously, thus it did not feel appropriate to use their data against their 
will. However, I also acknowledge that it is impossible for participants to withdraw 
following potential publication (Smith et al., 2009). This exception should have been 
explained verbally and in writing.  
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In accordance with British Psychological Society (BPS) guidelines (2010), all data 
collected, including the transcripts, will be stored securely for five years before being 
destroyed.  
 
With regards to my own self-care, research supervision and my research journal 
enabled me to explore my thoughts and feelings throughout the entire research 
process, while personal therapy ensured that I was monitoring my emotional 
resilience.  
 
2.11   Evaluation of research 
 
"The criteria traditionally used to evaluate the scientific value of quantitative 
research in psychology (e.g., reliability, representativeness, validity, generalisability, 
objectivity) are not, in their current form, meaningfully applicable to qualitative 
research" (Willig, 2013, p. 169). Qualitative researchers have consequently 
developed various criteria sets with which to evaluate the quality of qualitative 
research. The criteria used must fit the type of research being evaluated. 
Specifically, the study’s aims and the kind of knowledge it seeks to generate 
determines which criteria are most applicable (Willig, 2013). I used Yardley’s (2000) 
four principles as these are frequently used to evaluate qualitative psychological 
research and are well suited to a phenomenological approach. Indeed, Smith et al. 
(2009) illustrated how these principles can be addressed by IPA. 
 
2.11.1   Sensitivity to context 
 
Yardley (2000) suggests that to achieve sensitivity to context, the researcher should 
consider relevant theoretical and empirical literature, empirical data, participants’ 
perspectives, the socio-cultural setting, and ethical issues.  
 
In the Introduction, I conducted a thorough review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature, which enabled me to identify a gap in our knowledge of GAD. The 
theoretical considerations that shaped this study’s design and implementation were 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Finally, in the Discussion this study’s findings are 
considered in relation to existing literature. My research question, and consequently 
my method of data analysis (IPA), demonstrated contextual sensitivity from the 
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offset through their idiographic commitment. With regards to the social-cultural 
setting, throughout the research process I have reflected upon the "normative, 
ideological, historical, linguistic and socioeconomic influences on the beliefs, 
objectives, expectations and talk of all participants" (Yardley, 2000, p. 220) as well 
as my own (see Reflexivity section). From the offset, the participants’ perspectives 
have been at the forefront of my mind. As already discussed, I aimed to ensure that 
all potential participants felt valuable from initial contact. My method of data 
collection (semi-structured interviews) facilitated this process as I was able to draw 
on my counselling psychologist skills (e.g., active listening, empathy) to make 
participants feel at ease, identify any interactional difficulties, and sensitively 
negotiate "the intricate power-play where research expert may meet experiential 
expert" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 180). Semi-structured interviews enabled participants 
to describe what was important to them whilst I tried to monitor and restrain my own 
beliefs and assumptions so that these did not influence the interviews’ direction. I 
also offered to conduct each interview in locations where participants felt most 
comfortable. Consideration of participants’ perspectives continued throughout data 
analysis; I ensured that my interpretations remained grounded in the participants’ 
words. Inclusion of participant quotes in the Analysis chapter enables the reader to 
verify this. Finally, ethical issues were also considered (see section 2.10).  
 
2.11.2   Commitment and rigour 
 
According to Yardley (2000), commitment "encompasses prolonged engagement 
with the topic, competence and skill in the methods used, and immersion in relevant 
data", while rigour refers to "the resulting completeness of the data collection and 
analysis" (p. 221).   
 
I have read extensively around theoretical, empirical, and popular GAD literature, 
qualitative research methods and IPA. I also attended lectures on IPA and practiced 
it in seminar groups. I also practiced conducting the initial telephone screening and 
interview to ensure that the questions made sense and were appropriate, that 
participants felt comfortable and valued, and to ensure that both were completed in 
an appropriate time frame. I ensured that the sample was suitably homogenous 
and, to the best of my ability, matched the research question by including only those 
participants who had received a formal diagnosis of GAD. As already discussed, I 
was committed to considering participants’ perspectives throughout and this 
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resulted in rich, concrete data. Smith et al. (2009) state that to ensure rigour, "one 
needs to be consistent with one’s probing, picking up on important cues from the 
participant" (p. 181). Participant feedback communicated that I had, to a large 
extent, achieved this. Several participants reported that my ability to pick up on cues 
and probe further, particularly around topics that had previously been 
misconceptualised by others, had communicated that I was trying to understand 
them. Analysis was thorough and systematic. Themes were developed, revised, and 
occasionally rejected if I felt that another theme more accurately captured the data. I 
also tried to maintain a balance between idiographic engagement and identifying 
shared themes. This transferred into the Analysis chapter, where care was taken to 
ensure that each participant’s account was equally represented whilst highlighting 
important aspects of themes they share. Smith et al. note how novice qualitative 
researchers tend to complete a first draft analysis write-up that is "pretty descriptive" 
with "a lot of quotes from participants but not much analysis" (p. 110). Indeed, I 
revised the Analysis chapter to ensure that my interpretations outweigh participant 
quotes. 
 
2.11.3   Transparency and coherence 
 
According to Yardley (2000), transparency and coherence relates to the "clarity and 
cogency – and hence the rhetorical power or persuasiveness – of the description 
and argumentation" (p. 222). This entails transparent methods and data 
presentation, a good fit between theory and method, and reflexivity.   
 
I have clearly documented all stages of the research process, detailing how 
participants were recruited, how the interview schedule was constructed, and the 
interviews conducted, and how I applied Smith et al.’s (2009) six steps of analysis. 
Transparency was enhanced through including tables and samples in the main body 
of this write up as well as in the Appendices, detailing key participant information, 
the analytic strategy, and resulting data. I provided a rationale for every decision 
made. I believe that the developed themes "hang together logically" (Smith et al., 
2009, p. 182), telling a coherent narrative of how each super-ordinate and 
subordinate theme relate to one another. There is also cohesion between the 
research question (and consequent research aim) and the phenomenological 
approach employed. This enabled the study to remain focused on the lived 
experience of GAD via "consistent and complete description" (Yardley, 2000, p. 
79 
 
222) during data collection, followed by researcher interpretation during analysis, to 
make sense of these pre-reflective descriptions. While I have conducted this 
research according to IPA principles in the sense that I have focused on a 
"significant experiential domain for participants" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 182) and 
recognise that IPA involves researcher interpretation, I have also acknowledged the 
tensions between IPA’s claimed theoretical underpinnings, philosophical 
phenomenology and the hermeneutic tradition. Finally, reflexivity was considered 
throughout. I kept a research journal and discussed it in the Methodology and 
Discussion.  
 
2.11.4   Impact and importance 
 
Yardley (2000) argues that "it is not sufficient to develop a sensitive, thorough and 
plausible analysis, if the ideas propounded by the researcher have no influence on 
the beliefs or actions of anyone else" (p. 223).  
 
This research was conceived due to the lack of existing literature on the lived 
experience of GAD. To recall, despite GAD’s commonality and association with 
frequent healthcare use, it is significantly under-detected and undertreated 
(Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). The findings are consequently important and relevant to 
particular individuals (e.g., the participants, others with GAD, their families and 
friends, and healthcare professionals including counselling psychologists, 
physicians, medical specialists) as well as society (e.g., the findings highlight the 
potential importance of belonging to a community). Most of these implications are 
discussed further in the Discussion. With regards to the impact on participants, 
several expressed "surprise" and "fascination" that I was conducting research on 
GAD. Reasons given included perceptions that it is not a well-known condition and 
that it is not often talked about or understood. Some also commented during their 
verbal debrief that the interview process had facilitated new insight and had 
consolidated their own understandings of GAD. I hope that the findings strengthen 
their understanding and help normalise it. I also hope the findings inform loved ones 
and friends of individuals with GAD about it and how best to support them. Finally, I 
hope this research communicates that GAD is being taken seriously which, in turn, 
will hopefully encourage others with GAD to seek professional help sooner. 
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2.12   Reflexivity 
 
Finlay (2017) describes researcher reflexivity as "the use of a critical, self-aware 
lens to interrogate both the research process and our interpretation or 
representation of participants’ lives" (p. 1). As Finlay (2011) states, it is "inevitable 
that researchers bring their subjective selves into the research along with 
preconceptions which both blinker and enable insight" (p. 23). She compares the 
reflexive process to a dance that is co-created by both researcher and participant. 
During this dance, the researcher both restrains his or her preconceptions and uses 
them to interrogate meanings (Finlay, 2008). Reflexivity began as soon as I started 
conceptualising this study and has continued throughout the research process, 
largely in the form of a research journal.  
 
2.12.1   Personal reflexivity 
 
Personal reflexivity involves reflecting upon both the ways in which my personal 
values, interests, assumptions and experiences have shaped this research, and 
how conducting it has evoked change within me personally and as a scientist-
practitioner (Willig, 2013). Here, I focus on the former. The latter is discussed in 
section 4.9.  
 
My interest in this research topic was prompted by my first piece of clinical work as 
a counselling psychologist in training. While working in a local, private sector 
counselling service, my first client presented with emetophobia and feared long car 
journeys. However, it soon became apparent that his anxiety and worry extended 
beyond these specific foci; they were generalised across a wide variety of topics. I 
consequently began researching GAD as, at the time, my professional awareness 
and understanding of GAD was significantly limited and I needed to formulate his 
presenting difficulties and consider how best to approach therapy with him. My only 
personal, indirect contact with GAD has been through a friend’s experiences. She 
has previously met GAD diagnostic criteria on the GAD-7 (Spitzer, Kroenke, 
Williams, & Löwe, 2006) and self-identifies as having "generalised anxiety". 
However, her psychiatrist does not think she has "straightforward GAD", adding "I 
don’t think it’s as simple as that". Furthermore, her current mental health team 
letters refer to "mixed anxiety and depressive disorder". Through working with this 
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client and considering my friend’s experiences, the possible complexities and 
difficulties in diagnosing, understanding, and working therapeutically with potential 
GAD became apparent. Existing GAD literature highlighted that I was not alone in 
this perception; clinicians often struggle to recognise the symptoms as belonging to 
GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). I felt like something was missing from the 
literature and that this was hindering my ability to understand GAD – I craved the 
context and relatability I believe a phenomenological perspective would have 
provided. My decision to focus on the lived experience of GAD was consequently 
not only driven by my motivation to give these individuals a voice and to increase 
other healthcare professionals’ understanding of GAD; I personally wanted to gain a 
better understanding of GAD from those experiencing it in the hope that I too would 
become more efficient at recognising and treating it. 
 
Reflecting on my position as researcher, I was largely an "outsider", or different to 
the participants as I have never had GAD. While I therefore had no direct personal 
experience of GAD that required restraining, I needed to restrain any theoretical 
knowledge and assumptions of GAD specifically as well as personal experiences 
and theoretical knowledge of anxiety and worry. As discussed further in the 
following two sub-sections, this occasionally proved difficult. This was particularly 
the case when participants described worrying about what others think about them 
as I worry about what others’ think about me; I worry about being liked. The 
following steps were consequently taken: I wrote in my research journal after each 
interview, I ensured that I probed further when necessary, and I grounded my 
interpretations in the participants’ words. 
 
2.12.2   Methodological reflexivity 
 
First, I wish to acknowledge that another researcher may have generated different 
data from the interviews and another’s interpretations of the data may have resulted 
in different findings. Furthermore, if the participants had been interviewed at a 
different time, they may have provided alternative descriptions of their lived 
experiences. Similarly, if different individuals who met the inclusion criteria had 
participated, they may have described different experiences. This study 
consequently only claims to report on the participants’ lived experiences.  
I believe that the combined use of semi-structured interviews and IPA enabled me 
to successfully capture the rich textures of the participants’ lived experiences. Semi-
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structured interviews enabled me to obtain plentiful, rich, concrete descriptions while 
IPA acknowledges that researcher interpretation is required to make sense of these 
pre-reflective descriptions. More specifically, it explicitly acknowledges that my 
professional background and research context meant that I inevitably interpreted the 
data from a psychological perspective.  
 
Willig (2013) questions the extent to which participants can describe the "rich 
texture of their experience to the researcher" (p. 95). All participants were self-
selecting, suggesting that they were motivated to talk. They were articulate and able 
to convey their narratives in words. I believe that this is reflected in the Analysis 
chapter, the sample transcript (Appendix 10), and the tables of individual and group 
super-ordinate themes (Appendices 11 and 12). As already discussed, considerable 
time was spent revising the phrasing of the interview questions and I ensured that I 
did not ask about meaning as lived experience is largely pre-reflective. On the odd 
occasion where participants struggled to convey their experiences, I tried to follow 
Smith et al.’s (2009) advice of remaining curious and using prompt questions. 
However, there were times when I jumped in too quickly with my own responses 
(i.e., paraphrasing, asking a question), particularly when participants disclosed that 
they were very anxious or believed that they were not explaining themselves well 
enough. These instances provoked my own anxiety and need to reassure them.  
 
2.12.3   Procedural reflexivity 
 
I decided to exclude those without a formal diagnosis of GAD from participating. 
While I have already provided a rationale for this decision and believe it was 
necessary, it contradicts the phenomenological ethos of remaining in the 
experiential realm, taking participants’ declarations of GAD at face value. This 
contradiction evoked physical and emotional tension within me because a main 
motivation driving this study was my wish to give adults with GAD a voice. I 
therefore felt guilty that I had denied those who self-identify as having GAD the 
opportunity to share their experiences.  
 
Before any contact with each potential participant, I wrongly assumed that they 
would be anxious and display visible signs of anxiety and was surprised when this 
did not appear to occur. On occasions where it did, I found myself wanting to 
contain their anxiety, and in turn, observed my own anxiety as I tried to achieve this. 
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This was particularly apparent at the beginning of Chloe’s interview. She kept 
repeating that she was not explaining herself well, kept nervously laughing as she 
spoke and said that she felt silly. Feeling stuck and not wanting to fall into "therapist 
mode", I found myself reassuring her that she was being coherent despite not 
feeling like she was before returning to the interview schedule. I hoped that this 
would make her feel more at ease and challenge her self-conscious perceptions. I 
believe I achieved this aim to a certain extent as, during the verbal debrief, she 
reported feeling more relaxed as the interview progressed and forgot about the two 
digital recorders. Her fidgeting (e.g., tapping the sofa) also lessened as the interview 
progressed. 
 
Returning to self-conscious emotions, I was struck by the extent of self-
consciousness and stark self-criticism displayed by some participants during data 
collection. For Sandy, this extended beyond the interview itself. Upon meeting and 
parting she apologised for looking a "mess". When participants disclosed worrying 
about what others think of them I wondered how this may have affected their 
interaction with me and the degree of internal and external monitoring that they may 
have consequently engaged in.  
 
On several occasions during data collection, I failed to restrain my theoretical 
knowledge and assumptions. I applied CBT theory and terminology in some of my 
responses. For example, during Rob’s interview, I asked whether the "cognitive" 
symptoms occurred before the physiological. These instances may have 
strengthened my power as a researcher by falsely communicating that I am the 
expert of their experiences. Moreover, if participants described applying CBT 
techniques, sometimes I picked up on this at the expense of ignoring other parts of 
that section of dialogue. Although, in the majority of cases, I did refer back to these 
at a later stage, I interrupted the natural flow of the interview and their thought 
processes, thus possibly preventing important disclosures. 
 
Beyond occasions where I implicitly reinforced my position as a counselling 
psychologist in training and practitioner-researcher, I sensed that most participants 
were acutely aware of this throughout their interviews and that this influenced some 
of their disclosures. I got the impression that some participants spontaneously 
talked in depth about their experiences of psychological therapy because they 
assumed that I wanted to hear about them, despite not enquiring about them. I also 
wonder whether those who had negative experiences of psychological therapy 
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voluntarily disclosed these because they perceived me as a platform of change. I 
had conflicting feelings of responsibility (and consequent guilt) and defensiveness 
when Emma described her dissatisfaction with the counselling she had received. I 
managed to notice and restrain these thoughts during the interview and explored 
them thoroughly afterwards in my research journal.  
 
With regards to the process of data analysis, my decision to focus on the lived 
experience of GAD in relation to six life-world fractions was driven by my extensive 
consideration of philosophical phenomenology, my first piece of clinical work during 
my training, and my review of existing GAD literature. While I believe I achieved this 
aim, it resulted in a significant amount of data to analyse. This, together with my 
commitment to being rigorous and thorough (Yardley, 2000), meant that analysis 
was incredibly time-consuming and occasionally stressful. 
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3. Analysis 
 
3.1   Overview 
 
Analysis resulted in four super-ordinate themes that represent the lived experiences 
of GAD across participants. While each theme captures particular aspects of the 
lived experience of GAD, they are all intricately connected with one another. Figure 
3.1 below, depicts these interconnections. "Battling with uncertainty: What’s going to 
happen next?" explores participants’ difficulty tolerating uncertainty in its various 
forms. "A struggle for autonomy: You either let it get a hold of you, or you get a hold 
of it" addresses how participants engage in a constant battle for perceived control 
over their senses of self, as GAD takes over. "GAD and interpersonal relations: 
Worrying about what others think" explores the interactions between participants’ 
experiences of GAD and their interpersonal relationships. The final theme is "The 
need to create meaning amid uncertainty and loss: GAD is an eye-opener". It 
considers participants’ need to locate meaning and purpose within GAD in order to 
tolerate the psychological and physiological distress it causes them. Within the 
direct quotations from participants, words in bold were emphasised by them (see 
Appendix 14 for further information regarding this chapter’s format).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1   Representation of super-ordinate themes 
 
 
 
A struggle for autonomy:  
You either let it get a hold of you, or you get a 
hold of it 
 
 
Battling with uncertainty: What’s going to 
happen next? 
 
 
GAD and interpersonal relations: Worrying 
about what others think 
 
The need to create meaning amid uncertainty 
and loss: GAD is an eye-opener 
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3.2   Battling with uncertainty: What’s going to happen next? 
 
This super-ordinate theme captures participants’ difficulty tolerating uncertainty and 
consequent absence of perceived control over their life-worlds. Within the super-
ordinate theme fall four themes. "An endless cycle" considers GAD’s endless 
qualities. Little is therefore experienced as finite and certain. "No rhyme or reason" 
explores participants’ experience of GAD as illogical. Participants consequently 
locate meaning and purpose within GAD, presumably to maintain a sense of 
certainty. "Grappling with time" addresses participants’ difficulty living in the present 
moment as they ruminate on things they cannot change (past) or accurately 
anticipate (future). Lastly, "Doubt" explores the various manifestations of doubt GAD 
evokes.  
 
3.2.1   An endless cycle 
 
All participants describe an endless quality of both specific cognitions; thinking and 
worrying, and their anxiety.  
 
Emma conveys the extent of her thinking via her stark comparison to her former 
self:  
 
I don’t even think I thought before. I just like did what I wanted, and now, yeah, 
you’re always, always thinking. Over-thinking is terrible … and that’s where it all 
begins, when you over-think situations. (Emma: 1.4.30) 
 
Emma implies that before GAD she was not consciously aware of her thinking or at 
least not to the extent where it affected her decision-making ability. Now, she 
appears to constantly over-think situations. This seems confirmed in her repetition 
of "always". Her use of the word "terrible" implies the distressing nature of her 
excessive thinking which triggers her GAD symptomology. Her new sense of 
distress and disconnection from her former self is indicated in her transition from 
using the first-person position ("I") when referring to her former self, to second-
person position when describing her current sense of self ("you’re; you").  
 
Marie’s image implies a frantic quality to excessive thinking: 
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It’s almost like ten cars coming in for a collision. (Marie: 4.4.10) 
 
This comparison can be understood on several levels. It signifies both the speed 
and magnitude of Marie’s thinking. It also indicates that all her thoughts occur at 
once, posing a constant threat of devastating impact. This frantic quality is echoed 
in Chloe’s description of "all these racing thoughts going on" (8.3.8).  
 
Sandy describes how she not only over-thinks "everything", but also finds herself 
questioning this process: 
 
I’m always think-. I analyse everything, so every time I think anything, I think: well 
why is that? What’s all that about? And then that’s draining. (Sandy: 2.1.2) 
 
Sandy begins to describe how she is "always thinking", but "thinking" is replaced by 
"analyse". This suggests the degree of methodological scrutiny she engages in 
concerning stimuli in her lifeworld and the thought process itself. Her account 
indicates a disconnection between her excessive thinking and rational mind, making 
it difficult to understand. Her use of the word "draining" implies a mentally 
exhausting quest for answers that leaves her completely deprived of energy. There 
appears to be an obsessional element to thinking and this is echoed in other 
participants’ accounts. Marie notes how she "can’t stop obsessing with it" (4.4.6) 
when multiple individuals give her different accounts of a situation, while Shelley 
describes "overanalysing" (6.7.1) every interaction she has with others.  
 
This sense of endlessly trying to make sense of things that do not make logical 
sense or are indeterminable is also present in participants’ accounts of worrying. 
Rob describes an "endless cycle of what ifs" (3.2.1) which he later elaborates on:      
 
[what if?] It’s almost [in-breath] … the unanswerable question [ ] if you answer that 
one, you come, you go to the next one, so: what happens if? Well that will happen. 
Well what happens if that happens after that? And you just keep going. (Rob: 3.5.10) 
 
Here, Rob indicates that his answers to: "what if?" never sufficiently convince him to 
stop worrying. His in-breath followed by the pause in dialogue suggests that this is 
difficult to acknowledge, as does his use of the second-person position ("you"). His 
answers introduce more possibilities that lead him to re-ask the question. This cyclic 
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pattern appears to be compounded by the uncertainty unavoidable in worrying 
about the future.  
 
This cyclic pattern of worrying is shared by other participants. Kirsty describes how 
worrying about what might happen if she were to meet up with friends causes a 
chain reaction that results in her cancelling plans: 
 
It’s a bit of a vicious cycle isn’t it? So you think about things that could happen but 
probably won’t, but then instead of concentrating on they probably won’t, you 
concentrate on that they could, so then I think the panic starts, and then [ ] you feel a 
bit sick and then you kind of talk yourself out of doing it and then [ ] once you’ve 
cancelled it, it’s quite upsetting because you regret cancelling it, and it’s like [laughter] 
trying again, so sometimes it’s the same cycle over and over. (Kirsty: 5.2.3) 
 
Kirsty’s use of the word "vicious" implies that this cycle is a form of brutal self-
punishment. She is rapidly overcome by fear of dangerous possibilities. She stops 
herself from meeting her friends to protect herself. Paradoxically however, this act of 
self-protection quickly turns to one of self-disappointment as she finds herself 
repeatedly confronted with the same dilemma. Her laughter indicates a need to 
mask her disappointment.  
 
This sense of worry rapidly escalating is echoed in other participants’ accounts. 
Unlike Kirsty’s account of a consistent chain of events, Sarah describes how one 
worry can trigger other, seemingly unrelated ones:  
 
Although I might be thinking about: I need to put the washing on tomorrow, erm 
something about the washing will then remind me of something else, and it might not 
be clothes related. It might be: last time I did the washing, something else happened 
and oh my God I didn’t, it moves really, really quickly. (Sarah: 7.8.3) 
 
As with earlier participants, Sarah seems to consider infinite possibilities which 
maintains her worry. She construes worry as something separate from her with its 
own agency ("it moves"), suggesting that it is difficult to control. This perception of 
infinite possibilities seems to shed light on the fact that most participants describe 
worrying about everything. 
 
I think I still do worry about everything. [ ] I am a born, I think, worrier and I still do 
worry about absolutely everything. (Shelley: 6.9.1) 
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Despite narratives of feeling more in control of GAD since completing CBT, Shelley 
implies that her worry has not lessened ("I still do"). While Sarah construes worry as 
something separate, Shelley construes it as an innate part of her ("I am a born 
worrier").   
 
Finally, participants construe anxiety with the same perception of endlessness. This 
is perhaps unsurprising given the infinite nature of their thinking and worrying.  
 
At least with labour, you know it will come to an end at some point, be it a couple of 
hours, be it twenty-four hours, you know, be it a week. It will come to an end. With 
anxiety … no. (Emma: 1.3.11) 
 
Emma describes how she would rather be in constant labour than experience daily 
anxiety (1.3.10). Here, she implies that despite the pain of childbirth, knowing that 
there is an endpoint makes the pain bearable. She suggests that she perceives 
anxiety with equal pain, but the uncertainty of when, or if it will end makes it more 
difficult to tolerate. This perception of anxiety having no let-up is echoed by other 
participants. Marie describes how "there’s no respite from it" (4.9.1), while Chloe 
notes that her anxiety is "always there" (8.7.5).  
 
In summary, this theme has explored how participants appear to experience no let-
up with regards to their thinking and worrying. One thought or worry always seems 
to lead to another, resulting in constant anxiety.  
 
3.2.2   No rhyme or reason 
 
This theme explores how GAD is construed as illogical. Participants seem to find 
this illogicality difficult to tolerate. This is implied in their need to, once more, make 
sense of GAD. 
 
Participants describe an absence of logical explanation for their anxiety. 
 
It’s strange. [ ] I can’t even put my finger on any particular thing that … [in-breath] that 
happens. [ ] I dunno. Triggers? It could be anything. (Sandy: 2.4.8) 
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Sandy’s use of the phrase "it’s strange" can be understood on several levels. GAD 
is construed as something that takes Sandy by surprise. This makes it a difficult 
concept for her to understand ("can’t even put my finger on", "I dunno"). This 
difficulty seems captured in the pause in dialogue, immediately followed by an in-
breath. Her use of impersonal language ("it’s") to describe this strangeness 
indicates that she construes GAD as something separate and alien to her. There 
appears to be an unforeseen, foreign quality to GAD, and this is echoed in others’ 
accounts. Sarah describes how her catastrophic thinking happens "in the blink of an 
eye" (7.7.5), while Shelley states: "I don’t know where the thoughts come from" 
(6.9.2). 
 
Emma also perceives GAD as a separate, unpredictable entity, but her image is of 
being suddenly and violently attacked by "it": 
 
You never know when it’s gonna strike. You never know how it’s gonna strike. 
(Emma: 1.1.1) 
 
There also appears to be temporal fluctuation in anxiety’s intensity. Chloe describes 
sometimes feeling "just a little bit nervous", yet other times feels "really, really 
nervous" (8.1.3). Kirsty struggles to summarise her experience of GAD due to its 
daily variation: 
 
I: What is it like to live with everyday anxiety? 
 
It’s probably difficult to describe it as a whole because I think from day to day it 
changes so, depending on what you know you have to do or just generally how you’re 
feeling, so erm sometimes it can be quite difficult and other days, it’s a bit … more 
relaxed. (Kirsty: 5.1.1) 
 
The daily fluctuation in Kirsty’s anxiety levels seems dependent on the situations 
she may face. For example, as will be discussed later, Kirsty’s anxiety intensifies in 
the absence of perceived control. Her emphasised description of some days being 
slightly more "relaxed" strikingly conflicts with her later description of never having a 
"completely stress-free day" (5.7.2), suggesting her need to downplay her anxiety.  
 
Several participants explicitly describe their difficulty tolerating GAD’s illogicality. 
 
91 
 
When you can’t understand something, you can’t deal with it. [ ] If you lose someone 
or something like through death, you know why you’re sad. You know why you’re … 
not functioning in the way that you normally would, [ ] whereas when you don’t know 
why you’re feeling the way that you are, or why your head’s going off in the way that 
it does, you can’t control that [ ] there’s no rhyme or reason to it. There’s no: ‘yeah 
you’ll be fine’, cos you don’t know you will. (Emma: 1.11.7) 
 
Emma appears to experience the same degree of sorrow with regards to GAD as 
she does when mourning. With GAD however, her distress seems amplified 
because she does not know why she feels anxious, or, as discussed in section 
3.2.1, if it will end. She is consequently unable to reassure herself that eventually 
she will be "fine". Furthermore, she implies a disconnection between her mind and 
body ("head’s going off"), as though she perceives herself to be deranged and 
therefore incapable of her usual behaviour. Rob also communicates his struggle to 
understand GAD by contrasting it with something he can understand: 
 
It’s such a hard erm thing to describe. [ ] If you’ve got a broken metatarsal or 
something, you [in breath] can explain what that is, where it is and how it gets treated, 
and I think with this, it’s, it’s, it’s hard to explain. (Rob: 3.12.1) 
 
Rob starkly contrasts something tangible; a broken foot that can be seen, 
understood, and treated, to his opposing experience of GAD. His difficulty 
explaining GAD to others seems to stem from his own perception of it as "bizarre 
logic" (3.9.3). 
 
Most participants appear to cope, in part, with this difficulty by identifying causal 
explanations for their anxiety. It is noteworthy that these accounts were produced 
unprompted. Marie avoids phoning in sick to work when she is ill because she fears 
getting in trouble.  
 
I think part of it stems [ ] from a childhood experience anyway, [ ] when I was about 
eight [in-breath], whereas most parents would take time off to look after their child, my 
dad would leave me in the back of his car with a blanket, sick bowl and a teddy bear, 
erm while he went to work. (Marie: 4.1.8) 
 
Marie’s account extends our understanding of why this childhood experience 
continues to influence her adult behaviour. As a child, illness was associated with 
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punishment and neglect. She still avoids telling others when she is ill from fear of 
reoccurrence:  
 
As an adult, I still don’t … unless I’m physically unable to m-, to get up, I won’t tell 
anybody. I’ll just keep going. (Marie: 4.1.9) 
 
Ironically, this fear seems so great that she would rather neglect her own needs ("I’ll 
just keep going"). Some participants propose that their anxiety is either hereditary or 
a learned behaviour from a parent. Rob, for example, describes his mother as a 
"worrywart" (3.6.2). Others attribute their anxiety to specific past experiences such 
as moving home frequently or mentally abusive teachers or partners. Sandy 
suggests that the "awful progestogen-only pill" triggered a dramatic increase in her 
existing anxiety levels (2.11.2).  
 
Some participants appear to hold positive beliefs about worry. 
 
I did get really good grades s-, so it worked. [ ] Like at A Levels, it was a drive to work 
hard and like the fear kept me going [laughter] to do lots of work. (Chloe: 8.1.5) 
 
Chloe’s anxiety became noticeable during A-Levels. She described not taking 
GCSEs seriously whereas A-Levels held more importance, to the point where she 
missed social events to study. Here, she attributes her A-Level success to the fear 
of failing that motivated her to study. Sarah also holds positive beliefs about worry: 
 
This is really wrong. I feel like the reason that things don’t happen is because I worry 
about them. (Sarah: 7.7.5) 
 
Sarah indicates that she realises this belief is irrational ("this is really wrong"), but it 
is maintained in the absence of concrete proof to dispute it. Such proof cannot be 
obtained because the belief is based on future predictions that may never have 
occurred regardless of whether she worried. Positive beliefs about worry appear to 
allow participants to construe it as useful.  
 
This theme then, has explored GAD’s illogicality. Participants seem to struggle 
tolerating the uncertainty this evokes. They therefore attempt to make some sense 
of GAD, either through identifying causal and maintaining factors for it, or by 
attributing usefulness and therefore meaning to it. 
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3.2.3   Grappling with time 
 
All participants describe a lost sense of self. For most participants, this loss also 
encompasses ruminations about specific past events. Almost all participants appear 
to experience anticipatory anxiety. Most participants describe attempts to stay 
present but appear to find this challenging amid their past and future grapples.  
 
3.2.3.1   Loss of a past self 
 
For all participants, GAD has resulted in a lost sense of self. Some participants 
mourn their previous identities, while others appear hopeful of re-owning them. 
Emma describes the magnitude of her lost sense of self: 
 
I’ve become probably … a quarter of the person that I used to be. (Emma: 1.2.1) 
 
Emma’s description evokes the powerful image of being reduced to a quarter 
fragment of her former, whole self. She compares her former, "life and soul of the 
party" self (1.2.1) to her current self who feels cautious in social situations, partly 
due to a perceived loss of control over this new identity.  
 
I wanna go out, of course I do. I wanna go out. I wanna get smashed. I wanna be the 
person that I was. (Emma: 1.4.8) 
 
Here, Emma suggests that she is struggling to accept her new identity, instead 
wishing she could be the person she was before GAD. In Kirsty’s extract of pre-
planning a recent holiday, she also describes a lost sense of self but appears 
hopeful of its return:   
 
I knew like where the local shops were and how far the beach was and what [laughter] 
the cafés were called, [ ] whereas before, you kind of go and then you explore don’t 
you? Erm so I think it would be nice to get back to being able to do that. (Kirsty: 5.6.2) 
 
Kirsty implies a wish to be a past, more spontaneous self. Her transition from 
speaking in the first person when talking about her current self: "I knew", to second 
person when talking about her former self: "before, you kind of go", indicates the 
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vast distance between her current and former self. Chloe wishes she was her child 
self: 
 
That’s the thing about being a kid again, being like: oh, I just wanna be a kid forever, 
sort of thing cos I, I’m scared of the future. (Chloe: 8.5.3) 
 
Chloe perceives that being a child involves less responsibilities such as employment 
which is one of her main worries. Here, she implies an impossible wish to 
permanently maintain a sense of childhood innocence which would allow her to 
remain oblivious to such adult responsibilities and the future. Instead, she seems 
weighed down by her perceptions of both, and perhaps also by fear of the future’s 
inherent uncertainty.  
 
Other participants perceive that they will never be their former selves. Sarah seems 
to describe the sense of painful loss encompassed in this realisation: 
 
I’ve learnt that like this is it. [ ] I’m not gonna wake up one day and [in-breath] I’ll be 
me when I was … what? Twenty-, say twenty-four, when [ ] I didn’t get anxious about 
things. [ ] I used to be really good in interviews. [ ] I didn’t feel nervous, and I know 
that would be a normal level of anxiety, but I didn’t really have that. Now, I have that 
like multiplied. (Sarah: 7.4.2) 
 
Sarah’s description of learning suggests that this finite ("this is it") realisation is 
difficult to accept. Her extreme description of a past self who never felt anxious 
conveys a previous perception of an invincible self that has been replaced by a 
juxta-posing incredibly anxious, vulnerable self; a transition she is struggling to 
come to terms with.  
 
Most participants also describe ruminating about past events. Despite their inability 
to change these events’ outcomes, they appear to relentlessly worry about them. 
Rob’s account is notable for the way he construes his perceived mistakes as 
separate agencies, capable of violent punishment:  
 
[Perceived past mistakes] They’ll come back and hit you. [ ] It’s like a, a boxer 
punching you in the stomach every now and then and just saying: ‘ooo, you remember 
that?’ You just: ‘that happened to you nine years ago.’ [ ] ‘Blimey’, you know, ‘give 
yourself a break.’ (Rob: 3.8.3) 
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By employing the simile of a boxer simultaneously punching and verbally reminding 
him, Rob suggests that he is repeatedly tortured by his past mistakes. Being 
punched in the stomach evokes the image of being winded and consequently 
incapacitated. Rob indicates that this boxer, although separate from him, lives in his 
mind. He appears surprised by the boxer’s relentless attacks ("blimey"), and his 
more rational, compassionate internal monologue attempts to regain control ("give 
yourself a break").  
 
3.2.3.2   Anticipatory anxiety 
 
Almost all participants appear to experience anticipatory anxiety, often in the form of 
catastrophic future predictions.  
 
If I’ve got a meeting coming up at work erm … my instant thought is: I’m gonna get 
sacked. Then I’m thinking about how I’m gonna pay my bills and it’s like all happening 
at once even though the meeting’s not even taken place. (Marie: 4.7.1)  
 
Marie’s excerpt extends our understanding of her earlier description of her 
excessive thinking: "ten cars coming in for a collision". Here, she predicts a 
catastrophic outcome of a future meeting which then triggers additional catastrophic 
thoughts of being unable to cope with this fictitious scenario.  
 
Sandy’s anticipatory anxiety also results in self-doubt but unlike other participants, 
she explicitly recognises her inability to foresee the future, thus implying the 
pointlessness of worrying: 
 
They [others] can’t see what I see. Well what, what do I see? I don’t see anything cos 
I can’t see into the future. It’s what I think. It’s ‘What ifs?’ Erm and I daren’t do this, 
that and the other, cos what if that happens? [ ] Erm I don’t drive to [location] in 
November cos what if [laughter], what if I can’t drive? (Sandy: 2.9.1) 
 
Sandy starts to proclaim that others lack her future insight, before distinguishing 
between her own inability to foresee the future and her mind’s predictions. Her 
prediction of being unable to drive results in avoidance. Her laughter appears to 
mask the bewilderment, and perhaps a sense of shame, that her seemingly 
irrational self-doubt evokes. Sandy seems to confirm its irrationality in an earlier 
comment: "I’ve been driving twenty-odd years. I can absolutely drive" (2.4.1). 
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Emma’s experience of anticipatory anxiety is poignant because she construes the 
future’s uncertainty as a potentially lethal game: 
 
It’s like a hamster’s running around on this wheel of: oh my God, oh my God, oh my 
God. What’s, what’s gonna happen next? And you just don’t know. It’s like Russian 
roulette. (Emma: 1.4.20) 
 
The image of a hamster running on a wheel implies that Emma’s anticipatory 
anxiety is frantic and recurring. These qualities are captured in her stressed 
repetitions of "oh my God". In likening the uncertainty of the future to Russian 
roulette, Emma seems to perceive it as a dangerous game of chance with a 
potentially catastrophic outcome.  
 
The future’s uncertainty results in a lack of perceived control over it. Most 
participants engage in pre-planning. This appears to provide them with a degree of 
perceived control over the future.  
 
When we [Marie, family, friends] do go somewhere, it’s very particularly planned, so 
erm simple trip to the zoo, [ ] I packed stuff for migraine stuff, my daughter’s inhaler, I 
got sunscreen, two different sorts of sunscreen, packed lunch, but just in case anyone 
doesn’t like cheese sandwiches, I got five different sandwiches. (Marie: 4.7.1) 
 
Here, Marie seems to describe attempts to prepare for every eventuality, even 
packing several of the same item "just in case". This detailed preparation is 
juxtaposed with her description of a "simple" daytrip, implying that such pre-planning 
is unnecessary. As we will explore later, Marie’s need to cater for everyone’s 
requirements partly stems from her desire to feel accepted by others. 
 
While most participants intentionally engage in future planning, Shelley tries not to 
due to her superstitious thinking: 
 
I tried not to think about the future at all because I didn’t wanna think about it and be 
happy because I was convinced like the universe would think: ooh she can’t be happy. 
Let’s stop that from happening. (Shelley: 6.8.1) 
 
In her interview, Shelley explained that her CBT therapist helped challenge some of 
her superstitious thinking, for example, her belief that if she wrote milestones such 
as her son’s birthday on the calendar, she may die before the event occurs. Despite 
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this, she still only tentatively plans the short-term future. As explained in this extract, 
her reluctance is associated with beliefs of not deserving happiness. If she were to 
excitedly anticipate something, she believes that she would be punished by an 
almighty, spiritual power.  
 
3.2.3.3   Trying to stay present 
 
Some participants speak more generally about trying to live in the present moment, 
while others identify specific things to aid this.  
 
I would always think too far ahead and panic about the future [ ], but now things are a 
lot better, I’m just kinda taking one day at a time, living more in the moment. I’m trying 
to at least. (Chloe: 8.6.1) 
 
In her interview, Chloe described feeling less anxious since partaking in various 
psychological therapies and being on antipsychotic medication which has "dulled 
down" (8.1.3) her anxiety. Here, she associates this with an increased ability to live 
each day as it happens as opposed to anxiously anticipating the future. Marie 
describes attempts to replace her unhelpful pre-planning with impulsivity: 
 
I try to be spontaneous cos if I plan too much ahead of time [in-breath], the amount of 
scenarios I play in my head of what can go wrong, is just too much. (Marie: 4.7.1) 
 
Others believe that certain behavioural activities may help ground them in the 
present. Sandy describes trying to schedule in café visits amid her busy work 
schedule, noting how she "enjoyed the moment just chilling" (2.4.13) last time she 
did this. Sarah describes how her mind "can literally be a year ahead" (7.8.1). She 
hopes that yoga will enable her to "stay in the moment" (7.8.1).  
 
This theme has further highlighted participants’ difficulty tolerating absence of 
control. This appears evidenced in their ruminations over things they cannot 
change; events that have already occurred and lost identities or predict; the future.  
 
3.2.4   Doubt 
 
GAD evokes several manifestations of doubt. It can result in constant vigilance.  
98 
 
I’m always looking for something that’s not right. Like my mind goes into overdrive in 
an airport because I always think it’s going to be bombed. (Emma: 1.10.2) 
 
Emma describes constantly scanning the environment for potential threats, 
particularly in potentially crowded situations where, linking with earlier themes, her 
mind seems to jump to catastrophic predictions in the absence of rational proof. 
Hypervigilance is echoed in Sarah’s account of being on "high alert all the time" 
(7.3.2).   
 
All participants describe feeling more anxious in situations they do not have 
perceived control over.  
 
If I hit a traffic jam, I’m a nightmare [ ] cos I’ve got no control then over what’s going 
on. I dunno what’s gone on for this traffic jam to be there. [ ] Any situation that I’m not 
in control of, makes me anxious. (Emma: 1.10.7) 
 
Here, Emma implies her inability to tolerate uncertainty. The extreme noun she uses 
to describe herself: "I’m a nightmare", indicates how angry and ashamed this leaves 
her feeling. Not knowing what caused the traffic jam triggers anxiety, as does not 
knowing when she will be able to resume driving. Driving facilitates her perceived 
control of the situation.  
 
Kirsty’s account extends our understanding of the lengths participants go to, to feel 
in control of their environment.  
 
I wouldn’t go to London, or I don’t know, wherever you live. Like I wouldn’t get public 
transport there because I don’t know exactly what time the buses come. I can tell you 
when every single bus will be outside my house throughout the whole day. [ ] If I 
wasn’t sure on which bus I would need to get, how long it would take to get there, erm 
what time it would come and arrive, and how often they were coming, it’s something 
that I would struggle with. (Kirsty: 5.9.2) 
 
Kirsty feels able to travel locally by bus because she has recited the timetable. She 
also comments on how it is the "same bus" that "goes round in a circle" (5.9.2), 
suggesting that the journey’s familiarity makes it manageable. The extent of her 
need for certainty is implied in the number of journey details she needs to know.    
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Participants’ difficulty tolerating uncertainty encourages them to remain in situations 
they feel in control of and therefore safe. For Rob, this is apparent in his current job:  
 
I’ve stayed here probably too long … because it’s comfortable and I know what I’m 
doing and the likelihood of erm failure, or likelihood of, of doing something wrong is 
less likely because I know the job inside and out. (Rob: 3.9.3) 
 
Rob’s perception of remaining in the job "too long" indicates his desire to move on. 
His account suggests that his reluctance to do so is linked to self-doubt and self-
pressure. This is indicated in his use of extreme words ("failure"; "wrong") to 
describe making mistakes. He attributes his job capability to its familiarity ("know the 
job inside and out") rather than his own self-competence, further suggesting self-
doubt. Indeed, in his interview, Rob described how GAD has resulted in a "reduced 
level of confidence" (3.3.2).  
 
With one exception, all participants describe the self-doubt GAD has triggered.  
 
Sometimes I doubt my ability to do what I’m doing, whatever it is [ ] but I know I can, 
so I dunno what that’s all about. (Sandy: 2.1.2) 
 
This excerpt mirrors Sandy’s earlier account of doubting her ability to drive despite 
her rational mind telling her otherwise. Here, she implies not understanding her self-
doubt (" I dunno what that’s about"). This appears to result from the apparent 
conflict between it and her rational mind’s perceptions of capability.  
 
While some participants’ self-doubt relates to perceptions of capability, others 
distrust their thoughts. 
 
I can’t trust my thoughts. [ ] The thoughts that I have, that then make that anxious 
feeling, have to be questioned all the time: are they real? Are they something that I’ve 
kind of thought up? (Sarah: 7.2.1) 
 
Sarah describes a continuous process of deciphering whether her thoughts are 
rational ("real") or imagined by her irrational mind.  
 
Some participants are suspicious of others.  
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I’ve never had a best friend … erm simply for the fact that people just let you down.     
[ ] I’ve never trusted anybody a hundred percent. (Marie: 4.4.1) 
 
Marie’s difficulty trusting others seems to stem from being "let down" in the past, for 
example, by her father whose apparent neglectful behaviour was discussed in 
section 3.2.2.  
 
This theme has once again demonstrated participants’ difficulty tolerating 
uncertainty and consequent absence of control. They therefore attempt to create 
certainty through familiarity.  
 
3.3   A struggle for autonomy: You either let it get a hold of you, or you get a 
hold of it 
 
This super-ordinate theme captures participants’ continuous struggle for perceived 
control over their senses of self. Participants alternate between feeling in control of 
GAD and GAD taking control of them. GAD’s ability to take control of the self is 
explored in the first theme "GAD takes over self". Within the self, participants’ minds 
and bodies influence one another. These interactions are represented in the second 
theme "The interplay between mind and body". The third theme "I’m torturing 
myself" addresses participants’ construal of GAD inflicting self-torment which 
minimises their perceptions of freedom. The final theme "I’m in control" considers 
participants’ attempts to regain and maintain control over GAD, thus enhancing their 
perceived autonomy.   
 
3.3.1   GAD takes over self 
 
All participants experience GAD as something separate with its own agency, 
capable of gaining control over them. This sense of being taken over by GAD 
manifests itself in different ways across participants.  
 
Some participants construe GAD as something that distorts their perceptions of 
reality.  
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I have that sense of ‘wow’, full on excitement. [ ] ‘God, this is, everything’s working 
out really well’, [ ] and then it, it’ll be the other way, that: ‘oh it’s all doom and gloom 
and I don’t know how I’m gonna deal with anything’. It’s strange. It’s like it really takes 
over. (Sandy: 2.4.8) 
 
Sandy suggests that her positive feelings are overshadowed by GAD’s contrasting 
monologue, whose perceptions of her lifeworld involve absolute pessimism and self-
doubt. In her description of "it" as "strange", Sandy once more implies that this 
pessimistic voice is separate and alien from her; she cannot make sense of it or its 
origin.   
 
Chloe also seems to construe GAD as something separate that negatively distorts 
her perceptions of reality, but her image is of being blinded by it. This extract is 
taken from her narrative of not wanting to answer the phone at work from fear that 
she will not be able to help customers:  
 
The anxiety would just blind it and be like: ‘nope. This time it’s gonna be awful, even 
though I’ve done this a million times before [laughter], it’s going to be awful this time.’ 
(Chloe: 8.5.1) 
 
Chloe describes how her perceived capabilities are distorted by this separate 
anxiety ("the anxiety") despite having successfully coped with this scenario 
numerous times before. Rob also perceives GAD as a separate entity, but his 
account implies that "it" permanently resides within him. 
 
I’ve always had this level of worry and anxiety in, in me [ ] it’s kind of inbuilt [ ] and 
when it’s just in your professional life, you kind of learn to deal with it, but then when 
you’ve got worries outside, [ ] it gets too big, and gets out of control. (Rob: 3.2.1) 
 
Rob’s account evokes a sense of trying to keep this "inbuilt" resident at bay. This 
seems manageable until the worry spreads from work to other aspects of his life. 
When this happens, it appears he is no longer able to contain this resident as it also 
spreads and gains power over him. This sense of GAD spreading over and 
engulfing the self is echoed by Kirsty and Shelley:  
 
If you do cancel something, and then you find out you could have been there on time, 
it’s kind of like the disappointment of letting that consume you again. (Kirsty: 5.10.3) 
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It’s totally all-consuming. [ ] It makes it very hard [ ] in that moment, [ ] to do anything. 
(Shelley: 6.11.6) 
 
Their use of the word "consume" can be understood on several levels. It implies a 
sense of being restricted and smothered by GAD to the point where they cannot "do 
anything". It also positions GAD as a separate entity that devours them.  
 
Finally, Sarah seems to construe GAD as an opponent. This extract is taken from 
her narrative of the night before her wedding:  
 
It’s the anxiety that’s winning, and because I’m so drained, and I’m so tired, and I 
know that I should be asleep, I can’t stop it. (Sarah: 7.7.1)  
 
Sarah described not being able to sleep the night before her wedding because she 
was worrying about it. Here, she construes anxiety as something separate ("the 
anxiety") that has won the game or battle because she cannot defeat "it".  
 
There seems to be a fine line between participant’s control and GAD’s control of the 
self. Rob’s comment captures this: "it doesn’t take a lot for it to take control of me" 
(3.6.14).  
 
3.3.2   The interplay between mind and body 
 
Participants describe experiencing common physical symptoms of anxiety including 
headaches, nausea, and panic attacks. Marie’s description of her frequent 
migraines is notable because it captures the intense physical pain anxiety can 
cause: 
 
The pain is so unbearable that I cannot physically move with it. [ ] The skin on my 
face used to go really tight [ ]. My eyeballs felt like they were balls of cotton wool in 
water. (Marie: 4.5.5) 
 
The image of cotton wool balls in water is striking because it seems to capture the 
fragility of something so valuable; her eyes, being painfully squeezed and shrunken 
by the force of the migraine. Indeed, her whole body seems weakened by it, leaving 
her unable to move.   
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Shelley describes how anxiety slows her body’s self-healing mechanisms: 
 
I had like another little, small operation and it was day surgery. [ ] You should be back 
to work like in two days. I think I was off work for like a month. It just took me so long 
to recover from everything. (Shelley: 6.6.3) 
 
The interaction between mind and body can also work the other way with 
physiological changes arousing anxiety. Rob, for example, described the "self-
fulfilling" prophecy caused by interpreting pain in his left arm as a sign of 
catastrophic ill health: "you could be having a heart attack" (3.3.6). His resultant 
anxiety then perpetuates the physiological symptoms, further convincing him that he 
is seriously ill, and the cycle repeats. This self-fulfilling pattern is echoed by Marie 
who, in her interview, explained that after five months of ongoing throat infections 
she was convinced she had cancer.  
 
I’d caused myself so much anxiety, I was causing the muscles in my neck to clamp. [ ] 
I was almost choking myself where I was that clamped up with it, yeah, so it’s 
surprising how physically damaging you can be to yourself with anxiety. (Marie: 4.1.4) 
 
Marie’s account here, captures how her catastrophic thinking and consequent 
anxiety paradoxically caused more physiological damage than the perceived cancer 
prognosis. Marie also indicates however, that she can find herself attributing every 
physiological change to anxiety: 
 
If I got the shakes, I’d convince myself it was my anxiety. I’d be like: ‘I’m worrying 
about something, but what am I worrying about?’ (Marie: 4.5.7) 
 
Marie concludes that shaking indicates she is worried about something despite 
being unaware of what that something is. I therefore question the degree with which 
participants attribute genuine physiological changes to anxiety, particularly changes 
warranting attention.  
 
Participants also describe physiology’s role in anxiety management. Several 
participants note the importance of eating healthy, regular meals and sufficient 
sleep. For Sarah, the importance of sleep appears to be linked with her earlier 
account of otherwise being too tired to control her anxiety.  
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If I don’t have the right amount of sleep, I can’t control my mind to stop the anxiety. I 
don’t have the energy and I just feel so drained. (Sarah: 7.7.1) 
 
It appears that if Sarah does not sleep sufficiently, GAD "wins" because she is 
completely deprived of the energy ("feel so drained") required to maintain control of 
her mind. Many participants, including Sarah, describe how physically and mentally 
tiring GAD is. Sandy notes how "completely draining" (2.1.1) it is, while Sarah 
describes being "worn down" (7.9.2) by it. The restorative function of sleep seems to 
hold even more importance because it is needed to replenish their limited energy 
resources.  
 
Most participants describe attempts to release anxiety through their bodies.  
 
I don’t know whether you’ve heard of like an EFT workshop? [ ] You literally tap things 
out of your body, so like yesterday when I was driving, I was tapping myself, like in my 
collar bones and then in my temples, you know, and anywhere else that I could, I felt 
that I would release something. (Emma: 1.4.13) 
 
Emma’s account implies a wish to expel her anxiety, and the associated physical 
tension, from her body ("tap things out"). Her description of tapping any reachable 
body part implies her desperate need to rid herself of it. Other participants employ 
physical exercise, writing their worry content and feelings on paper, or talking about 
their anxiety with others.  
 
This theme has highlighted the vicious cycles participants can become trapped in 
when their mind-body balance is out of kilter.  
 
3.3.3   I’m torturing myself 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, given GAD’s apparent endless, illogical nature, that 
participants experience it as something that inflicts psychological and physical 
torment. For Shelley, as for many participants, GAD involves intense fear.  
 
It’s so scary. [ ] I suppose it’s like if you have a really bad nightmare and you wake up, 
and that just instant [ ] where you’re still in your nightmare, and you’ve just woken up 
and you’re like [gasp]. It’s that all the time. (Shelley: 6.12.9) 
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By employing the image of suddenly awakening from a nightmare, Shelley seems to 
imply that her fear feels surreal; where, immediately after waking from a bad dream, 
perceptions of reality remain distorted and frightening. Emma’s account captures 
the psychological torment GAD inflicts.  
 
It is, without a shadow of a doubt, the worst thing I’ve ever experienced in my life. [ ] I 
would rather be in constant labour than deal with anxiety every day, so that kind of 
gives you a little bit of an insight as to how bad it is. (Emma: 1.3.10) 
 
Emma implies that this psychological torment is unimaginable. The only way I can 
begin to imagine its magnitude is by comparing it to a painful experience I may be 
able to contemplate; childbirth. This seems confirmed in the last line: "that kind of 
gives you a little bit of an insight as to how bad it is." 
 
Marie construes GAD as a self-torture device. This excerpt derives from our 
discussion of her physical symptoms.   
 
It’s almost like I’m torturing myself. (Marie: 4.5.1) 
 
Marie implies that she is inflicting these symptoms upon herself. The word "torture" 
suggests self-punishment involving severe physical, and presumably psychological, 
pain.   
 
Participants also seem tormented by their moral emotions. All participants spoke 
about their experiences of GAD with a sense of shame. This was implied in their 
frequent use of adjectives such as "pathetic" and "silly". In her interview, Kirsty 
explained how she panics when she has multiple appointments one after another in 
case she is late to one. Here, she describes contemplating whether to cancel an 
appointment because she thinks she may be late: 
 
‘Oh I should phone them and say: … ‘I can’t come because of this’ because you, you 
don’t wanna phone somebody and say: ‘I can’t come because … I’m anxious’, 
because it kind of makes you feel a bit stupid. (Kirsty: 5.10.3) 
 
The extent of Kirsty’s shame is implied in her desire to keep the real reason for 
cancelling – her anxiety, hidden. Her shame seems to stem from her perception that 
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she will sound "stupid" for cancelling on these grounds and may therefore be 
subjected to external ridicule.  
 
All participants describe feeling self-conscious of their physical appearance and 
actions.  
 
Little things like pulling my skirt down a lot, like when I’m walking down the street. [ ] I 
worry about people laughing at me. [ ] In restaurants I still do it. I’ll be like: ‘oh can we 
go? cos they’re laughing at us or they’re laughing at me’, and they’ll be like: ‘no 
they’re not. They’re really not’, and it was like: ‘no they’re looking right at me.’ (Chloe: 
8.8.2) 
 
The magnitude of Chloe’s self-consciousness is indicated in her need to repeatedly 
adjust her physical appearance. She implies feeling embarrassed at having to fine-
tune "little things". The degree of self-consciousness is also captured in her 
conviction that strangers are ridiculing her despite others’ attempts to reassure her 
otherwise.  
 
In terms of participants’ self-consciousness of action, participants appear to take 
things personally and engage in self-blame. Shelley’s account is striking because it 
captures the stark self-criticism evoked by her perceived wrongdoing:  
 
People [friends] stop asking you to go places, but then you think it’s something you’ve 
done wrong, even though in, the reality is you’re the one that’s pushing them away, 
but you twist it in your brain to think: oh, well it’s because, you know, I’m a really 
rubbish person. (Shelley: 6.2.1) 
 
It appears that Shelley’s irrational mind has created a false and extreme perception 
of reality in which her friends have rejected her, not simply because she has done 
something wrong, but because she is a "rubbish person" to the core.  
 
Self-consciousness also seems to influence participants’ self-expectations. With one 
exception, all participants spoke with a sense of huge self-pressure. In this excerpt, 
Rob describes insights gained through counselling: 
 
I think a lot of stuff that came out erm after my son was in hospital, was around failure 
to do something, [ ] and this is where the irrational part of my, my brain takes over is 
a,  I couldn’t do anything [ ] and it felt awful. (Rob: 3.3.3) 
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Rob’s anxiety peaked following his young son’s hospital treatment for a non-life-
threatening condition. Despite rationally knowing that there was nothing he could 
have done, with his irrational mind in control ("takes over"), he feels helpless that he 
"couldn’t do anything", presumably to assist his son’s recovery or perhaps even 
cure him. His self-pressure seems to evoke feelings of guilt ("it felt awful"). Indeed, 
several participants explicitly described feeling guilty in their interviews. Sarah, for 
example, felt "really guilty" (7.5.1) for extending her work leave following her 
sertraline withdrawal.  
 
In summary, this theme has explored how tormenting GAD can be. Participants 
appear to torture themselves through their moral emotions and self-criticism. Guided 
by their perceived morality, most participants seem to subject themselves to 
immense amounts of self-pressure. When their codes of conduct are violated, they 
feel shame and guilt.  
 
3.3.4   I’m in control 
 
All participants describe their difficulty maintaining control of GAD. 
 
You either let it get a hold of you or you get a hold of it so, that’s taken quite a long 
time for me to realise that but now I am … so I’m, I’m trying to take back the control 
of my life. (Emma: 1.2.1) 
 
Emma implies a new perceived ability to regain control of her life. She indicates that 
before, GAD had such a tight grip on her ("get a hold of") it was in full control. She is 
now "trying" to wriggle free from GAD’s grasp, indicating that this is not easy. Her 
use of the phrase "get a hold of" also implies that she now has more knowledge of 
GAD and how to control it. There is a sense of an uphill battle to maintain control. 
This seems echoed in other participants’ accounts. Rob explains how "you have to 
work at it" (3.6.8), while Sandy describes having to "really try hard" (2.9.3) to control 
her worrying.   
 
Participants employ various GAD management strategies. Several participants 
describe their increased ability to directly challenge their thinking.  
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Instead of: ‘what if I have a car crash? What if Christmas is awful?’ [ ], stopping that 
and saying: ‘but what’s the reality?’ and sort of breaking it down, and then once you 
get into that good habit, then obviously that helps quite a lot. (Sarah: 7.1.5) 
 
Sarah perceives that she has "got it (GAD) under control" because she can stop 
herself (7.9.1). Here, she indicates that this stopping refers to challenging her "what 
ifs" by questioning their rationality and consequent power. This enables her to stop 
her thoughts in their tracks ("breaking it down"). She implies that the more she 
practices this "good habit", the easier it becomes to maintain control over GAD. For 
Shelley, the stopping process seems to involve acknowledging her catastrophic 
thoughts without acting on them:   
 
I try and just let the thought cross my mind now and leave my mind, rather than 
staying in there and worrying about it even more. I try and just let it go [ ] let’s just 
move on. (Shelley: 6.9.1) 
 
Instead of being influenced by her catastrophic predictions, it appears that Shelley is 
trying to recognise them for what they are; thoughts. This enables her to carry on 
with her day as planned without her thoughts governing her behaviour.  
 
Despite attempts to challenge their thinking directly, participants also spoke with a 
sense of wanting to avoid anxiety as much as possible. Avoidance strategies 
include distraction and behaviours that minimise perceived threat. Sandy appears to 
seek distraction from her self-awareness:  
 
We [Sandy and her friend] went and had a coffee and sat [ ] for hours talking. That 
was good, and I was thinking: yeah do this [ ] more often. [ ] We didn’t talk about 
anything that was going on for me, just random stuff. (Sandy: 2.5.5) 
 
In her interview, Sandy implied another reason for wanting to keep the focus off her 
internal world - fear that her friend may respond to it in the same way that others 
have; with ridicule and rejection. Others’ responses to GAD will be explored in detail 
in super-ordinate theme three.  
 
Participants appear to go to extreme behavioural lengths to protect themselves from 
perceived threats, thus maintaining perceived control. Shelley for example, turns all 
electrical appliances off in her house before she goes out from fear that the house 
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might burn down with her dog inside. Chloe reduces her risk of forgetting something 
by repeatedly checking that she has everything she needs before going out: 
 
I worry about forgetting things. Like before I go out, like I check my bag over and over 
and over again, like in a kind of ritual way. (Chloe: 8.8.2) 
 
Chloe did not elaborate on her fear of forgetting but forgetting signifies ultimate loss 
of self-control. The word "ritual" suggests an obsessional quality to repeatedly 
needing to check her bag before she is satisfied that she has not forgotten anything. 
Chloe’s narrative echoes participants’ need to prepare for every eventuality.  
 
Participants describe feeling more in control of GAD now, overall. Some participants 
attribute this to their "inner strength" (Emma: 1.11.1) which has enabled them to 
"push through" (Shelley: 6.12.7) anxiety-provoking situations as opposed to 
avoiding them. Others attribute this to their increased ability to challenge their 
irrational thoughts or their ability to recognise that their thoughts are just thoughts; 
they do not have to govern emotions or behaviour. Some participants acknowledge 
others’ roles in facilitating or hindering their perceived control over GAD. This leads 
us to the third super-ordinate theme.  
 
3.4   GAD and interpersonal relations: Worrying about what others think 
 
This super-ordinate theme considers the interactions between participants’ 
experiences of GAD and their relationships with others. "GAD through others’ 
lenses" captures participants’ experiences of how others perceive GAD. "Striving to 
belong" explores participants’ apparent need to feel accepted by others and the 
various approaches they employ to attain this sense of belonging. "Helpfulness of 
support" addresses participants’ experiences of varying degrees of, and total 
absence of support from others, in both personal and professional capacities. 
Lastly, "Concern for others’ welfare" explores participants’ strong desire to protect 
their loved ones and those who may be living similar experiences from harm.  
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3.4.1   GAD through others’ lenses 
 
With one exception, all participants suggest that GAD needs to be seen by others to 
be believed. In her interview, Sandy described how her partner is very critical of her 
for not doing enough to resolve her anxiety.  
 
Cos he [partner] doesn’t see an, an actual illness of some kind, he can’t see it [GAD]. 
He can’t- 
 
I: And he can’t understand? 
 
Understand.       (Sandy: 2.5.3 – 2.5.4) 
 
Here, Sandy suggests that her partner does not understand GAD because unlike an 
"actual illness" that either has visible symptoms or can be visualised, GAD is not 
tangible and therefore cannot be envisaged by her partner. Emma’s account seems 
to echo this perception that seeing is believing, but she suggests that those who do 
not believe GAD actively choose not to envision it:  
 
A lot of people don’t believe it because … you can’t see it. [ ] When it’s in ya head, it’s 
literally in your head, so nobody else can see it, unless they want to see it. [ ] A lot of 
people don’t want to see it because they don’t believe it. (Emma: 1.3.1) 
 
Emma also implies that GAD is not automatically visible to others but can be seen if 
people look hard enough. She suggests that those who do not want to believe that 
GAD exists avoid seeing it to maintain denial. This sense of denying GAD’s 
existence is echoed in Chloe’s account of her mother’s initial response to it: 
 
My mum had always been like: ‘oh, you’re just a worrier. [ ] You’re just flapping like 
your dad’, and it was just disregarded as petty. [ ] I guess that had been drummed 
into me as like: ‘oh, you’re just being silly. Just making it up.’ (Chloe: 8.2.10) 
 
While some participants perceive that those who have had similar experiences or 
have been close to someone who has, tend to understand GAD more, Chloe 
suggests that this was not the case concerning her mother. She implies that her 
mother initially did not take GAD seriously, instead reducing it to a common trait her 
father shares. Chloe consequently started to believe the messages that were 
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"drummed into" her of imagining GAD. Chloe went on to describe the moment her 
mother realised that GAD "is really a real thing" (8.3.17). Chloe threatened to cut 
herself with a knife because her mother was once again pressuring her to get a job, 
something that causes Chloe great anxiety. Since then, her mother has learnt more 
about GAD. Chloe also describes society’s increasing awareness of mental health 
generally. This appears to have helped both Chloe and her mother to normalise, 
and therefore accept, GAD. 
 
More recently, the last few months or so, I’ve seen things in the news on the telly.  
[ ] Mental health’s just been taken more seriously now than when I was at school. 
(Chloe: 8.2.10) 
 
Several participants suggest that it is not just a case of others believing that GAD 
exists that facilitates their understanding of it. Actively doing something about GAD 
seems to promote external validation.  
 
My wife [ ] has been a-, amazing through it. [ ] She kind of recognises what it is but 
also the fact that I’ve done something about it. [ ] We both know people that erm have 
got into a far worse state because they haven’t done things about it. (Rob: 3.6.1) 
 
Rob implies that his wife may not have been as understanding if he had not been 
proactive about GAD. This is suggested in his comparison to those who have gotten 
into a "far worse state"; a state that is the perceived direct result of not acting on 
GAD. He implies that his wife would struggle to cope with GAD in its unrestrained 
form. Indeed, most participants describe the negative impact GAD has had on those 
closest to them. Shelley’s account is notable for the way GAD can indirectly restrict 
others:    
 
When I was ill, really quite ill, he just stopped like going places as well [ ] I would 
always [ ] have just this massive panic attack and I’d be crying and [ ] he was like: ‘I 
can’t deal with that.’ He said: ‘I’d rather just not even go’, [ ] it was easier for him. 
(Shelley: 6.4.6) 
 
Here, Shelley construes GAD as a disease with varying degrees of illness. She 
implies that when she was "really ill" with GAD, her partner could not cope with her 
extreme anxiety at the thought of leaving the safety of home. He would rather avoid 
the possibility. Shelley informed me that she used to cancel social plans at the last 
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minute, even if their friends had put a lot of effort into hosting. The fact that her 
partner would not go out without her suggests feelings of guilt and embarrassment.   
Finally, although participants imply that seeing is believing, there is a sense that 
GAD can never be fully understood by others.  
 
For people to just try and understand it more would be amazing, you know? (Emma: 
1.11.1) 
 
Emma implies that the act of trying to understand GAD would satisfy her. This 
extract emphasises her experience of others who quickly dismiss GAD as "a load of 
bull" (1.4.1).  It also draws parallels with Emma’s internal experience of GAD as 
something which perhaps neither she - nor others - will ever fully understand. Her 
question ("you know?") suggests that she is seeking reassurance that I am also 
trying to understand.    
 
3.4.2   Striving to belong  
 
All participants appear to worry about being accepted by others. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given their prior experiences of others’ rejection. The importance 
placed on others’ perceptions of them is summarised by Chloe: 
 
My colleagues not liking me. I worry about what other people think, a lot. 
 
I: Ok, a-, about you? 
 
Yeah. 
 
I: And not being accepted? Cos you mentioned before about fitting in. 
 
Yeah [ ] but [ ] in the job I’m in now, it’s like a [ ] happy family sort of thing. It feels very 
different to any other workplace I’ve been in.        (Chloe: 8.1.10 – 8.1.12) 
 
The extent of Chloe’s concern for others’ perceptions of her aids our understanding 
of her seemingly relentless self-consciousness, discussed in section 3.3.3. This 
account suggests that she always expects rejection and mistreatment from others, 
presumably due to previous experiences of this. Indeed, in her interview, Chloe 
discussed former managers who behaved inappropriately towards her. These past 
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experiences are starkly contrasted with her construal of her current workplace as a 
"happy family", suggesting a new, and perhaps exaggerated, sense of intimate 
belonging.  
 
Fear of not fitting in also seems to stem from participants’ perceptions of themselves 
as different or abnormal. This is bluntly captured in Sarah’s narratives of her 
wedding day: 
 
Going into make-up feeling very aware that everyone else is very normal and I’m not 
normal. (Sarah: 7.7.1) 
 
Sarah described feeling "really anxious" (7.7.1) when she woke up on her wedding 
day. Here, her perceived abnormality stems from comparing herself to those around 
her. She assumes that she is feeling and behaving differently to the wedding party. 
These comparisons continued throughout the day: 
 
‘I’m not enjoying it. [in-breath] Everyone else is enjoying it’, which probably isn’t true   
[ ] but [ ] you make yourself feel like you’re the only one which just makes it so much 
worse. (Sarah: 7.7.1) 
 
Sarah indicates that this self-other comparison leaves her feeling isolated ("the only 
one") which further strengthens her perceived abnormality.  
 
Participants consequently appear to go to great lengths to feel like they belong. 
Kirsty describes frequently "trying to show normal behaviour" (5.5.6). Here, she 
refers to hosting a dinner party for friends: 
 
I perhaps ate more than I normally would. [ ] You’re perhaps not hungry erm because 
you’re still quite stressed out about the situation, but because everybody expects you 
to be eating, because that’s a normal situation, so I think sometimes you 
overcompensate for that. (Kirsty: 5.5.4) 
 
Kirsty describes not feeling hungry due to the anxiety induced by hosting. She was 
particularly worried that her friends would not like the food; implying that rejection of 
food symbolises a rejection of her whole self. Her perceived social norms, which 
she assumes her friends share, cause her to eat more than usual despite not feeling 
hungry. Eating also prevents others asking why she is not, thus minimising the 
possibility of having to explain what is going on internally. Conscious efforts to 
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conceal GAD presumably derive from a desire to feel accepted by others. Indeed, 
many participants describe attempts to hide GAD. This makes sense considering 
others’ dismissive responses to GAD and participants’ consequent feelings of 
shame. Like Kirsty, other participants conceal GAD by controlling their external 
persona. Sandy describes being "really good at managing how I come across" 
(2.1.7), while Rob’s account evokes a sense of intentional isolation via an 
impermeable, exterior barrier:    
 
They [colleagues] would say that I’m very confident, [ ] what it [GAD] does is it puts a  
façade up, [ ] people will think that I’m ok but I, actually inside I’m, I’m not. [ ] There’s 
like a brick wall that I put up around me that, that just tries to protect myself. (Rob: 
3.3.2) 
 
Rob seems to have closed himself off with this "brick wall", rendering his fragile, 
self-doubting inner self inaccessible to the outside world. His intentional isolation 
functions as a self-protection mechanism. This is echoed in others’ accounts.  
 
Wanting to be on my own is because if I, if I’m in my own space, then I haven’t got to 
speak to anyone and I haven’t got to talk about anything. (Sandy: 2.2.3) 
 
Sandy isolates because she perceives that others do not understand her internal 
experiences. She predicts, for example, that if she told her mother how she was 
feeling she would starkly reject Sandy: "oh don’t be stupid. There’s nothing wrong 
with you" (2.2.1). Sandy’s isolation creates internal conflict because she also craves 
a sense of belonging: "I wanna be on my own, but then I feel lonely" (2.2.3).  
 
For Marie, isolation functions to conserve energy. 
 
Sometimes I’d just rather be on my own [ ] putting that effort can be more exhausting 
cos it’s more things [laughter] to worry about, especially if [ ] I have someone round, 
it’s er trying to make sure my house is tidy, doesn’t smell. [ ] Then it’s the conversation 
content. Making sure that [ ] there’s no awkward silent patches. (Marie: 4.4.17) 
 
Social contact introduces more worry topics that appear to relate to others’ 
acceptance of her. Her desire to be perceived in a positive light seems confirmed in 
her description of wanting people "to have a nice opinion of me" (4.4.14). Some of 
these worries seem to stem from past experiences. She mentioned that her 
childhood home was in an "awful state" (4.4.12) and her school peers used to 
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comment on the fact that her uniform smelt. Marie therefore strives to protect herself 
from further rejection by ensuring that she does not give anyone reason to perceive 
her negatively.  
 
This theme then, has highlighted the extreme lengths participants go to to feel like 
they belong. Paradoxically, this can involve intentionally isolating themselves. It is 
noteworthy that in most of these accounts, participants switch from using the first-
person position ("I") to second person ("you") when referring to themselves. This 
implies their desire to somehow belong to another, whilst emphasising their 
perceived differences, and therefore distance, from others.  
 
3.4.3   Helpfulness of support 
 
Participants describe mixed experiences concerning support from those closest to 
them. For Kirsty, her longer-term friends (ten-plus years) are generally more 
supportive than those she met more recently. Kirsty attributes this to the fact that 
her long-term friends knew her before she began experiencing GAD and therefore 
understand that when she cancels plans at the last minute, it is not because she is 
"unreliable" (5.4.1). These friends consequently seem more accommodating of 
Kirsty’s needs, particularly when she feels too anxious to leave home:   
 
They come round like to see me and to spend time with my son and erm maybe take 
my son out. (Kirsty: 5.4.1) 
 
Emma suggests that others can still be supportive of GAD, regardless of whether 
they understand it: 
 
I’m very lucky with my mum and dad erm because they are very supportive even if 
they don’t understand it, [ ] they’re still there and I know [ ] they’re not going anywhere. 
(Emma: 1.4.31)  
 
Emma’s account suggests that others do not have to do anything in particular to be 
helpful. Her parents’ apparent unwavering presence and investment in Emma’s 
wellbeing, despite not understanding her internal experiences, is sufficient for her to 
feel supported. It appears that Sandy has not shared this experience. Her partner’s 
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inability to understand GAD seems to have resulted in a total absence of emotional 
support. 
 
He’s not been there [ ]. When I’ve stood in front of him, absolutely breaking my heart, 
hands in my head, and just dunno what I’m doing, he’s just walked away, and all I’ve 
wanted was him just to hold me. (Sandy: 2.5.1) 
 
Like Emma, Sandy, through her desire to be held, implies that all she needs from 
her partner is emotional comfort and stability, particularly during moments of intense 
emotional pain ("breaking my heart") and helplessness ("dunno what I’m doing").  
 
Set against these positive perceptions of emotional support, Chloe suggests that too 
much soothing, to the point of over-protection, is equally as unhelpful as dismissal.   
 
One thing he [her father] said was like the worst advice he could have given me, 
where he was like: ‘if you get too nervous, just come home’, and I did, and I quit that 
job. [ ] I could have just er pushed on [laughter] maybe, if he hadn’t said that, so both 
my parents very different ways of treating it [GAD], and neither seemed [laughter] 
quite right; of being totally soft or totally harsh. (Chloe: 8.3.2) 
 
Chloe stated that her mother used the "tough love approach" (8.3.2) before she took 
GAD seriously, whereas her father continues to be "totally soft". Here, she conveys 
the unhelpfulness of both approaches. She implies that her father’s apparent 
mollycoddling reinforces her self-doubt that she cannot cope with workplace anxiety. 
Instead of challenging her beliefs by staying in the situation, her father encourages 
her to flee. He also reassures her that he will always protect her from perceived 
threats: "you can always come home to us" (8.3.2).  
 
Participants also convey mixed reviews concerning their experiences of professional 
support. With regards to interactions with physicians, Sarah’s account seems to 
summarise others’ narratives of not feeling heard:  
 
They’re [doctors] just there to diagnose you. They’re not, they don’t have an interest in 
you personally. They just sort of saw it as: ‘no, you’ve got anxiety back’ [ ] they were 
offering to put me on different things and higher doses. I just thought: [ ] all you want 
to do is put a pill down my neck. (Sarah: 7.1.4) 
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In her interview, Sarah spoke in detail about her experiences of being put on 
diazepam followed by various brands and doses of sertraline, as well as her 
decision to come off medication altogether because she felt that it was increasing 
her anxiety. Here, she describes how the physicians rejected her claim that the 
medication withdrawal was responsible for her increased anxiety. She perceives 
that physicians "don’t have an interest in you personally", implying that the complex 
human existence is reduced to a physiological machine that can be "diagnosed" and 
fixed. She seems to convey how physicians silence her feelings by putting "a pill 
down my neck".  
 
For others, their physician’s support has been invaluable. Shelley is notable for the 
way she construes one physician as the initial change catalyst.  
 
I thank my lucky stars that I saw this doctor on this day because all the other doctors 
that I’d seen, with all these various, different illnesses, they just … I don’t know, do 
what? Like prescribe like some painkiller or, you know, send you off for a blood test or 
something [in-breath] but [ ] she said: ‘I will test your blood for thyroid levels but [ ] is 
there any possibility that this is more mental than physical?’, and [ ] I was like: 
‘actually yeah, I think it is.’ (Shelley: 6.6.1) 
 
She referred me to, first of all, to the GP’s like counsellor, then onto a psychologist, 
and then onto the CBT guy. [ ] Thank God for her because I dread to think. [ ] I 
couldn’t have carried on as I was. (Shelley: 6.6.5) 
 
Echoing Sarah’s perceptions, in the first extract Shelley describes how previous 
physicians attributed her recurring illnesses to a physiological cause or offered to 
prescribe medicine. When Shelley proposed her thyroid was to blame, this 
physician tentatively suggested that it could be anxiety. She listened to Shelley’s 
opinion, presumably making it easier for Shelley to consider anxiety’s role, thus 
facilitating a shift from denial to acceptance. The second extract conveys the 
physician’s investment in Shelley’s wellbeing; she directed her to further 
professional support systems. Shelley seems to struggle to envision her continued 
existence if she had not seen this physician ("I dread to think"; "I couldn’t have 
carried on as I was"), implying that she was Shelley’s saviour ("thank God for her"). 
Shelley confirms this in a later comment: "I honestly think I’d probably be dead" 
(6.12.7).  
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Many participants attribute their positive experiences of psychological therapy to the 
fact that it helped them challenge their irrational thinking. Echoing Shelley’s 
perception of her physician’s invaluable support, Marie describes the life-changing 
impact of CBT: 
 
The biggest one I was taught in CBT is to say ‘stop’. [ ] The best question they used 
to ask me was: ‘what’s the worst that can happen? [ ] Face your fear of what’s the 
worst that can happen.’ (Marie: 4.1.12) 
 
The CBT changed my life. [ ] Now, [in-breath] I’m a lot more upbeat, a lot more erm 
flowy with how I move, whereas before they [colleagues] said you could physically 
see the weight of it on me. (Marie: 4.6.3) 
 
As discussed in section 3.3.4, it appears that the thought challenging Marie was 
"taught" in CBT has enabled her to regain a level of control over GAD. Her 
embodied self can move more freely as GAD’s constraints weaken. This image of 
the physical weight of GAD being lifted off her starkly contrasts with her earlier 
description of sometimes being unable to move due to the severity of her migraines, 
indicating her need to downplay her distress.  
 
Emma contrastingly appears to feel let down by her counselling experience. She 
attributes her ability to regain some control over GAD to her self-resilience in the 
absence of sufficient psychological support.  
 
I’ve had to build myself up because it took months for the counselling referral to 
come through, erm … and then the counselling stops and then what? They couldn’t 
find the, the root of the problem. [ ] Well how the fuck am I supposed to know? You 
know, how am I supposed to … [in-breath] do anything? [ ] It’s just not good enough. 
(Emma: 1.4.19) 
 
Here, Emma evokes a sense of being left alone to fend for herself, both whilst 
waiting for counselling and after it ended. She explicitly confirms this perception in 
an earlier comment: 
 
It needs to be dealt with [ ] in a lot … more in-depth way, rather than, you know, six 
counselling sessions and: ‘oh yeah, you’ll be fixed. Oh deal with it yourself.’ (Emma: 
1.3.3) 
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It appears that Emma hoped that if her counsellor could identify the "root cause" of 
GAD, she could help her fix the "problem". The absence of this preconception 
seems to leave Emma feeling even more confused and helpless because nobody, 
not even a trained professional, can offer a logical explanation for her experiences 
or a solution. Emma seems to mask her vulnerability with anger ("how the fuck am I 
supposed to know?").  
 
3.4.4   Concern for others’ welfare 
 
Participants with children (five participants) express extreme concern, to the point of 
over-protection, for their children’s wellbeing. Kirsty describes excessively worrying 
about her son’s safety: 
 
I: What is it exactly that you worry about? 
 
[ ] A lot of it kind of centres around my child and the things that could happen to him    
[ ]. My sister has to take my son to the farm because I … stop him from doing things 
there because I’m scared that the animals might bite him, even though it’s a petting 
zoo [laughter], and they’re like guinea pigs [laughter], and I shouldn’t be worried about 
that because if he gets bitten, he’ll cry and then he’ll be fine, but I worry that he might 
get bitten and seriously hurt. (Kirsty: 5.8.1)  
 
Kirsty’s catastrophic predictions of threat, even in the apparent absence of danger 
("petting zoo"), result in overprotection. Despite acknowledging the irrationality of 
her worries, they are maintained through her avoidance of the situation. The fact 
that Kirsty allows her sister to take her son to the farm implies that she does not 
want him to share her perception of the world as fundamentally dangerous.  
 
Shelley, who also has a young (two-year-old) son, explicitly describes how her 
motivation to challenge her irrational thinking and consequent behaviour derived 
from not wanting her son to grow up feeling irrationally fearful of everything: 
 
You pick up a lot from peoples’ behaviour, and obviously at his age, he t-, he takes 
everything on board, so I didn’t want him to think the world was a scary place. [ ] 
They’re not reasonable worries so I was really determined to try and get better for 
him. (Shelley: 6.12.7) 
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Shelley notes how her son has "given me that motivation to push myself" (6.12.7) to 
face anxiety-provoking situations and therefore challenge her irrational worries.  
While Kirsty and Shelley’s concerns are rooted in their children’s safety, Marie 
worries that her children will be rejected by others. The following narrative draws 
parallels with her own fear of rejection: 
 
I don’t want my kids’ uniforms to smell, [ ] I’m always going on at my daughter at like 
antiperspirants and, and stuff like that. You know, I try not to push my anxieties on 
‘em but I’m tryna also protect ‘em [ ] cos I know children can be cruel. (Marie: 4.4.13) 
 
Like Shelley, Marie does not want to "push" her worries onto her children. However, 
she appears torn between this and trying to protect her children from the same 
"cruel" rejection she experienced as a child. Like Kirsty, Marie seems to over-protect 
her children via attempts to eliminate any source of threat; this time in the form of 
ridicule. Despite this, she also tries to shelter her children from excessive anxiety 
using her own management strategies: 
 
If my daughter shows any signs of it [GAD], [ ] I try and use my techniques to help 
her. (Marie: 4.1.11) 
 
She [daughter] had a problem with school [ ] and I actually said it to her: ‘so what’s the 
worst that can happen?’, and she’d tell me. [ ] I said: ‘and what’s the problem with 
that?’, you know, and we’d talk it out, you know, cos I think fear sometimes makes 
anxiety worse. (Marie: 4.1.12) 
 
Marie employs thought challenging when her daughter catastrophises perceived 
problems. She suggests that talking about anxiety with another person can reduce 
its power. However, when it comes to her own anxiety, she does not always talk 
about it with others despite wanting to, noting "I just don’t wanna be a burden to 
people" (4.8.6). This self-perception of feeling like a burden is echoed by Sandy. 
 
I wouldn’t wanna talk to friends that have had a tough time cos I don’t want them to 
feel they’re taking a burden of my issues on. (Sandy: 2.3.4) 
 
Sandy expresses her endeavour to protect those friends who have experienced 
their own difficulties by not imposing her own sense of struggle on them. She 
implies that sharing her own challenging experiences might reactivate her friends’ 
difficulties somehow. In contrast, Rob hopes that sharing his own experiences with 
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those who have experienced or are experiencing similar challenges helps them as 
much as it helps him.  
 
If me saying that this is happening to me, helps at least one other person, then it’s, 
it’s, it’s ok because I think [ ] a lot of people suffer in silence, and actually, talking 
about it [GAD] makes me feel better. (Rob: 3.6.6) 
 
Rob indicates a wish to normalise GAD, and perhaps wider mental health 
difficulties, so that individuals do not "suffer in silence" because they feel alone in 
their senses of struggle. Rob seems to be slowly destroying the "brick wall" he 
created to conceal his true, vulnerable sense of self.  
 
Indeed, as already mentioned, participants discussed their altered perspectives of 
GAD and the consequent changes they have made regarding their responses to it. 
This leads us to the final super-ordinate theme.  
 
3.5   The need to create meaning amid uncertainty and loss: GAD is an eye-
opener 
 
This super-ordinate theme draws upon the previous three. In order to tolerate the 
uncertainty, torment, and losses (of participants’ senses of self, perceived control 
and external support) GAD has caused, and continues to cause participants, it 
appears that they need to locate meaning within their distress. Meaning is created 
through attempts to convince themselves that they have come to terms with GAD, 
and this is explored in the first theme "Learning to ride with GAD (I suppose)". 
Meaning is also derived via convictions that GAD has taught them something 
valuable, and this is addressed in the final theme "Now I appreciate things more".  
 
3.5.1   Learning to ride with GAD (I suppose) 
 
This theme explores participants’ narratives of trying to accept GAD. Here, 
acceptance refers to making (a degree of) peace with GAD as opposed to wanting 
to eradicate it.  
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Some participants explicitly describe their difficulty accepting GAD, while others 
evoke a sense of trying to convince me – and themselves? - that they have come to 
terms with it despite counterpart accounts suggesting otherwise.  
 
Kirsty explicitly describes her difficulty accepting GAD, especially when she feels 
particularly anxious: 
 
If I’m having a particularly bad day, it kinda makes you feel a little bit hopeless 
because … [ ] nobody can’t, just lives with everyday anxiety [GAD] and just says: ‘oh 
that’s ok, like no problem.’ (Kirsty: 5.7.1) 
 
Emma’s apparent difficulty accepting GAD is implicit.  
 
It’s [GAD] one of those things. You gotta learn to … ride with it I s’pose. (Emma: 
1.4.34) 
 
The phrase "it’s one of those things" suggests that Emma is trying to downplay 
GAD’s challenges despite her earlier description of it as the worst "thing" she has 
ever experienced. It also implies that GAD is unpreventable and thus something she 
is reluctantly ("I s’pose") forced to accept ("ride with it"). Her reluctance seems 
evident in her hope of eventual cure: 
 
My doctor said: ‘one day you might just snap out of it as quickly as you snapped into 
it’, so [ ] that’s the hope I will live for, that one day it will just disappear. However, I’m 
not naïve enough to think: yeah that’s gonna happen like the next day, which is what 
you hope, [ ] and when it doesn’t happen, then you get disappointed. [ ] I know it will 
happen one day but I know that that day isn’t around the corner. (Emma: 1.11.6) 
 
Here, Emma suggests a need to remain hopeful that "one day" GAD will "just 
disappear" despite questioning the possibility. Hope seems to enable Emma to 
continue living a meaningful life ("the hope I will live for"). Emma implies that without 
hope, she would struggle to cope with the distress GAD causes her. Emma’s 
description of having to "ride with it" suggests that the process of coming to terms 
with GAD is a journey. This sense of embarking on a journey towards acceptance is 
echoed in others’ accounts. Like Emma, Marie wishes that GAD would suddenly 
disappear: 
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I’d love to be able to just sit here and not have all these thoughts in my head all the 
time. (Marie: 4.1.2) 
 
However, Marie also seems to acknowledge the unlikelihood of this wish coming 
true. Echoing Shelley’s earlier account of allowing thoughts to come into her mind 
without trying to alter them, here Marie describes forming a similar accepting 
relationship with her anxious thoughts that allows her to regain power over them: 
 
I have to just ride it out and get through the other side before I can say: ‘you know 
what? Stop.’ You know, I have to take the journey before I can say: ‘stop.’  
 
I: Uhuh, and in terms of riding it out, do you mean letting those worries-? 
 
I have to let the thoughts go through.       (Marie: 4.7.1 – 4.7.2) 
 
Furthermore, Marie explains how the knowledge gained from CBT aided her ability 
to accept GAD as well as learning that she is not alone in her experiences of it.  
 
It was just learning that there are other people out there, [ ] I think learning the 
medical side of it [ ] really helped as well cos they explained about the serotonin 
levels, so that really helped [ ] cos I didn’t feel like I was so abnormal, you know that 
there is a medical reason for it and- 
 
I: Ok, so that helped you personally? 
 
Yeah, [ ] it helped me to accept it, you know, and I felt really empowered by having 
the knowledge as well.       (Marie: 4.9.3 – 4.9.4) 
 
Knowledge of something so illogical facilitates Marie’s perceived control over it. 
Attributing a physiological understanding to her GAD symptomology allows her to 
feel less "abnormal" because she now has another tangible explanation for it that is 
located outside of her mind. This seems to eradicate her perceived responsibility for 
GAD. Moreover, it allows her to perceive that these "medical reasons" can occur in 
anyone, thereby normalising her experience.  
 
Sarah also conveys the long process involved in reaching (a degree of) acceptance.    
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There’s been a lot of, you know, talking about things and seeing different counsellors 
and trying to understand it. Getting over the frustration and the annoyance that this 
has happened to you in the first place. That took a long time. (Sarah: 7.7.5) 
 
In her interview, Sarah discussed her initial anger and rejection towards GAD and 
her negative experiences of medication and medication withdrawal: "this isn’t how 
life should be" (7.5.1). Here, she implies a need to mourn her lost sense of self and 
life direction before she could begin the acceptance process. This sense of loss is 
implied in her use of the second-person position to describe her own experience 
("happened to you"). Like Marie, Sarah’s increased understanding of GAD seems to 
have facilitated her perceived control over it and therefore her acceptance of it.  
 
If we’re gonna have a baby, we’re gonna have a baby. If it heightens my anxiety, then 
we’ll deal with it [ ] but spending time obsessing over it and thinking about it, and ‘what 
if-ing’, and catastrophising … doesn’t do anything for me. (Sarah: 7.2.4) 
 
Sarah worried about becoming pregnant because the hormone changes may 
increase her anxiety. Here, she suggests that learning about her thought patterns, 
presumably during her referenced counselling experiences, has enabled her to fear 
anxiety less. Instead of being governed by her thought patterns, Sarah appears to 
be regaining control of her decisions, for example, to have a baby. Sarah seems to 
confirm her increased ability to tolerate anxiety because she no longer perceives it 
as a threat to her personal safety in a later comment:  
 
Now, it is just, I feel anxious and I know that that’s not gonna hurt me. (Sarah: 7.9.1) 
 
Finally, society’s increasing awareness of mental health has helped Chloe to not 
only accept that GAD exists but has also aided her perceptions of it as "normal".  
 
Seeing it in the news and things, and so like my parents seeing that, and yeah, that’s 
really helped me. [laughter]  
 
I: To feel like- 
 
It’s normal. It’s a real thing.       (Chloe: 8.10.29 – 8.10.30) 
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Chloe noted how she "tried to keep it (GAD) hidden for a very long time", partly 
because she "didn’t think it was a real thing" (8.3.5). Her new perception of GAD as 
"normal" and "real" seems to have enabled her to be more open and accepting of it.  
 
This is the first job where [in-breath] everyone knows about it, and my boss has seen 
me really bad. Like she’s seen me crying and upset and stuff [ ] yet she still wanted 
me to work for her, and that was really shocking to me. [ ] I didn’t have to worry all the 
time about … hiding it. (Chloe: 8.3.29) 
 
It appears that being open about her experience of GAD has challenged Chloe’s 
assumption that others will reject her if she exposes her true self. Acceptance from 
others seems to have increased her self-acceptance; she no longer feels the need 
to hide her vulnerability in shame. This leads us to the final theme.  
 
3.5.2   Now I appreciate things more 
 
This theme considers participants’ narratives of how their experiences of GAD have 
taught them something valuable; about themselves, others, or life’s meaning.  
 
Several participants convey a sense of increased self-acceptance, including a 
greater emphasis on self-care. Kirsty describes how she has recently started 
reading in the evenings, noting "it’s important to take some time out for yourself" 
(5.6.4), while Sandy notes that her café breaks "completely give myself that time" 
(2.4.13). Emma’s apparent transition from perceived failure to self-acceptance 
seems to have facilitated her self-care:  
 
Some days, I don’t wanna come out the house, and I love those days now. I used to 
feel like a failure for ‘em but I love those days because now, I see them as me 
knowing that I need to have that time to myself. (Emma: 1.11.12) 
 
Chloe also explicitly, and starkly, describes shifting from self-reprimand to self-
appreciation: 
 
I feel more like my own person now. [ ] I definitely like myself now. Before, I, I like 
despised who I was kind of thing but I’ve made some big changes. (Chloe: 8.2.2) 
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In her interview, Chloe explained becoming more independent ("more like my own 
person") since breaking up with her boyfriend. She goes on to describe other 
changes that have increased her self-acceptance.   
 
I’m really into like alternative fashion, like Japanese street fashion, so about a year 
ago, if you met me, I would’ve been in like all pink and pastels, tutus, [ ] colourful clips 
[ ], and I thought: maybe if I try to dress a bit older, I might mentally feel a bit older. [ ] 
Erm and like not just not having as much toys in my room. [ ] I really like toys. I collect 
them, but now I’ve kind of just hidden them in the loft and just kept out a select few, so 
it feels a bit more grown-up, and that’s kind of helping, I think. (Chloe: 8.2.3) 
 
Chloe’s previous descriptions of feeling more like her own person and being 
increasingly open about her vulnerability are extremely contrasted with this narrative 
of supressing her true self and interests. It appears that Chloe is trying to both 
convince herself that she does feel "more grown-up" and that self-suppression is 
beneficial ("kind of helping, I think"). Her attempts to look and feel older and more 
mainstream appear to stem from her desire to belong. Chloe seems to confirm this 
in her comment: "I worry that my interests are quite childish" (8.2.7). Furthermore, 
she perceives that her mainstream self-image has reduced the likelihood of gaining 
negative attention from others:  
 
It has been nice going out [ ] thinking: oh, I can just walk down the street and no-one’s 
staring at me. (Chloe: 8.3.26) 
 
Chloe’s earlier use of the phrase "like myself" as opposed to "love myself", further 
suggests that Chloe tried to convince me – and herself – that she accepts herself, 
despite her drastic attempts to suppress her true self.    
 
Several participants perceive that GAD has altered their perspectives of others. For 
Emma, GAD has enabled her to distinguish between genuine and fake individuals.  
 
I’ve seen through a lot of people since being this way, [ ] I can see people who suffer. 
[ ] Then you can just see the bullshitters [ ] yeah, it’s an eye-opener. (Emma: 1.11.11) 
 
Emma indicates that her own experiences of "suffering" have enabled her to detect 
genuine suffering in others, suggesting her increased ability to empathise. Rob’s 
account echoes this sense of increased empathy.   
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I think sometimes it’s easy to, for people to jump to conclusions about what, what’s 
going on with individuals in the work scenario, but you never know what’s going on 
inside someone’s head. [ ] That person [ ] may be facing some real erm difficult times 
in their life and still trying to come to work, as I was. (Rob: 3.12.3) 
 
Rob implies a shift in attitude from making assumptions about individuals to the 
importance of trying to find out what may be "going on inside someone’s head". 
 
Finally, participants’ accounts suggest that GAD has confronted them with the 
existential nature of human existence, thus facilitating their appreciation for life.  
 
I’m very grateful that I’m still here and I’m still fighting it. Before, I would just took 
things for granted whereas now I appreciate things more. (Emma: 1.7.3)  
 
In her interview, Emma explained how, before GAD, she did not have to try hard in 
life because "everything used to fall into place" for her. Now, in contrast, she has to 
"work really hard just to get out of bed" (1.11.8). Here, she implies that her 
newfound need to "fight" to survive has led her to value her existence. However, her 
description of "fighting" GAD seems to further confirm that she has not accepted it. 
Other participants share this sense of appreciating their current existence despite 
GAD’s challenges. Marie notes that despite "suffering" with anxiety, she still has "a 
reason to smile every day" (4.6.1), while Sarah describes feeling "really grateful for 
where I am at the moment" (7.3.2).  
 
For Shelley, perspectives gained through CBT have facilitated her engagement with 
her life-world. In her interview, she discussed learning that she was not avoiding 
leaving her home because she does not like people or did not want to go out. She 
was avoiding having a panic attack. This realisation, together with her determination 
not to negatively influence her son’s perceptions of the world, has encouraged her 
to go out and socialise which, in turn, has given her the confidence to try other 
things. It appears that her increased self-confidence has facilitated her self-
acceptance: 
 
It’s building up the like evidence in my brain that erm … nothing bad will happen, and 
that gives you a little bit more confidence [ ] to [laughter] do more things. [ ] I feel like 
just a better person I like. (Shelley: 6.4.8) 
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Like Chloe, Shelley’s use of the word "like" as opposed to "love" suggests a 
tentative degree of self-acceptance.     
 
3.6   Summary of findings 
 
Participants appear to experience great difficulty tolerating uncertainty and absence 
of perceived control. Difficulty tolerating uncertainty is not only confined to specific 
situations. GAD itself evokes uncertainty as it is experienced as unpredictable and 
illogical. Uncertainty is also located within participants’ senses of self (i.e., self-
doubt), and is directed towards others (i.e., uncertain of others’ intentions). 
Participants employ various cognitive and behavioural strategies to cope with 
uncertainty and absence of perceived control. The main cognitive strategy is 
excessive worrying. Behavioural strategies include pre-planning, checking rituals, 
and avoidance.  
 
Participants appear to engage in a continuous struggle for control over their senses 
of self as GAD takes over. There is also a continuous struggle taking place 
internally as mind and body influence one another. All participants described feeling 
more in control of GAD, generally, at present. This was attributed to altered 
responses to GAD. For some, this involves challenging their distorted cognitions 
directly. Others described acknowledging their distorted thoughts and worries 
without allowing them to govern their decision-making and consequent behaviours.  
 
Participants appear to hold a strong need to be accepted by others and fear 
rejection. This results in attempts to either fit in with others or intentionally isolate. 
Isolation not only protects them from the possibility of others’ rejection, it also 
protects others from GAD’s "burden". Participants described how others do not 
understand GAD. Some participants’ loved ones still provide helpful support despite 
this, while other participants described a total absence of support or unhelpful 
support in the form of over-protection. Participants also described mixed 
experiences with regards to professional help from physicians, counsellors, and 
psychologists. GAD also appears to have had a direct negative impact on 
participants’ loved ones and they appear to excessively worry about their loved 
ones’ personal safety and wellbeing. Worry extends to hypothetical others who may 
be going through similar experiences.  
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To cope with the distress and loss GAD has caused, and continues to cause 
participants, they locate meaning within their experiences. Meaning is construed via 
attempts to make sense of GAD and come to terms with it, and through identifying 
its positive implications for themselves, others, and their lives.  
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4. Discussion 
 
4.1   Overview 
 
I begin this chapter by elaborating on the findings, locating them within the existing 
literature. This elaboration is organised by the four super-ordinate themes. Despite 
this, consideration of how the super-ordinate and sub-ordinate themes relate to one 
another is maintained throughout. Strengths and limitations of the study are then 
discussed before considering the findings’ implications for counselling psychology 
and the wider context, and opportunities for future research. I conclude this write-up 
by returning to personal reflexivity, this time reflecting on the impact this research 
has had on me as a scientist-practitioner and personally.  
 
4.2   Battling with uncertainty 
 
Participants appear to experience difficulty tolerating uncertainty and consequent 
absence of perceived control over their life-worlds. As discussed in the Introduction 
chapter, the cognitive model of GAD asserts that IU is key in GAD’s development 
and maintenance (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Wilkinson et al., 2011). Dugas and 
Robichaud (2007) define IU as a "dispositional characteristic that results from a set 
of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications" (p. 24). Similarly, 
Wilkinson et al. (2011) define it as "negative emotional, cognitive, and behavioural 
reactions to uncertain situations and events" (p. 13). For the current participants 
however, difficulty tolerating uncertainty seems to extend beyond specific uncertain 
situations and events; GAD itself is experienced as uncertain and therefore 
threatening, and it is located within participants’ senses of self (i.e., self-doubt). 
Uncertainty, in any form, is experienced as intolerable. This discordant finding 
appears to suggest that participants not only experience IU but also intolerance of 
ambiguity: the tendency to interpret an ambiguous situation as a threat or source of 
discomfort (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005). Although both traits are 
characterised by discomfort in the absence of certainty and clarity, Grenier et al. 
(2005) argue that IU refers explicitly to uncertain future events, whereas intolerance 
of ambiguity refers to ambiguity in the present. Emma’s intolerance of both is 
131 
 
apparent in her account of being stuck in a traffic jam. Not knowing what caused it 
or when it will end triggers anxiety.  
 
The subtheme "An endless cycle" captured how all participants appear to engage in 
excessive worry in an attempt to reduce future-orientated uncertainty. This supports 
Wilkinson et al.’s (2011) assertion that one of the cognitive strategies employed by 
individuals with GAD to reduce future-orientated uncertainty, is to identify as many 
possible negative outcomes as they can. In other words, they worry about a 
hypothetical and catastrophic future. This worry usually manifests as "what if?" 
cognitions. Paradoxically, asking this question increases the number of potential 
scenarios and outcomes, thus increasing the amount of uncertainty. Wilkinson et al. 
describe how a distressing cycle consequently develops as worry and uncertainty 
maintain one another. This cyclic pattern is evident in Rob’s description of engaging 
in "an endless cycle of what ifs?" and Kirsty’s description of a "vicious cycle" that 
unfolds regarding an upcoming meeting with friends. This supports empirical 
evidence. Buhr and Dugas (2006) found that IU uniquely contributed to worry, after 
controlling for other factors related to worry such as perceived self-control and 
positive beliefs about worry. This relationship has also been demonstrated using 
experimental manipulation. Participants whose level of IU was increased reported 
more worries than participants whose level of IU was decreased (Ladouceur, 
Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000).  
 
The cyclic pattern between worry and uncertainty aids our understanding of the 
participants’ tendency to worry about "everything" and their apparent difficulty 
controlling their worries. Sarah, for example, described how worrying about one 
topic can trigger worries about unrelated topics. Of particular poignance was her 
use of the phrase "it moves really quickly" to describe this process. Participants’ 
difficulty controlling their worries seems to stem from their construal of them as 
separate entities with their own agency. This supports evidence that uncontrollable 
worry is a central feature of GAD (Abel & Borkovec, 1995; Hallion & Ruscio, 2013). 
The extent and uncontrollability of participants’ worrying appears to provide an 
explanation for why they experience GAD as infinite, rendering it difficult to control.  
 
The subtheme "No rhyme or reason" explored how all participants construe GAD as 
illogical and unpredictable which magnifies their difficulty controlling it. Emma 
explicitly acknowledged this in her account of not being able to control GAD 
because unlike experiencing the loss of a loved one, an event that triggers an 
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emotional response that makes sense to her (i.e., sadness), she cannot explain 
GAD or its impact. This unidentifiable quality echoes Lee, Lam, Kwok, and Leung’s 
(2014) finding that individuals with GAD reported a much higher frequency (71%) of 
unspecified sources of worry than those without GAD (15.8%). Together, these 
findings support ICD-10’s implication that individuals with GAD can indeed feel 
anxious and worried for no identifiable reason, that is, they can experience "free-
floating" anxiety (WHO, 1992). Grillon, Pine, Lissek, Rabin, Bonne, and Vythilingam 
(2009) found that anxious reactivity to unpredictable, aversive events was 
heightened in individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) but not in those 
with GAD. However, current findings indicate that aversive, unpredictable events 
(including GAD itself) do induce heightened anxiety in adults with GAD. 
 
Participants’ intolerance of ambiguity is further implied in their quests to make sense 
of GAD and its origins or identify its benefits (i.e., holding positive beliefs about 
worry). Both processes appear to enable participants to assign meaning to their 
experiences. 
 
Most participants traced GAD’s origins to parental traits or behaviour. Marie 
attributed GAD to her father’s neglect during childhood, while Rob attributed it to the 
fact that his mother is a "worrywart", suggesting that he believes his GAD is the 
result of either a learned behaviour from his mother or is hereditary. Similarly, all six 
participants in Golfinopoulos’ (2013) study believed that their GAD was either 
genetically inherited or behaviourally learned from at least one of their parents. 
These findings support evidence that familial history of severe anxiety (Hettema, 
Neale, & Kendler, 2001) and parental rejection can cause and maintain GAD 
(Cassidy et al., 2009). They also suggest that Bowlby’s (1973) attachment theory 
provides a useful framework for understanding GAD’s development and 
maintenance. Participants’ childhood experiences of parental neglect or severe 
parental anxiety has likely led them to doubt that a stable, protective figure will be 
available to provide the security and comfort needed to reduce their anxiety in times 
of perceived threat.  
 
Previous research has demonstrated that childhood physical and sexual abuse are 
risk factors for GAD onset and maintenance (Cougle et al., 2010). In the current 
study, two participants attributed GAD’s onset and maintenance to psychological 
abuse in childhood or adulthood suggesting that psychological abuse, at any age, is 
also a risk factor.  
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Sandy’s belief that the progestogen-only contraceptive pill triggered a dramatic 
intensification of her existing anxiety and worry also provides new insight. Existing 
literature suggests that the progestogen-only pill increases risk of depression and 
other mood disorders (Skovlund, MØrch, Kessing, & Lidegaard, 2016; Svendal, 
Berk, Pasco, Jacka, Lund, & Williams, 2012), but there appears to be less, if any, 
empirical evidence to suggest that it increases anxiety or GAD specifically.  
 
Positive beliefs about worry have been implicated in the development and 
maintenance of excessive and uncontrollable worry (Dugas & Koerner, 2005; Wells, 
2005), and individuals with GAD have been shown to hold positive beliefs about 
worry (Newman & Llera, 2011). Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, and 
Ladouceur (1994) investigated individuals’ (with or without GAD) reasons for 
worrying. Worrying was believed to function to avoid negative outcomes, even when 
the individuals recognised the irrationality of this belief, and to motivate individuals 
to get things done. Echoing a recurring theme in the current findings, positive beliefs 
about worry increased the individuals’ sense of perceived control (Freeston et al., 
1994). Despite acknowledging its irrationality, Sarah believes that worrying prevents 
"things" from happening, while Chloe believes that worry and "fear" motivated her to 
study for her A-level exams and that this strategy "worked" because she performed 
well. Wells (2005) posits that negative beliefs about worry are responsible for 
maintaining and exacerbating GAD symptomology, not positive beliefs about worry. 
However, current findings suggest that positive metacognitive beliefs are equally 
responsible.   
 
As captured in "Grappling with time", participants seem to spend a significant 
amount of time ruminating on the past or anxiously anticipating the future, thus 
struggle to live in the present moment. Dwelling on things they cannot change (past) 
or predict (future) further highlights their difficulty tolerating absence of perceived 
control.  
 
Existing GAD literature tends to highlight the presence of future-orientated 
cognitions in GAD, with little to no mention of past rumination. Indeed, Rachman 
(2013) argues that the tendency for individuals with GAD to worry about past events 
is often overlooked in GAD literature. Current findings suggest that GAD also entails 
spending a substantial amount of time ruminating on specific, negatively-appraised 
past events and lost senses of self.  
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Borkovec (2002) asserts that individuals with GAD are stuck "living in an illusion" (p. 
77), where much time is spent thinking about things that exist only in their minds. 
Consequently, little to no attention is paid to real life because there is always a new 
danger that needs to be anticipated. This appears to be the case for most 
participants, who, as already discussed, anxiously anticipate the future, often in the 
form of hypothetical, catastrophic predictions. Contrastingly, Shelley’s superstitious 
beliefs result in attempts to avoid future thinking. She believes that if she were to 
excitedly anticipate her son’s birthdays she would be punished in the most 
fundamental way (death of her or her son). This is an example of a specific form of 
superstitious thinking called thought-action fusion, whereby the individual falsely 
assumes that a causal relationship exists between their thoughts and external 
reality (Shafran & Rachman, 2004). Similarly, Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, and Diaz 
(1999) found that individuals with GAD believed that their thoughts and worries 
could influence external events. Superstitious thinking has mainly been associated 
with OCD (West & Willner, 2011). However, West and Willner (2011) found that 
there was no significant difference between the superstitious thinking seen in GAD 
and OCD. Furthermore, superstitious thinking was significantly higher in individuals 
with GAD than in non-clinical controls. Current findings support evidence that 
superstitious thinking, especially thought-action fusion, occurs in GAD. Moulding 
and Kyrios (2006) posit that individuals may resort to superstitious thinking to 
restore perceived control in low-control circumstances, for example when they are 
stressed or anxious. This fits with the recurring theme in the current findings: 
participants’ need for control.  
 
Another strategy most participants employ to maintain a degree of perceived control 
over the future’s uncertainty is behavioural pre-planning. Similarly, Mahoney, 
Hobbs, Newby, Williams, and Andrews (2018) found that 79.6% of individuals with 
GAD reported over-planning activities (e.g., preparing for all possible negative 
outcomes, planning every step of an activity). Maladaptive behaviours were not 
included in the DSM-V classification of GAD because, at the time, there was not a 
sufficient amount of empirical data available to determine which behaviours are 
most relevant to GAD (Andrews et al., 2010). The current finding further indicates 
that pre-planning is a common behavioural symptom of GAD.  
 
The subtheme "Doubt" captured participants’ uncertainty about their physical 
environments, situations out of their control, their thoughts and capabilities, and 
others’ intentions.  
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Consistent with the suggestions that individuals with GAD are highly sensitive to 
threat (van der Heiden, Methorst, Muris, & van der Molen, 2011) and frequently 
observe potential threats (Barlow, 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994), participants 
are hypervigilant; constantly scanning the environment for potential threats. They try 
to create certainty through familiarity, to feel in control and therefore safe. For Kirsty, 
this involves restricting her use of public transport to familiar journeys, while Rob 
remains in his familiar job. This supports Rachman’s (2013) safety-seeking 
perspective. Rachman argues that individuals with GAD constantly search for 
safety. If the anticipated aversive event (threat) is unpredictable or irregular, a 
dependable safety signal is difficult or impossible to establish, thus maintaining the 
individual’s hypervigilance and anxiety. Familiarity, in contrast, is a dependable 
safety signal.  
 
Seven participants described experiencing self-doubt. Six described doubting their 
capabilities. Research has suggested that negative problem orientation specifically, 
rather than potentially related personality characteristics (e.g., low self-mastery, 
pessimism), is closely related to worry (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005). Consequently, 
negative problem orientation is a key component of the cognitive model of GAD 
(Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Wilkinson et al., 2011). Wilkinson et al. (2011) assert 
that individuals with GAD generally know how to solve problems but have trouble 
doing so because they negatively appraise the problem. For example, problems are 
perceived as threatening or unfair, or they doubt their problem-solving ability and 
are pessimistic about the problem’s outcome. According to the cognitive model of 
GAD then, doubting one’s abilities is the result of negative problem orientation, not a 
fundamental personality trait. This appears to correspond with Sandy’s account of 
doubting her ability to do anything despite rationally knowing that she can.  
 
Although Romero-Sanchiz, Nogueira-Arjona, Godoy-Ávila, Gavino-Lázaro, and 
Freeston (2017) found that worries were perceived as being more based in reality 
than obsessions and illness intrusions, Sarah’s inability to trust that her thoughts are 
real (rational) suggests that basis in reality of thoughts and worries should also be 
considered in the assessment and treatment of GAD, not just OCD.  
 
Finally, some participants reported difficulty trusting others. Newman et al. (2013) 
posit that individuals with GAD may employ cold behaviours due to the belief that it 
is better to keep others at a distance than to allow oneself to experience the 
vulnerability associated with warm behaviours and subsequent risk of being 
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confronted with conflict or rejection. This corresponds with Marie’s narrative of never 
having a best friend because people let her down. Marie appears to believe that 
remaining emotionally distant from others protects her from repeated experiences of 
rejection. Ultimately, attachment insecurity refers to the difficulty trusting and relying 
on others in times of need (Cassidy et al., 2009). This finding therefore supports the 
notion that insecure attachment can cause and maintain GAD. It also makes sense 
of evidence that individuals with GAD tend to lack close friendships (Whisman, 
Sheldon, & Goering, 2000).  
 
4.3   A struggle for autonomy 
 
Participants appear to engage in a continuous struggle for control over their sense 
of self as GAD "takes over". Several participants described how GAD distorts their 
perceptions of reality. This, once again, resonates with Borkovec’s (2002) assertion 
that individuals with GAD live in an illusion, not reality. Negative problem orientation 
is apparent in Sandy and Kirsty’s accounts of GAD taking over. Pessimism and self-
doubt once again ensue despite ample evidence of previous coping, suggesting that 
distorted appraisals of problems are responsible, not fundamental personality traits. 
Sandy described an extreme emotional contrast, from excitement to "doom and 
gloom". This does not align with Newman and Llera’s (2011) contrast avoidance 
model. Newman and Llera posit that individuals with GAD use worry to avoid 
negative affect contrasts (shifting from a positive to a negative emotional state), but 
Sandy indicates that she experiences one every time GAD takes over.  
 
Rob, like several other participants, construes GAD as a separate entity that has 
been residing within him for a long time, capable of gaining control over him when it 
spreads across multiple life domains. Similarly, one participant in Golfinopoulos’ 
(2013) study described how she had always felt anxious, but after her first child was 
born, "the anxiety became overwhelming" (p. 57). Another described feeling like she 
had "no control of my feelings and daily life" (p. 61).  
 
"The interplay between body and mind" captured the continuous exchanges 
between participants’ bodies and minds. Consistent with literature regarding GAD’s 
physiological symptoms (Aldao, Mennin, Linardatos, & Fresco, 2010; Kubarych, 
Aggen, Hettema, Kendler, & Neale, 2005), all participants reported experiencing 
somatic symptoms such as nausea, diarrhoea, sweating, muscle tension and pain. 
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DSM-V asserts that symptoms of autonomic hyperarousal such as accelerated 
heart rate and dizziness are less prominent in GAD than in other anxiety disorders 
(APA, 2013). However, several participants described experiencing these 
symptoms. Furthermore, Marie’s description of unbearably painful migraines 
supports evidence that chronic pain in individuals with GAD can occur in additional 
areas of the body as well as muscles (Beesdo, Jacobi, Hoyer, Low, Höfler, & 
Wittchen, 2010; Nutt et al., 2006). Together, these findings highlight the need for 
accurate diagnosis and management of somatic pain while assessing and treating 
GAD, particularly considering evidence that its presence in individuals with GAD is 
significantly associated with functional impairment and poorer quality of life 
(Romera, Montejo, Caballero, Caballero, Arbesú, Polavieja, Desaiah, & Gilaberte, 
2011).  
 
Shelley’s account of GAD delaying her body’s wound healing ability indicates that 
GAD impairs the immune system. This supports evidence that stress and anxiety 
impair the immune system, including wound healing (Cole-King & Harding, 2001; 
Kiecolt-Glaser, Marucha, Malarkey, Mercado, & Glaser, 1995). This impairment may 
increase the risk of co-morbid physical conditions such as IBS (Gros et al., 2009) 
and cardiovascular problems (Martens et al., 2010).  
 
Paradoxically, four participants also reported health anxiety, supporting evidence 
that health anxiety is common in GAD (Abramowitz, Olatunji, & Deacon, 2007; 
Sunderland, Newby, & Andrews, 2013). Interestingly, Lee, Ma, and Tsang (2011) 
found that 78.9% of those with GAD reported health anxiety, and that these 
individuals were significantly older than those who did not report health anxiety. The 
researchers consequently suggested that age may affect the degree of health 
anxiety in GAD. However, in the current study, those who disclosed health anxiety 
ranged in age from 34 to 46, suggesting that age is not a distinguishable factor.    
 
Linking with the subtheme "I’m in control", participants described physiology’s role in 
managing GAD. They stressed the importance of eating regular, healthy meals and 
getting sufficient sleep. Consistent with previous findings (Bélanger, Morin, Langlois, 
& Ladouceur, 2004), several participants described difficulty initiating and 
maintaining sleep because they were worried about the day ahead. Many also 
described how physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausting GAD is. 
Although DSM-V notes how individuals with GAD can be "easily fatigued" (APA, 
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2013), this does not capture the intensity of the participants’ exhaustion which 
leaves them feeling completely drained and worn down.  
 
Previous research has highlighted the benefits of GAD management techniques 
including physical exercise (Herring, Johnson, & O’Connor, 2016), and writing about 
anxiety, worries and associated feelings (Schroder, Moran, & Moser, 2018). 
However, the motivation driving these strategies for the current participants appears 
to be their need to completely rid themselves of anxiety and worry rather than 
manage them. This supports the suggestion that individuals with GAD struggle with 
their internal experiences (e.g., thoughts, emotions, urges, physical sensations), 
which often results in attempts to avoid or control them (Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & 
Orsillo, 2005).  
 
Indeed, as captured in "I’m torturing myself", participants construe GAD as a self-
torture device that inflicts psychological and physiological torment. GAD’s ability to 
distort reality is also apparent in Shelley’s description of the intense fear GAD 
triggers. She compares it to waking from a "really bad nightmare", where the line 
between imagination and reality remains distorted. This echoes Hawkins (2017) 
description of GAD being "scary" because her fears and worries "seem real". 
 
Participants also seem tormented by two negatively-valanced, self-conscious 
(moral) emotions: shame and guilt. Lewis (1971) asserts that shame and guilt have 
differential foci. Shame leads one to focus on the self, whereas guilt leads one to 
focus on specific behaviours. Tangney and Dearing (2002) believe that this 
difference produces different associated concerns; shame is related to concerns 
about others’ evaluation of the self, whereas guilt is related to concerns about one’s 
effect on others. Shame is believed to lead to feelings of worthlessness and being 
exposed, while guilt is believed to lead to feelings of regret and remorse (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). This distinction is apparent in participants’ accounts. Kirsty’s shame 
in one narrative stems from her belief that if she were to state the real reason for 
cancelling an appointment (because she feels anxious), she would be subjected to 
external ridicule. Feelings of worthlessness are apparent in participants’ use of 
"silly" and "pathetic" to describe themselves and their experiences. Rob’s guilt in 
one account centres around his belief that he was unable to help his son in hospital. 
He consequently felt regret that he failed to do something.  
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Gilbert (2007) distinguishes between internal and external shame. He states that 
external shame relates to concerns about others’ evaluations of oneself, whereas 
internal shame relates to negative self-evaluations. He emphasises how internal 
shame extends beyond basic self-criticism to "hostile (e.g., anger and contempt) 
emotions directed at the self" (p. 297). Participants appear to experience both. 
Furthermore, guilt is usually only maladaptive when it becomes generalised to the 
self, that is, it becomes shameful (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). This 
"shame-fused guilt" (Tangney et al., 2007, p. 353) is present in Shelley’s narrative of 
how her friends stopped inviting her to social events. She believes that her friends 
did so, not because of her behaviour (non-attendance), but because she is a "really 
rubbish person".  
 
Recalling participants’ self-doubt, Berenbaum (2010) posits that perceptions of self-
incompetence which, in turn, elicit moral emotions, play an important role in worry 
genesis. This corresponds with the current findings. Fergus, Valentiner, McGrath, 
and Jencius (2010) found that GAD symptoms shared a significant, specific 
relationship with internal shame-proneness but not with guilt-proneness. They 
consequently concluded that internal shame is more relevant to GAD than guilt. 
However, the current findings indicate that guilt, shame-fused guilt, and external 
shame are equally relevant. Moreover, Gosselin, Ladouceur, Langlois, Freeston, 
Dugas, and Bertrand (2003) assert that individuals with GAD believe that worry 
allows them to avoid negative emotions directed towards the self (e.g., if I did not 
worry, I would be careless and irresponsible). However, the current findings suggest 
that internal shame and worry co-exist.  
 
Despite their difficulty maintaining control of GAD, participants described feeling 
more in control of GAD, generally, at present. This was captured in "I’m in control". 
In addition to the physiological strategies already discussed, various strategies have 
facilitated this perception. Some participants described directly challenging their 
"what if?" cognitions. Wilkinson et al. (2011) explain how generic cognitive 
restructuring techniques, that are based on probability estimates, do not tend to 
work for individuals with GAD because 100% certainty cannot be guaranteed. Worry 
and anxiety consequently persist. Sarah, however, noted how asking herself "what’s 
the reality?" does stop her worry.  
 
The acceptance-based behavioural therapy (ABBT) for GAD uses mindfulness 
exercises to help promote individuals’ acceptance of their internal experiences 
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rather than efforts to control or avoid them (Roemer & Orsillo, 2005). Drawing from 
valued action in acceptance and commitment therapy (Wilson & Murrell, 2004), 
individuals are also encouraged to engage in specific activities that are meaningful 
to them, regardless of internal distress (Roemer & Orsillo, 2005). Similarly, several 
participants appeared to describe an increased ability to recognise their worries for 
what they are: thoughts that do not need to govern behaviour or be acted upon. 
Shelley, for example, described attempts to acknowledge her worries without being 
consumed by them which enables her to "move on".  
 
Despite reported attempts to accept their internal experiences, participants also 
engage in cognitive avoidance and safety behaviours to control or avoid anxiety and 
worry. Dugas and Robichaud (2007) identified four explicit cognitive avoidance 
strategies: supressing worrisome thoughts, substituting neutral or positive thoughts 
for worries, using distraction to interrupt worry, and avoiding situations that trigger 
worry and anxiety. Sandy appears to distract herself from her anxiety-provoking 
thoughts and feelings by talking about "random stuff" with a friend. Not only does 
this seem to function to avoid distressing internal experiences, it also protects her 
from the possibility that her friend, like others in her life, may reject her if she were 
to disclose them.  
 
Alongside pre-planning, some participants engage in checking behaviours. Chloe 
repeatedly checks her bag before leaving home to ensure that she has not forgotten 
anything, while Shelley checks that all electrical appliances are turned off to 
minimise the possibility of the house burning down. This finding supports evidence 
of checking rituals in GAD (Mackenzie, Christenson, & Kroll, 1990; West & Willner, 
2011). Checking behaviours have been significantly correlated with superstitious 
thinking (Einstein & Menzies, 2008). This may explain why some individuals with 
GAD experience superstitious thinking. Shelley’s account also supports the 
suggestion that individuals with GAD worry about topics remote in probability 
(Wilkinson et al., 2011).   
 
4.4   GAD and interpersonal relations 
 
As explored in "GAD through others’ lenses", most participants’ close relatives and 
partners do not understand GAD. Some, like Emma and Rob, noted how those 
closest to them still support them despite this, while others, like Sandy and Chloe 
141 
 
have received criticism and denial of GAD’s existence. This latter finding mirrors 
Lima’s (2013), who explored the experiences of male partners of females with GAD. 
Many participants in this study described initially not understanding GAD at all or 
fully. One participant commented: "she got worse, or maybe it was bad all along but 
I just didn’t see it because I was oblivious" (p. 43), his account highlighting how 
easily GAD can go unnoticed. The stark criticism in this excerpt is echoed in another 
participant’s account: "she is not put together … shambles is more like it" (p. 43).  
Several participants in the current study implied that being proactive about GAD 
promotes external validation, again, a finding echoed by Lima. Several participants 
in Lima’s study believed that their partner attending individual psychological therapy 
was the only way to decrease both partners’ distress with one participant 
commenting: "maybe if she works on herself then I will feel better" (p. 58). Indeed, 
the negative impact GAD has on those closest was another shared finding between 
the two studies. Shelley described how her partner also stopped attending social 
events. I surmise that her partner may have felt embarrassed and guilty when 
Shelley used to cancel social plans at the last minute, particularly when their friends 
had put a lot of effort into hosting, and that these feelings influenced his behaviour. 
Similarly, six participants in Lima’s study reported experiencing reduced social 
activities with friends. Some attributed this to their inability to have fun in their 
partner’s absence, while others felt a great sense of responsibility for their partner’s 
well-being. Many consequently felt guilty, either for going out without their partner or 
for encouraging them to socialise. Echoing the current participants’ lost senses of 
self, several participants in Lima’s study described feeling like they had lost their 
partners, with one commenting: "it was like that original girl I met disappeared" (p. 
43).  
 
The subtheme "Striving to belong" explored participants’ apparent deep-seated 
need to be accepted by others and their constant fear of rejection. This supports 
evidence that interpersonal concerns (e.g., fearing that their interpersonal needs will 
not be met) are the most common worry topics in individuals with GAD (Newman, 
Castonguay, Borkovec, & Molnar, 2004; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997). In line 
with Cassidy et al.’s (2009) assertion that insecure attachment in childhood can 
cause negative interpersonal perceptions (e.g., fear of rejection) in adult 
interpersonal relationships, it seems that participants’ past experiences of rejection 
have caused them to fear similar rejection in their current relationships. A further 
dimension offered by the current study is that participants perceive themselves as 
different or abnormal which magnifies their sense of not belonging. 
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Participants consequently go to extreme behavioural lengths to conceal GAD and 
thus feel accepted by others. Participants’ apparent shame may explain these 
behaviours. Moral emotions can be elicited by failing to live up to personal 
standards or shared social conventions which, in turn, motivates socially appropriate 
behaviour (Tangney et al., 2007).  Participants’ experiences of rejection, together 
with their self-perceptions of abnormality, appears to have led to feelings of shame. 
Concealing GAD enables them to demonstrate socially appropriate behaviour 
which, in turn, increases their sense of belonging and minimises the possibility of 
repeated rejection. This is apparent in Kirsty’s account of over-eating when she 
hosted a dinner party even though her anxiety had dampened her appetite. Eating is 
a socially appropriate behaviour in this scenario. Participants either try to fit in or, as 
already discussed, intentionally isolate, supporting evidence that submissive 
behaviours (i.e., non-assertive, socially-avoidant) are common in GAD (Przeworski, 
Newman, Pincus, Kasoff, Yamasaki, Castonguay, & Berlin, 2011). Newman et al.’s 
(2013) suggestion that submission often serves to appease others and avoid 
hostility fits with the current findings. Participants’ need to be accepted by others is 
another reason for behavioural pre-planning. Marie, for example, described packing 
various sandwiches for a zoo trip in case someone did not like a particular filling to 
reduce the likelihood of hostility.   
 
Participants described mixed experiences concerning the "helpfulness of support" 
both from those closest to them and professionals. As already mentioned, some feel 
helpfully supported (emotionally and practically) by their close relatives, partners, 
and friends, despite their inability to understand GAD. For others, this lack of 
understanding has resulted in the total absence of external support. Recalling 
Bowlby’s (1973) attachment theory, several participants appear to implicitly 
communicate their need for warmth and protection from their loved ones; the 
provision of a secure base. Emma, for example, acknowledged her parents’ 
unwavering support, while Sandy communicated her need to be held during 
moments of immense emotional pain. Despite this need, Chloe highlighted how 
maladaptive over-protection from loved ones can be. Her father’s apparent 
mollycoddling reinforces her self-doubt and avoidant behaviours. This shares 
similarities with Lima’s (2013) findings. Participants in Lima’s study perceived that 
their enabling behaviours such as reassuring and taking over tasks helped their 
partners.  
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Participants also described mixed experiences concerning their interactions with 
physicians, counsellors, and psychologists. Several participants indicated that they 
did not feel heard by physicians, instead silenced by psychopharmacological 
medication. They described only negative effects of medication, for example, 
increased anxiety or new suicidal ideation and consequently did not believe that 
medication was "the answer". Similarly, all six participants in Golfinopoulos’ (2013) 
study were, at some point after receiving their GAD diagnosis, prescribed 
psychopharmacological medication to treat their symptoms. Not one participant felt 
that their GAD symptoms completely diminished after taking medication, and they 
all reported negative side effects such as increased anxiety. Echoing current 
participants’ narratives of being reduced from an embodied person to a mechanical 
body, one participant described feeling like a "guinea pig" because "the doctor tried 
so many drugs on me" (p. 62). Another noted that her physician would "see me for 
less than a minute" (p. 68). One participant commented: "I believe that it is very 
important that doctors make us aware of different treatment options" (p. 68). The 
last comment resonates with the current study, where positive experiences involved 
perceptions of being taken seriously by physicians, including consideration of 
various diagnostic possibilities and treatment options. These findings hold particular 
poignancy given that physicians are often the first professional point of contact for 
individuals with GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), and psychopharmacological 
medication is a recommended treatment of adult GAD in the UK (NICE, 2011).  
 
Participants who found psychological therapy beneficial attributed this to the fact 
that it facilitated the thought challenging process. Others, like Emma, described the 
inadequacy of available psychological therapy in relation to long waitlists and too 
few sessions. The fact that Emma’s therapist could not identify GAD’s cause 
seemed to emphasise her uncertainty and lack of control over it. Ultimately then, 
positive therapeutic experiences appeared to derive from increased perceptions of 
self-control. Echoing this finding, all eight participants in Macaulay et al.’s (2017) 
study reported that therapy (MI-CBT) had resulted in shifts from feeling powerless 
and overwhelmed by GAD to feeling more in control of it. Seven participants 
attributed this to the fact that therapy increased their awareness of distorted 
thoughts and core beliefs underlying their worry and anxiety. Identifying distortions 
helped participants challenge their thoughts. Similarly, one participant in 
Golfinopoulos’ (2013) study described how her therapist helped challenge her 
"faulty and negative thoughts" (p. 64). Another explained how psychotherapy 
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combined with massage therapy had resulted in her being able to control her 
anxiety.  
 
The final subtheme "concern for others’ welfare" explored participants’ concern for 
others’ physical safety and emotional wellbeing. Consistent with the finding that 
participants excessively worry about close others, including their children, partners, 
and friends, Lee et al. (2014) found that participants with GAD ranked worry about 
family and the health of family members even higher than worry about their own 
personal health. These findings support Wilkinson et al.’s (2011) assertion that 
individuals tend to worry about the things most important to them (e.g., family and 
relationships), and that at the heart of these topics lie our goals, aspirations, and 
values. Wilkinson et al. therefore assert that worry is about potential threats to our 
goals, aspirations, and values. However, concern in the current study was not only 
directed at close others but extended to colleagues and strangers who may be in 
similar situations.  
 
Although all five participants with children appear to worry about them to the point of 
over-protection, several also described attempts to control their worry from fear that 
GAD may rub off on them. This possibility is highlighted in Lima’s (2013) study. Six 
of the male partners of females with GAD described how their partner’s anxiety had 
contagiously transferred onto them with one commenting: "I bet they will find out 
that GAD can be caught" (p. 50). Current participants’ intentional isolation not only 
minimises the risk of rejection, it also functions to protect others from the "burden" of 
GAD.  
 
Echoing Wilkinson et al.’s (2011) assertion, Wells (1995) posits that worry may be 
represented in the mind of the worrier as a protective form of care towards goals 
and values. These theories imply that excessive worriers "care too much” and may 
consequently believe that they must exhibit caring or affiliative behaviours towards 
others and predominate in the use of such behaviours (Newman & Erickson, 2010). 
Indeed, many individuals with GAD are either intrusive, overly self-sacrificing, or 
exploitable (Przeworski et al., 2011), and endorse heightened empathy (Peasley et 
al., 1994). This may explain why participants also worry about those who are less 
well known to them. For example, in his interview, Rob described wanting to talk 
about GAD in his workplace, not only because it makes him feel better, but also to 
help colleagues who may be suffering in silence. Linking with this disclosure, in the 
subtheme "Now I appreciate things more" Rob described how GAD has taught him 
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not to make assumptions about what may be going on internally for his colleagues 
who, like him, may be trying to maintain work despite experiencing "difficult times". 
Newman et al. (2013) suggest that, like cold behaviours, warm behaviours function 
to prevent negative responses from others. This fits with participants’ need to be 
accepted. 
 
4.5   The need to create meaning amid uncertainty and loss 
 
This super-ordinate theme explored how participants appear to engage in attempts 
to locate meaning within their distress in order to tolerate the uncertainty, torment, 
and losses (of their senses of self, perceived control, and external support) GAD 
has caused. Meaning is created via attempts to make sense of GAD and come to 
terms with it, as captured in the subtheme: "Learning to ride with GAD (I suppose)", 
and through identifying its positive implications, as explored in "Now I appreciate 
things more".  Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Larson (1998) argue that these two 
construals of meaning are two distinct yet equally important concepts. Individuals 
are motivated to make sense of negative life events in an attempt to maintain their 
perception that significant events in one’s life should make sense. Such events are 
presumed to be predictable, comprehensible, and occur for a reason. When events 
do not make sense, the individual feels vulnerable and highly distressed, and is 
consequently motivated to find meaning by making sense of the event (Davis et al., 
1998; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Deriving benefit from loss or trauma is a fundamental 
way of assigning positive value or significance to the event for one’s life which helps 
ease feelings of loss or hopelessness (Davis et al., 1998). These two construals of 
meaning were also present in the subtheme "No rhyme or reason" – participants 
identified GAD’s origins and hold positive beliefs about worry. 
 
Recalling conflicting accounts of participants’ need to eradicate anxiety, it seems 
that some are trying to convince themselves that they have made (a degree of) 
peace with GAD. Emma appears to summarise this internal conflict in her 
description of learning to "ride with it I s’pose". The "I s’pose" emphasises her 
apparent resistance, as do prior accounts of GAD being the worst thing she has 
ever experienced. Resistance seems confirmed in participants’ hope of cure which, 
linking with the subtheme "loss of a past self", would hopefully enable them to return 
to their former senses of self before GAD "struck". Similarly, all six participants in 
Golfinopoulos’ (2013) study wanted to be cured, and five initially believed that this 
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was possible. However, as treatment progressed, participants appeared to realise 
that cure may not be possible and instead focused on managing their GAD 
symptoms more effectively. This mirrors current findings; several participants 
acknowledged that while cure was unlikely, changing their relationship with anxiety 
and worry has enabled them to manage GAD more effectively. Marie, like several 
others, described how she has learnt that she needs to accept her distorted anxious 
thoughts and worries before she is able to challenge them. This process enables 
her to regain a degree of control over GAD. Sarah acknowledged the time required 
to mourn her lost sense of self and life direction before she could begin the journey 
towards acceptance. Now, echoing Shelley’s accounts of not letting anxiety govern 
her behaviour, she is not allowing it to prevent her from starting a family. It seems 
that learning that anxiety and worry do not present a rational threat has enabled 
participants to obtain some distance and power over them. Similarly, all eight 
participants in Macaulay et al.’s (2017) study transitioned from perceiving GAD as 
all-consuming and permanent to separate and transient. This enabled them to step 
back from it and make choices in their daily lives. 
 
Normalising GAD has also helped participants come to terms with it, presumably 
because it has weakened their self-perceptions of difference and abnormality. One 
participant in Golfinopoulos’ (2013) study explained how she initially did not tell 
anyone about her severe anxiety, partly because she believed that it was normal but 
also from fear that others would perceive her as "weird" (p. 57). This mirrors Chloe’s 
prior experiences of GAD. It seems that increasing societal awareness has helped 
Chloe and her mother shift from denying GAD’s existence to accepting that it is real. 
It has also challenged her assumptions that others will respond negatively. Chloe is 
consequently becoming more open about GAD, at least with her colleagues. For 
Marie, this altered self-perception seems to stem from the knowledge that there is a 
physiological explanation for GAD. This has reduced her sense of perceived 
responsibility for GAD and thus her shame. This supports Cutrona’s (1983) 
assertion that blaming oneself for a loss increases personal distress and grief.  
 
Ultimately, it appears that participants are making sense of GAD via new, present 
insights as well as identifying its origins.  
 
In terms of GAD’s positive implications, several participants conveyed a sense of 
increased self-acceptance, including increased self-care. Similarly, five participants 
in Macaulay et al.’s (2017) study reported increased self-acceptance, while others 
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described smaller shifts from self-criticism to self-compassion. Several participants 
indicated hesitancy in these disclosures. For example, one commented: "um, it’s ok 
to be what – to be who I am" (p. 175). This seemingly hesitant comment echoes 
current participants’ apparent tentative degrees of self-acceptance, as suggested in 
their conflicting narratives. Chloe, for example, described feeling more like her own 
person but went onto explain how she suppresses her true self and interests to, 
once again, fit in and be accepted by others. Chloe and Shelley’s use of the phrase 
"like myself" as opposed to "love myself" further implies tentativeness. 
 
GAD also appears to have positively altered several participants’ perceptions of 
others. As already touched upon, GAD has increased Emma and Rob’s empathy 
which enables them to distinguish between genuine and fake individuals and has 
highlighted the value of enquiring about others’ internal experiences as opposed to 
making assumptions.  
 
Finally, GAD has also strengthened participants’ appreciation of life. Davis et al. 
(1998) suggest that learning about one’s strength in the face of adversity can help 
ease feelings of loss and hopelessness. This mirrors Emma’s narratives of self-
resilience ("inner strength", "fight") and Shelley’s newfound ability to "push through" 
anxiety. Several theorists have suggested that the perception that one’s life has 
goals and purpose is critical for self-esteem and well-being (Frankl, 1986; Janoff-
Bulman, 1992; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). Identifying the positive implications of 
GAD seems to have restored participants’ beliefs that their lives, as Emma 
suggests, are worth fighting for (Davis et al., 1998).  
 
4.6   Strengths and limitations 
 
The fundamental strength of this study is due to the participants. The willingness 
and openness with which they shared their experiences produced rich, plentiful 
data. While this study only claims to report on the experiences of the eight 
participants interviewed, I believe that important insights derived from this rich data 
have significant implications (see section 4.7) and are relevant and transferable to 
other adults with GAD. However, I am also aware that Kirsty’s interview was 
significantly shorter in duration. Upon arriving at her house to conduct the interview, 
she informed me that she had considered cancelling that morning because she was 
so anxious and had not slept well. Her willingness to continue despite these internal 
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challenges demonstrates that she deemed it important and is testament to her 
bravery. This was reflected in her verbal debrief, where she disclosed being pleased 
that she had participated. Participants, including Kirsty, also reflected on how I had 
made them feel comfortable and communicated my attempts to understand them, 
for example, through asking prompt questions. This seemed particularly poignant 
when they were talking about topics they perceived to be frequently misunderstood. 
Such feedback suggests that I had earned their trust which appears to have 
facilitated their ability to talk, largely in detail, about their experiences.  
 
One limitation concerns the recruitment procedure. Initial difficulty recruiting led me 
to rely more heavily on one source: Facebook, thus largely restricting potential 
participants to those who use this social networking platform. Furthermore, 
Rozmovits and Ziebland (2004) warn that self-volunteering participants may differ 
from a broader sample in their motivations to participate. For example, in the 
context of this study, participants may have been drawn to participate because of a 
particularly positive experience of GAD or a particularly negative one. Although it is 
impossible to rule out this possibility, the varied textures of experience described, 
combined with participants’ different disclosed reasons for participating (i.e., to raise 
awareness of GAD generally, to address particular misconceptions, to consolidate 
their own understandings of GAD), reassure me that there was not one shared 
motivation driving participation.  
 
Other limitations concern the characteristics of the participant group. Only one male 
participated compared to seven females. Many possible explanations could account 
for this. Re-considering my main recruitment source, research has shown that 
females use Facebook more frequently and for longer durations than males 
(Shepherd, 2016). Furthermore, it has been suggested that females are, on 
average, more comfortable discussing more sensitive and emotionally distressing 
topics (Chester & Glass, 2006). I also wonder whether males feel more comfortable 
talking to a male researcher. However, research has shown that the majority of both 
female and male participants do not have a gender preference for researchers 
(Yager, Diedrichs, & Drummond, 2013) and do not consider this an important factor 
(Theadom, Fadyl, Hollands, Foster, & McPherson, 2014). The finding that GAD is 
more common in females than males (McManus et al., 2016; Seedat et al., 2009; 
Vesga-López et al., 2008) is perhaps a more likely explanation. As indicated by the 
shared individual super-ordinate themes across all eight participants, Rob’s 
experiences seem to converge, at the broader level, with the female participants’ 
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experiences. However, I cannot ascertain whether divergence between the 
experiences of male and female participants exists and, arguably more importantly, 
male insight into the lived experience of GAD remains limited.  
 
Finally, co-morbid diagnoses were not excluded, and I did not inquire about the 
possibility. While Emma was the only participant to voluntarily disclose having an 
additional, formal psychiatric diagnosis, I cannot rule out the possibility in other 
participants. It is therefore unclear whether participants’ reported experiences are 
confined to GAD or are influenced by potential co-morbid psychiatric and/or physical 
health conditions.  
 
4.7   Implications for counselling psychology and beyond 
 
The findings have useful clinical implications for counselling and clinical 
psychologists, counsellors, and psychotherapists who may encounter adults with 
GAD.  
 
Supporting Cassidy et al.’s (2009) suggestion, the findings indicate that Bowlby’s 
(1973) attachment theory provides a useful framework with which to understand 
GAD’s developmental antecedents and maintaining factors. However, following the 
advice of Hudson and Rapee (2004), it is important to consider attachment as part 
of a broader etiological model of how anxiety develops that also considers other risk 
factors including biological (genetic and neurodevelopmental) and stressful life 
events. Nevertheless, the finding that insecure attachment continues to plague 
participants’ lives now via continued fear of rejection suggests that the therapist’s 
ability to provide a secure base in therapy may aid successful GAD treatment. 
Bowlby (1988) argued that the therapist should provide the client with a sense of 
safety, comfort, and acceptance to enable the client to manage the distress evoked 
by painful exploration during therapy. Indeed, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging research has demonstrated that the presence of a secure base reduces the 
perception of threat in the brain (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2005, 2006). As 
already discussed, individuals with GAD are highly sensitive to threat (van der 
Heiden et al., 2011), particularly interpersonal ones (Newman et al., 2004). In 
relation to the last point, it may also be useful for therapists to address clients’ 
inaccurate assessments of their interpersonal interactions (Cassidy et al., 2009) as 
these are also associated with insecure attachment styles (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 
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2007, for a review). Indeed, greater emphasis in the psychological treatment of GAD 
is now on addressing the client’s interpersonal difficulties, whereby the client is 
encouraged to reflect on their contributions to them (Newman et al., 2004). 
Reflecting on a key finding from the current study, care must be taken to ensure that 
the client’s feelings of shame are not strengthened.  
 
This study highlighted participants’ difficulty tolerating ambiguity (present and future-
orientated) and consequent difficulty tolerating absence of perceived control. 
Although traditional CBT remains the "gold standard" treatment for GAD (Treanor, 
Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011, p.127), this study’s findings 
support the beneficial impact of other psychological therapies that target these 
aspects of GAD. ABBT, which was introduced in section 4.3, is one such therapy. It 
uses targeted interventions for emotion regulation difficulties, IU, and low 
perceptions of control (Treanor et al., 2011). Treanor et al. (2011) propose that 
ABBT for GAD may alter the client’s expectations and desire for rigid control and 
encourage them to focus on actions that are more likely under their control, such as 
clearly stating their needs or choosing their own actions. They found that those who 
received ABBT reported significantly fewer emotion regulation difficulties, greater 
tolerance of uncertainty, and greater perceived control over anxiety than waitlist 
controls. These effects were maintained at three and nine-month follow-up 
assessments (Treanor et al., 2011).  
 
While ABBT does appear to be an effective treatment option and draws parallels 
with some of the beneficial therapeutic experiences described by this study’s 
participants, I am struck by their conflicting accounts of struggling to accept GAD 
and of engaging in a continuous fight for perceived control. These accounts suggest 
that something is hindering their efforts to manage GAD more effectively. I also find 
myself reflecting on their self-doubt. Whilst linking the findings to existing literature, 
it seemed that this was indeed the result of negative problem orientation as 
opposed to a fundamental personality trait. I drew this conclusion based on their 
disclosures of rationally knowing that they are capable. In hindsight however, 
participants’ apparent shame suggests that they do in fact hold engrained, negative 
self-perceptions. These reflections made me question whether an integrative 
psychological therapy for GAD could address this potential hinderance by targeting 
its many elements (e.g., interpersonal difficulties, shame, IU, need for rigid control).  
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This led me to Wolfe’s (2005, 2008) integrative psychotherapy for anxiety disorders. 
Barry Wolfe is a clinical psychologist who has worked with individuals with anxiety 
disorders for over thirty years. This has led him to draw two conclusions. First, that 
"anxiety disorders are typically generated by failed efforts to confront and solve a 
finite number of unavoidable existential dilemmas that every human being will 
experience" (2008, p. 204). More specifically, he asserts that the roots of anxiety 
disorders lie in the interaction between the individual, who has a damaged, negative 
self-perception, and their struggle with an existential crisis (Wolfe, 2008). Existential 
crises include difficulty accepting one’s mortality, difficulty accepting the inevitability 
of loss, and fear of the rigours and realities of everyday living (Wolfe, 2008). 
Secondly, he believes that anxiety disorders can be durably treated using his 
integrative psychotherapy (Wolfe, 2008).   
 
Drawing parallels with this study’s findings, Wolfe (2005) asserts that the 
fundamental damaged self-perception of those with GAD is a deep shame about 
who they are as humans. They perceive themselves to be defective and unworthy of 
others’ love. He posits that unless this self-perception is healed, there is a high 
probability that the symptoms of GAD will remain chronic and intermittent, even after 
successful symptom treatment (e.g., modified worry cognitions, IU improved). This 
may explain why participants who had completed therapy were still experiencing 
GAD symptoms. His integrative psychotherapy draws ideas from psychodynamic, 
cognitive behavioural, and experiential approaches (Wolfe, 2005). The first stage 
involves symptom alleviation as these are experienced as painful and 
overwhelming. Then, the behavioural, cognitive, and emotional strategies that 
prevent the client from confronting their specific existential dilemmas are identified 
and modified, as contexts in which damaged self-perceptions develop usually 
involve an existential dilemma that cannot be faced. Finally, process-directive 
experiential therapy helps the client face, process, and ultimately solve their 
existential crises (Wolfe, 2008).  
 
It may be beneficial for those offering psychological therapy to individuals with GAD 
and other anxiety disorders to train in this therapeutic modality or at least consider 
the theory behind it when working with this client group, as damaged self-
perceptions and unaddressed existential crises may be hindering clients’ progress. 
The connection between insecure attachment and existential anxiety should also be 
considered as one way meaning is acquired is through attachment, thus secure 
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attachment acts as a buffer against existential anxiety (Iverach, Menzies, & 
Menzies, 2014).  
 
I also believe that an existential approach to therapy may benefit individuals with 
GAD. I use the term existential approach as opposed to existential therapy because 
a diverse range of existential therapies exist, each with a shared concern: human 
lived-existence (Cooper, 2017). Existential philosophers have tried to identify the 
universal, invariant qualities of human existence. Although different, and sometimes 
contrasting, existential givens have been emphasised by different philosophers, 
several commonalities exist across the existential spectrum (Cooper, 2017). One is 
the assertion that human existence is fundamentally free (Macquarrie, 1972). 
According to the existential philosophers Kierkegaard (1844/1980) and Sartre 
(1943/1958), human existence erupts into the world out of no-thingness and thus 
cannot be reduced to a set of determinative causes. As touched upon in section 
1.2.4, humans are therefore free to make choices (Cooper, 2017). To illustrate this, 
the reader of this portfolio is not impelled by a set of causes to act in a certain way, 
for example, to adopt the beliefs and opinions presented throughout. Rather, the 
reader has the possibility of making choices, for example, to continue reading or 
take a break. From an existential perspective then, we are our choices; our identity 
and characteristics are consequences - not causes - of the choices we make 
(Cooper, 2017). This does not mean that existential philosophers believe that 
humans are free to do whatever they want. They acknowledge that human 
existence is confronted with numerous limit-situations such as death and suffering 
(Cooper, 2017). Our freedom is also limited by the particular concrete situations we 
find ourselves in (Cooper, 2017). For example, we cannot walk through the walls of 
our homes to directly access the room we want to be in. From an existential 
perspective, although we cannot fully control our beginnings, our endings, or much 
of what occurs in between, we can choose how we face these limitations (Cooper, 
2017).  
 
Kierkegaard (1844/1980) argues that the more we acknowledge and act on our 
freedom, the more we experience anxiety. This is because in choosing one thing, 
we are always choosing against something else, and there is always the possibility 
that we will choose against the better alternative. Of fundamental importance is the 
fact that often we cannot know and cannot be certain which option is the better one; 
we must make important decisions amid uncertainty (Cooper, 2017). Sartre 
(1943/1958) argues that making choices is made even more anxiety-provoking by 
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the fact that we not only choose for ourselves but also for others. From an 
existential perspective, while we alone are responsible for our decisions, we also 
carry responsibility for others (Cooper, 2017). Our anxiety is further strengthened 
because we have nothing solid on which to base our choices. We have no fixed 
identity, no given meanings to guide us, or to blame our decisions on (Sartre, 
1943/1958). Fundamentally then, from an existential standpoint, it is not only that 
freedom and nothingness evoke anxiety but also the fact that our existence is 
confronted with limit-situations. If these immovable boundaries did not exist, we 
could make all the choices we wanted to, alternatives would not be excluded, and 
we would not feel anxious (Cooper, 2017). From an existential perspective, anxiety 
is a response to the reality of the human condition (Cooper, 2017). It is an 
immediate yet often unwelcome feeling towards-the-world (Cooper, 2015). The 
existential standpoint argues that we try to supress this unwelcome anxiety and 
other ‘negative’ feelings such as guilt and despair by denying the reality of our 
existence (Cooper, 2017). At the heart of this self-deception is a denial of our 
freedom and responsibility. This denial can manifest itself in various ways, such as 
objectifying oneself, adhering to an ideology, blaming our choices on someone else 
or on an unconscious, internal urge, or trying to deny the given limitations of our 
lives (Cooper, 2017). According to existential philosophers, these defences against 
existential reality inevitably falter, and existential anxiety is sublimated into a 
neurotic manifestation of anxiety (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014; Tillich, 2000). Consequently, 
as Wolfe (2008) stated, the individual’s deeper existential concerns are not 
confronted and solved but rather continue to haunt him or her. Using an example 
from the current study to illustrate this, it can be hypothesised that Kirsty’s adoption 
of a ‘likeable’ persona (e.g., at the dinner party she hosted) functions to avoid her 
existential responsibilities. She appears to communicate that she is not in charge 
and will do what others do. Existentially however, it could be argued that at some 
level Kirsty knows that this is false. She knows that she is an adult woman with 
shared responsibility for her son. This awareness evokes anxiety, and it can be 
hypothesised that one way she attempts to deal with this is to try to fit in with others 
even more. She increasingly worries that others do not like her. Here, Kirsty’s 
existential anxiety (of being responsible) gets sublimated into a neurotic anxiety (of 
people not liking her).  
 
Although the existential therapies differ in their influences and clinical practices, they 
share a common aim: to help clients become more authentic. This involves 
becoming more aware of their actual existence and living more in line with their true 
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values, beliefs, and experiences (Cooper, 2017). An existential approach to therapy 
therefore encourages clients to acknowledge and act on their freedom and 
responsibility. From an existential perspective, to face our freedom and possibilities 
we must face our existential anxiety. Existential anxiety is therefore not 
conceptualised as irrational or pathological but as a teacher and guide that helps us 
live a more authentic, meaningful existence (Cooper, 2017). An existential approach 
may not only benefit individuals with GAD but also those presenting with any 
manifestation of neurotic anxiety. I believe that it would facilitate clients’ 
understanding of, and ability to normalise, both existential and neurotic anxiety. By 
encouraging clients to acknowledge that it is anxious for them to acknowledge that 
they have choices, that their decisions will affect themselves and those around 
them, and that their choices are, to a certain extent, ridden with uncertainty, I 
believe that they can find the courage to accept and learn from their existential 
anxiety (and other ‘negative’ feelings) and begin to decide who and how they want 
to be (Cooper, 2017).  
 
Given that the presence of somatic pain in individuals with GAD is significantly 
associated with functional impairment and poorer quality of life (Romera et al., 
2011), it would be useful for therapists to inquire about pain and to inform clients 
about available complementary strategies that may help alleviate it such as 
physiotherapy, yoga, or massage. Recalling Sarah’s account, yoga may have the 
added benefit of facilitating the client’s ability to remain in the present moment.  
 
The findings also have implications for the assessment of GAD. It is important that 
healthcare professionals are equally aware of GAD symptoms that are commonly 
associated with OCD, such as superstitious thinking and checking rituals or appear 
to have been overlooked in existing GAD literature, such as past ruminations and 
difficulty tolerating present ambiguity. The findings also serve a poignant reminder 
to healthcare professionals to treat these individuals like persons as opposed to 
biological machines that require fixing immediately. I appreciate that healthcare 
professionals’ time with patients, particularly physicians and medical specialists, can 
be limited, but it is still possible to communicate to the individual that they are being 
heard and respected. Simultaneously, it is important for healthcare professionals to 
consider all possibilities with regards to diagnosis and preferred treatment options. 
This is a particularly important message for physicians, given that individuals with 
GAD often seek professional help from physicians first and tend to present with 
physiological symptoms (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Shorter time between GAD 
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onset and first treatment seems to be associated with a larger treatment effect 
(Altamura, Dell’Osso, D’Urso, Russo, Fumagalli, & Mundo, 2008), further 
highlighting the importance of early detection.  
 
My final suggestion aligns with Strawbridge and Woolfe’s (2003) assertion that as 
counselling psychologists, we have a responsibility to consider how 
psychopathology is represented or socially constructed. Pearson (2008) was 
diagnosed with GAD aged twenty-three. She believes that community plays a 
crucial role in creating a society not plagued by neurotic anxiety (Pearson, 2008). In 
her memoir, she cites the existential psychologist Rollo May, who once wrote 
"competitive individualism militates against the experience of community, and the 
lack of community is a centrally important factor for contemporaneous anxiety" 
(Pearson, 2008, p. 83). She also draws ideas from psychologists whose cross-
cultural research has led them to conclude that the more a culture enforces rational 
control, the more likely it will generate neurotic anxiety because it is more fearful of 
losing control. Pearson believes that the intense value Western cultures give 
rationalism has not helped individuals confront fear but rather has "invalidated 
meaning" which, in turn, reinforces fear (p. 96). Engaging in "communal rituals" (p. 
46), such as dancing at a blues club and belonging to a church community, has 
helped her cope with her anxiety. For Pearson, community appears to create shared 
meaning and purpose. In addition, "knowing that you’re not alone" provides comfort 
(p. 46). This sense of meaning, purpose, and togetherness strikes a chord with the 
participants’ narratives in the current study. I therefore wonder whether we, as 
counselling psychologists, could promote community-based activities to strengthen 
these individuals’ senses of purpose and belonging, and reduce the value placed on 
rationalism. This, in turn, will hopefully reduce their neurotic anxiety. Such promotion 
could be achieved by working in direct collaboration with various community 
organisations such as religious groups and recreational clubs.  
 
4.8   Future research 
 
All participants in this study were of British Caucasian ethnicity. It would be 
interesting to replicate the study with participants of different ethnicities and cultures 
to see whether the lived experience of GAD differs across different ethnic and 
cultural groups. This suggestion stems from considering how cultural influences 
shape individuals’ perceptions and descriptions of their experiences. For example, 
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Western cultures tend to perceive adversities as "journeys", "struggles", or "battles". 
Recalling the published accounts of GAD included in the Introduction chapter, 
McWilliams (2016) described how she has "fought this mental illness for nine 
years". Current participants also made references to "fighting", "hard work", 
"struggle", and implied engaging in a journey towards accepting GAD. These 
narratives are also present in Western individuals’ descriptions of experiencing 
physical illnesses such as cancer. Personal accounts on Macmillan’s online 
community are rife with these terms. HappyEeyore (2018) comments: "I intend to 
fight", while Rozzieroo (2018) refers to "my bowel cancer journey". When someone 
dies of cancer, announcements often contain phrases like "X died after a long battle 
with cancer".  
 
To this end, discourse analysis could be conducted to investigate how individuals 
with GAD construct their experiences through discourse. Discourse techniques 
could also be used to analyse the constructions of GAD seen in the media and in 
organisations that provide information and support to individuals with GAD (e.g., 
Anxiety UK, Mind). Hawkins (2017) wrote about the importance of being open and 
honest about her experiences, not only because this is "cathartic", but also to "break 
down the stigma that still seems to be ever present". Contrastingly, in this study, 
Chloe noted how increasing coverage of "mental health" in the news has helped her 
and her mother normalise, and thus accept GAD. It would therefore be beneficial to 
consider whether these public constructions of GAD do indeed reduce or contribute 
to the associated stigma.   
 
My final suggestion also stems from participants’ references to journeys. Sarah, for 
example, described the long process involved in reaching a degree of acceptance, 
while Chloe described feeling "better" now than she did seven years ago when her 
anxiety "surfaced really badly" (8.1.2). These accounts highlight the potential 
usefulness of investigating the impact of GAD across time. As Flowers (2008) 
suggests, meeting with a participant more than once facilitates the development of a 
trusting relationship in which participants feel comfortable with increasing 
disclosures. Multiple contacts also enable material to develop from an initial meeting 
(Flowers, 2008). However, he also warns that the focus on open exploration of lived 
experience at that time can be lost if significant time is spent reconsidering issues 
raised previously. One way to reduce this possibility would be to consider 
supplementing semi-structured interviews with other data collection methods such 
as personal diaries, as these may enable more spontaneous accounts of 
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experience. Several participants in the current study described the catharsis 
achieved through writing their thoughts and feelings down, suggesting that this data 
collection method may also have additional benefits for participants. While such a 
longitudinal study would be time-consuming, the findings may shed light on the 
particular support (both personal and professional) individuals with GAD need at 
different times following diagnosis.  
 
4.9   Concluding thoughts 
 
This study’s findings have further highlighted how diagnostic entities are often 
simplifications of the complicated clinical and phenomenological profiles of 
psychiatric disorders (Denys, 2011). Conducting this research has strengthened my 
resolve as a counselling psychologist to consider the phenomenological 
perspectives of clients’ experiences before theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
Phenomenology in the mental health field is synonymous with the pure clinical 
descriptions of symptoms. However, as discussed in the Methodology chapter, 
phenomenology considers phenomena as they are experienced without reference to 
their psychological origins or causal statements (Denys, 2011).  
 
With this in mind, I have been struck both professionally and personally by the 
debilitating extent of participants’ need for certainty and control, themes that are 
more commonly associated with OCD (Denys, 2011). As Denys (2011) asserts "the 
tragedy of certainty is that it is not based on objective knowledge or on external 
reality but on a feeling" (p. 9). One can be right but still experience doubt or one can 
be wrong but feel certain, thus because knowledge cannot guarantee security, 
absolute certainty can never be achieved. Participants’ continuous pursuits of 
certainty, which leave them feeling "worn down", are consequently useless. Perhaps 
these two themes have evoked a particularly strong emotional response (i.e., 
anxiety, sadness) on a personal level because control and certainty are "illusions" 
(Denys, 2011, p. 9) I think we all, as humans, cling onto at times to protect 
ourselves from life’s harsh "paramount reality" (Wagner, 1970, p. 320).  
 
Linking with the latter point, this research has sparked my personal and professional 
interest in both existential philosophy and psychology; perspectives that, until 
conducting this research, were absent from my counselling psychologist training. An 
existential approach may be best described as a particular ethic: that humans 
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should be treated, first and foremost, as humans (Cooper, 2015). Echoing the 
phenomenological standpoint, from an existential perspective, individuals are their 
lived existing (Cooper, 2017). Both perspectives have consequently reinforced the 
importance of treating clients as the concrete, unique, irreducible, whole human 
existents that they are. This involves approaching clients’ presenting difficulties as 
aspects of their existence as opposed to pathological symptoms (Cooper, 2017). 
The value of approaching my clinical work in this way has been highlighted through 
my acquired knowledge of existential anxiety. By conceptualising anxiety as an 
unavoidable basic given of human existence rather than an aspect of pathology that 
needs to be managed or cured, the client can view it as an opportunity for learning. 
Knowing that neurotic anxiety has its basis in existential anxiety encourages the 
client to identify a source of meaning in their life and clarify their personal values 
(Iacovou, 2011). As already touched upon, while I believe that psychiatric diagnoses 
help distinguish between presenting difficulties and can facilitate meaning, I believe 
that they should be approached as an aspect of a much larger, contextualised 
understanding of the client as a human being. At the heart of my clinical work going 
forward, I will therefore consider what it means to be human and what each client’s 
presenting difficulties are trying to tell them (Kirkland-Handley, 2002; Steffen & 
Hanley, 2014).  
 
As a researcher, conducting this study has given me the confidence to use 
qualitative methods of data analysis that rely more heavily on researcher intuition, 
such as reflective lifeworld research. Returning to my study rationale, I hope this 
study has increased awareness of the rich textures that characterise the lived 
experience of GAD. As I conclude this write-up, I am reminded of one of the first 
things Chloe said when she responded to my research flyer. She was really 
surprised that I wanted to talk to individuals with a formal diagnosis of GAD as she 
did not think it was a well-known "condition". Upon arranging the initial telephone 
screening, she asked whether many people had expressed interest as she did not 
know of anyone local with GAD. I hope that this research has communicated that 
GAD is being taken seriously and has provided some comfort to those with GAD 
that they are not alone. Considering the significant lack of literature on the lived 
experiences of GAD, together with the relatively small scale of this study, further 
research is needed to strengthen these messages and our understanding of GAD.  
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Appendix 1:   GAD-Q-IV (Newman et al., 2002) 
 
1. Do you experience excessive worry?       Yes        No 
2. Is your worry excessive in intensity, frequency or amount of distress it causes?   Yes      No 
3. Do you find it difficult to control your worry (or stop worrying) once it starts?         Yes      No 
4. Do you worry excessively and uncontrollably about minor things such as               
being late for an appointment, minor repairs, homework etc?                                 Yes      No 
5. Please list the six most frequent topics about which you worry excessively and 
uncontrollably: 
 
6. During the last six months have you been bothered by excessive and uncontrollable worries 
more days than not?                                                                                                   
  Yes     No 
IF YES, CONTINUE. IF NO, SKIP REMAINING QUESTIONS 
7. During the past six months, have you often been bothered by any of the following 
symptoms? Place a check next to each symptom that you have had more days than not: 
- Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge 
- Difficulty falling/staying asleep or restless/unsatisfying sleep 
- Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank 
- Irritability 
- Being easily fatigued 
- Muscle tension 
 
8. How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work, social activities, 
family etc? Circle one number: 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8      
         None                      Mildly               Moderately                 Severely            Very  
                                                                                                                              severely 
 
9. How much are you bothered by worry and physical symptoms (how much distress does it 
cause you)? Circle one number: 
0             1             2              3             4             5             6             7             8 
     No distress             Mild distress            Moderate                  Severe               Very severe 
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Appendix 2:   GAD-Q-IV scoring system (Newman et al., 2002) 
 
Scored using a sum total response.  
 
All yes answers coded as 1. All no answers coded as 0. 
 
For question 5 which asks for a list of most frequent worry topics, individuals will be given 1 
point for each topic listed up to six topics, and then this total will be divided by three. 
 
For question 7, participants will be given 1 point for each physical symptom they experience 
up to six symptoms, and then this total will be divided by three. 
 
The numbers circled for questions 8 and 9 will each be divided by four and the resultant two 
numbers will be added together. 
 
Any skipped questions will be scored as 0.  
 
In line with Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, and Fresco’s (2014) recommendations, a total 
score of 7.67 or above must be obtained to meet criteria for a diagnosis of generalised 
anxiety disorder.   
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Appendix 3:   Initial interview schedule 
 
Prior to asking the following questions, the researcher will state that she will be using the 
term everyday anxiety when referring to generalised anxiety disorder, throughout the 
interview. 
 
General opening questions:  
 
What is it like to live with everyday anxiety? 
 
Can you tell me about a memorable event in which you were experiencing everyday 
anxiety? (Ask this question again later) 
 
Prompt questions:  
 
Can you give me an example of…?  
 
Can you give me some examples so that I can visualise it? 
 
Each chosen lifeworld fraction (in bold) and their corresponding questions: 
 
Selfhood  
 
How would you have described yourself before you experienced everyday anxiety?  
 
How would you describe yourself now?  
 
How do you think others perceived you before you experienced everyday anxiety?  
 
How do you think others perceive you now? 
 
Sociality  
 
Can you tell me about your relationships with others? What were they like before you 
experienced everyday anxiety? Now what are they like? 
 
Embodiment 
 
What do you notice about your body when you are experiencing everyday anxiety?  
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Appendix 3:   Initial interview schedule (cont. ) 
 
Temporality 
 
When you first wake up, do you worry about what’s going to happen during the day?  
 
Do you worry about what’s going to happen in a week’s time? How about in a month’s time? 
 
Are there times when you don’t experience everyday anxiety?  
 
Can you give me an example of a time when you didn’t experience everyday anxiety? 
 
Material Objects 
 
What are your worries about? 
 
Spatiality 
 
Is there a place where you don’t feel anxious? What is this place like?  
Is there a place where you feel particularly anxious? What is this place like?  
 
End question:  
 
Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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Appendix 4:   Final interview schedule 
Prior to asking the following questions, the researcher will state that she will be using the 
term everyday anxiety when referring to generalised anxiety disorder, throughout the 
interview. 
 
General opening question:  
 
What is it like to live with everyday anxiety? 
 
Prompt questions:  
 
Can you tell me about a memorable event in which you were experiencing everyday 
anxiety? (ask about the narrative again later) 
 
Can you give me some examples so that I can visualise it? 
 
Each chosen lifeworld dimension (in bold) and their corresponding questions: 
 
Selfhood  
 
Since experiencing everyday anxiety, how has your sense of self changed over time? 
 
How has the way others perceive you changed over time? 
 
Sociality  
 
How have your relationships been affected by everyday anxiety? (Prompts: Start with the 
people closest to you. How about your family, friends, work colleagues etc.,?) 
 
Embodiment 
 
How has everyday anxiety affected your body? 
 
Temporality 
 
How does everyday anxiety affect how you think about the past? 
 
How does it affect how you think about the future? 
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Appendix 4:   Final interview schedule (cont. ) 
 
Material Objects 
 
What is it, exactly, that you worry about? 
 
Spatiality 
 
What situations make your everyday anxiety worse? 
 
End question:  
 
Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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Appendix 5:   Research flyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you been diagnosed with generalised anxiety 
disorder (GAD)? 
 
Would you be willing to talk about your experience of 
GAD? 
 
If you have received a formal diagnosis of GAD, are aged 
eighteen or over and are not currently receiving any form 
of psychological therapy, I would be very keen to hear from 
you! 
My name is Laura Young and I am doing this research project as part of my Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology at City, University of London. This project is supervised by 
Professor George Berguno, Registered Psychologist and Senior Lecturer 
  
Participation will involve a ninety-minute (approx.) interview with me. If you are interested 
in sharing your experience, or would like to find out more, please give me a call on  
 or email me at:  
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through the City, 
University of London Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, City, 
University of London [Ref: PSYETH (P/F) 15/16 182] 
If you would like to complain about any aspect of this project, please contact the 
Secretary to the University’s Senate Research Ethics Committee on  or 
via email:   
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Appendix 6:   Participant information sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
The lived experience of individuals with generalised anxiety disorder 
 
My name is Laura Young, and as part of my Doctorate in Counselling Psychology at City, 
University of London, I am carrying out research exploring the lived experience of individuals 
with generalised anxiety disorder.  
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH? 
 
This research aims to explore individuals’ experiences of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) 
and how they make sense of their experiences. Participants must have received a formal 
diagnosis of GAD and be aged eighteen or over to take part in this research. Participants 
must not currently be receiving any form of psychological therapy. 
 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? 
 
Your participation in this research is voluntary and you may choose to withdraw at any time, 
without any consequences or need to give a reason. Just let me know at the time if you wish 
to withdraw. 
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO?  
 
If you choose to take part in this research, you will be invited to attend a telephone screening 
with myself. During this screening, I will ask the questions on the Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Questionnaire IV (GAD-Q-IV). The purpose of this is to ensure that you meet this 
questionnaire’s criteria for a diagnosis of GAD.  The use of this standardised measure 
ensures that the same criteria are applied to each participant. It is important to note that this 
screening does not represent a formal diagnosis of GAD. Similarly, if you have previously 
received a formal diagnosis of GAD but do not meet this questionnaire’s criteria, this does 
not imply that your previous, formal diagnosis is wrong. You do not have to answer any  
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questions you do not want to. Your answers will be written down briefly so that a total score 
can be calculated. Your answers will not be used in the research, and they will be destroyed 
as soon as the telephone screening has ended. If you do not meet this questionnaire’s 
criteria for a diagnosis of GAD, you will be thanked for your participation up until this point 
but will not be asked to take part in an interview. If you do meet the criteria for a diagnosis of 
GAD, you will be invited to participate in one face-to-face interview with myself about your 
experiences of GAD. If you choose to participate in this interview, you will be asked to sign a 
consent form indicating that your participation is voluntary and that you understand your 
rights. The interview will take place at a location agreed beforehand, and the interview will 
take approximately ninety minutes. The interview will be audio recorded using two digital 
recorders.  
 
WILL THE INTERVIEW AND RESEARCH PROCESS BE CONFIDENTIAL? 
Yes. The interview will be recorded and listened to only by me, or an examiner if requested. 
The interview will then be transcribed. Names and identifying information will be removed 
and replaced by a code. In accordance with the British Psychological Society’s guidelines, 
all data collected will be stored securely for five years before being destroyed. If you choose 
to withdraw at any time during the interview, the recording will be stopped and destroyed 
immediately. The only time I would need to break this confidentiality is if you disclosed that 
you were planning to commit an illegal act or one that endangers yourself or another person, 
which I will discuss with you before we start.  
 
DO I HAVE TO ANSWER ALL OF THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IF I DO NOT WANT 
TO? 
No. It is up to you whether you wish to answer the questions. Mostly it will be you choosing 
what you wish to talk about, the questions are simply there to guide the interview. 
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WHAT IF I FIND THE INTERVIEW UNCOMFORTABLE AND/OR DISTRESSING? 
If you find it difficult or uncomfortable to talk about certain things in the interview at any time, 
please let me know. You can withdraw completely at any time or take a break if you wish. 
You will be invited to attend a ten minute debrief session, after the interview has finished and 
recording has stopped, to talk about your experience of being interviewed. A list of 
confidential support services will also be given to you after the interview. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH? 
The results of this research will be written up as part of a formal doctoral thesis portfolio and 
may additionally be published in psychological or other scientific books or journals or 
otherwise reported scientific bodies. Your identity will not be revealed under any 
circumstances. If you would like to receive a summary of the  
research findings, please inform either myself or my research supervisor.  
 
WHO HAS REVIEWED THIS RESEARCH? 
This research project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through the City, 
University of London Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, City, University 
of London [Ref: PSYETH (P/F) 15/16 182] 
 
If you have any questions or would like any further information about this research, 
please contact me at or my research supervisor, Professor 
George Berguno at  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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Resources 
 
Anxiety UK 
08444 775 774 
www.anxietyuk.org.uk 
Provides information, self-help resources and support for individuals with anxiety disorders 
 
Anxiety Alliance 
0845 296 7877 
www.anxietyalliance.org.uk 
Provides advice and support to individuals with anxiety disorders 
 
Samaritans 
116 123 
www.samaritans.org 
Phone service providing emotional support. Available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year 
 
Mind 
0300 123 3393 
www.mind.org.uk 
Provides information, advice and resources on all aspects of mental health 
 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy 
01455 550243 
To find a therapist: www.itsgoodtotalk.org.uk/therapists 
 
UK Council for Psychotherapy 
020 7014 9955 
To find a therapist: www.ukcp.org.uk 
 
British Psychological Society 
To find a psychologist: +44 (0) 116 254 9568   
www.bps.org.uk 
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Consent Form 
Title of Study: The lived experience of individuals with generalised anxiety disorder 
Ethics approval code: [PSYETH (P/F) 15/16 182] 
I have read and understood the participant information sheet and have had the opportunity 
to ask questions. Based on this, I understand the purpose of the study and my role in it, and 
I agree to participate in this research. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
I am free to withdraw at any time without needing to give a reason and without any 
consequences. I understand that if I withdraw at any time, the recording of my interview will 
be destroyed.  
I consent to the interview being audio recorded using two digital recorders. I understand that 
the interview will be recorded and listened to only by the researcher, or an examiner if 
requested and will then be transcribed. I understand that names and identifying information 
will be removed and replaced by a code to protect my anonymity. I understand that in 
accordance with the British Psychological Society’s guidelines, all data collected will be 
stored securely for five years before being destroyed. 
I agree to the researcher, Laura Young, recording and processing this information about me. 
I understand that this information will be used only for the purpose(s) set out in this 
statement and my consent is conditional on the researcher complying with her duties and 
obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. 
I understand that confidentiality will be protected throughout the research.  
I understand that this consent form will be kept securely and separate from all other 
research documents and at no point will I be identifiable by name in any part of the research 
findings. 
I understand that the researcher conducting this research is abiding by the Ethical Principles 
of conducting Research with Human Subjects, set out by the British Psychological Society 
(2004).  
By signing below, I am agreeing that I am a minimum of eighteen years old, and consent to 
participate in this research. 
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Participant name (Please PRINT):  ___________________ 
Participant signature: ___________________   
Date: ___________________   
 
Researcher signature: ___________________  
Date: ___________________    
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Appendix 9:   Written debrief 
 
 
The lived experience of individuals with generalised anxiety disorder 
 
DEBRIEF 
 
Thank you for participating in this research. 
 
The interview in which you just participated was designed to explore your lived experience of 
generalised anxiety disorder. In particular, I am interested in how you make sense of this 
experience. It is hoped that this will increase understanding and awareness of the meaning 
of this experience to you.  
 
Please let me know if you have any further questions about this research and what I am 
hoping to achieve with it. 
 
If anything discussed in this interview, or during your completion of the GAD-Q-IV has 
caused you any distress, please see the attached resources sheet. This sheet provides 
contact details for organisations that may be able to offer advice and support. These include 
services specifically for anxiety disorders and counselling services. 
 
If you have any questions, complaints or would like to receive further information about this 
research and/or a summary of the research findings, please contact me at 
or my research supervisor, Professor George Berguno at 
 
 
Thank you again for participating in this research. 
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1 Battling with uncertainty: What’s going to happen next? 
a. An endless cycle 
Transcript 
location 
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
Marie 
Kirsty 
Shelley 
Sarah 
Chloe 
 
With labour, you know it will come to an end. [ ] With anxiety … no 
Thinking. Constant thinking 
It’s like an endless cycle of ‘what ifs?’  
The thing with GAD is, is that there’s no respite from it 
You’re always anxious about something  
I’m just always worrying 
I worry quite a lot about everything 
Just worry about everything 
1.3.11 
2.3.7 
3.2.1 
4.9.1 
5.7.2 
6.1.4 
7.7.5 
8.7.5 
b. No rhyme or reason  
Emma 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
Marie 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
Sarah 
Chloe 
 
There’s no rhyme or reason to it [GAD] 
I’ve got certain buzz words I use which is: bizarre, odd, strange, erm doesn’t make 
any sense, confusing 
It’s a bizarre logic that goes on in your brain sometimes 
They [triggers] can come at any time 
It’s probably difficult to describe it [GAD] as a whole because I think from day to day 
it changes 
I don’t know how, I don’t know where the thoughts come from 
That [catastrophising] happens like literally in the blink of an eye 
I don’t know how to explain it [GAD] 
1.11.7 
2.6.14 
 
3.9.3 
4.1.2 
5.1.1 
 
6.9.2 
7.7.5 
8.3.5 
c. Grappling with time 
i. Loss of a past self 
 
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
 
Marie 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
 
I wanna go out. I wanna get smashed. I wanna be the person that I was 
I think about how I’ve been over the years. What I’ve done, how, what I’ve achieved 
It [GAD] doesn’t let me let it [the past] go. [ ] Things that you have done, erm and 
mistakes that you’ve made 
I’ll be thinking about all the, back to all the bits that I regret 
That’s [previous public panic attacks] something that I think about, even if it 
happened a while ago, it tends to still play on your mind 
I do look back on things and I worry about it 
When I first got the anxiety, thinking about the past and old me, and wanting to go 
back to that was really hard to swallow 
That’s the thing about being a kid again, being like: oh, I just wanna be a kid forever 
1.4.8 
2.8.3 
3.8.1 
 
4.2.5 
5.6.2 
 
6.7.1 
7.2.4 
 
8.5.3 
ii. Anticipatory anxiety  
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
 
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
 
What’s gonna happen next? And you just don’t know 
I’m a forward thinker. [ ] I’m always thinking about the next bit 
The minute I get up and start the presentation, everything’s fine. It’s the worrying 
about it before 
If I’ve got a meeting coming up at work, erm … my instant thought is: I’m gonna get 
sacked 
I went on holiday at the end of last month but it’s something that I planned for [ ] over 
a year and a half 
We did have a party in the end but [ ] I was like: ‘oh God, what if he [her son] dies 
before his birthday?’ 
Worrying about … everything that’s gonna happen over the next however many 
years 
Worrying about the next day 
1.4.20 
2.8.1 
3.5.1 
 
4.7.1 
 
5.6.2 
 
6.8.1 
 
7.8.1 
 
8.4.5 
iii. Trying to stay present  
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
Marie 
 
Sarah 
Chloe 
I just try and take each day at a time. Some days I have to go hour by hour 
Have a coffee somewhere, just sit there [ ] enjoyed the moment just chilling 
I’ve tried to stop looking too much in the future 
I try to be spontaneous cos if I plan too much ahead of time, the amount of scenarios 
I play in my head of what can go wrong is just too much 
That’s why I wanna do yoga, to try and stay in the moment 
I’m just kinda taking one day at a time. Living more in the moment. I’m trying to at 
least 
 
1.8.1 
2.4.13 
3.9.1 
4.7.1 
 
7.8.1 
8.6.1 
d. Doubt  
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
Marie 
Kirsty 
Shelley 
Sarah 
Chloe 
Any situation that I’m not in control of, makes me anxious 
Sometimes I doubt my ability to do what I’m doing, whatever it is 
My confidence has almost eroded away 
I don’t let people in. I don’t trust anybody 
There’s lots of things that I would like to do but I can’t or, well, I feel like I can’t 
I don’t like … what I don’t know and where I don’t know 
I don’t trust myself. I can’t trust my thoughts 
I’m really scared, like I don’t know if I could do it [job] 
 
1.10.7 
2.1.2 
3.3.6 
4.4.1 
5.2.2 
6.10.1 
7.2.1 
8.10.8 
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2 A struggle for autonomy: You either let it get a hold of you or you get a hold of it 
a. GAD takes over self 
Transcript 
location 
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
 
Marie 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
Sarah 
Chloe 
It’s not nice not being in control of your own head 
It’s strange. It’s like it really takes over 
I’ve always had this level of worry and anxiety in, in me. [ ] It gets too big and gets 
out of control 
It controls every aspect of my life 
If you do cancel something [ ] it’s kind of like the disappointment of letting that 
consume you again 
It’s totally all-consuming. [ ] It makes it very hard to [ ] do anything 
The anxiety sort of got the best of me 
It can blind you, it really can 
 
1.4.20 
2.4.8 
3.2.1 
 
4.1.1 
5.10.3 
 
6.11.6 
7.1.2 
8.6.1 
b. The interplay between mind and body  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
Shelley 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
 
I can get like jelly legs [ ]. I can feel like I’m just going to pass out, like really dizzy, 
faint 
At the conference thing I was thinking: I can’t actually breathe. I can breathe but then 
I panic I can’t 
It [GAD] really does kind of affect your nervous system, your whole central nervous 
system 
I’d caused myself so much anxiety, I was causing the muscles in my neck to clamp.   
[ ] I was almost choking myself 
I’ve made myself literally sick with worry 
I had like my wisdom teeth out and [ ] it just took me weeks to recover from it 
If I don’t eat regularly, I get anxious, erm so making sure I’m eating healthily, eating 
regularly 
The most extreme reaction I’ve had to anxiety [ ] was like [ ] this really physically 
painful panic attack. [ ] Heart smashing against my chest and my hands were like 
seizing up  
 
1.6.1 
 
2.7.7 
 
3.7.2 
 
4.1.4 
 
5.7.2 
6.6.3 
7.1.1 
 
8.4.1 
c. I’m torturing myself  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
Rob 
 
Marie 
Kirsty 
Shelley 
 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
 
I do get snappy and I do shout a lot, and I hate myself for that. [ ] I feel like I’m 
constantly saying no to my daughter 
What ifs. Can’t stand it. It drives, drives me mad 
I worry about failure. [ ] I worry about erm being erm a good father, [ ] a good 
husband 
I’m suffering with a lot of migraines. [ ] It’s almost like I’m torturing myself 
I kind of put a lot of pressure on myself to make sure everything’s done 
The reality is, you’re the one that’s pushing them [friends] away, but you twist it in 
your brain to think: oh, well it’s because, you know, I’m a really rubbish person [ ] 
they don’t want me to come 
It’s that feeling bad, cos that’s what I did. Like it was all because of me that [ ] we 
[Sarah and her husband] weren’t blissfully happy 
I worry about people laughing at me. [ ] In restaurants I still do it. I’ll be like: ‘oh, can 
we go? Cos they’re laughing at us or they’re laughing at me’ 
 
1.4.2 
 
2.9.1 
3.10.4 
 
4.5.1 
5.7.2 
6.2.1 
 
 
7.5.1 
 
8.8.2 
d. I’m in control  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
 
 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
You either let it [GAD] get a hold of you or you get a hold of it so [ ] I’m, I’m trying to 
take back the control of my life 
My daughter’s text me the other night about a car crash. When I read it, it’s that, it’s 
like a almost knee-jerk: ‘ooh.’ ‘No you don’t need to react to that. It’s fine. It will be 
fine’ 
I’m worrying about things that I need to do, but let’s do the ‘to do’ list cos it, it makes 
you feel like there’s practical things that you can do to resolve it 
I try and distract myself as best, you know, so that’s why I like watching either a film 
or erm going out and doing something, you know, just to try and get that focus 
elsewhere  
You have goals that you wanna set yourself and you do try and push yourself a bit, 
otherwise it [GAD] would just consume you 
I try and just let the thought cross my mind now and leave my mind, rather than 
staying in there and worrying about it even more 
Instead of: ‘what if I have a car crash? What if Christmas is awful?’ Dur dur dur, 
stopping that and saying: ‘but what’s the reality?’ and sort of breaking it down 
I’ve got like a song I think about that calms me down [ ] just like a toolkit of things to 
use for anxiety 
 
1.2.1 
 
2.11.7 
 
 
3.6.13 
 
4.6.8 
 
 
5.7.1 
 
6.9.1 
 
7.1.5 
 
8.2.4 
3 GAD and interpersonal relations: Worrying about what others think 
a. GAD through others’ lenses 
Transcript 
location 
Emma 
Sandy 
Rob 
A lot of people don’t believe it because … you can’t see it 
Cos he [partner] doesn’t see an, an actual illness of some kind, he can’t see it  
She [wife] kind of recognises what it is but also the fact that I’ve done something 
about it 
1.3.1 
2.5.3 
3.6.1 
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a. GAD through others’ lenses (cont.)  
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
Because [ ] more people have seen how I’ve responded to certain situations, I think 
they’re finally understanding the level of anxiety I suffer 
Some of the mums that I’ve met at playgroup, erm when I do go, are quite 
understanding of it 
He [partner] just stopped like going places as well [ ] I would always just like have 
just this massive panic attack [ ] and he was like: ‘I can’t deal with that’ 
Fortunately, the woman that was interviewing me suffered really badly with anxiety 
as well, so she was really understanding 
My mum had always been like: ‘oh you’re just a worrier’, [ ] and it was just 
disregarded as petty. [ ] ‘Oh you’re just being silly. Just making it up’ 
 
4.3.1 
 
5.4.1 
 
6.4.6 
 
7.5.1 
 
8.2.10 
b. Striving to belong  
Emma 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
Kirsty 
 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
Not fitting in [ ] I didn’t care what people thought of me [ ] I didn’t care but now I do 
Wanting to be on my own is because if I, if I’m in my own space, then I haven’t got to 
speak to anyone, and I haven’t got to talk about anything 
They [colleagues] would say that I’m very confident [ ] what it [GAD] does is it puts a 
façade up [ ] and people will think that, that I’m ok but I, actually inside I’m, I’m not 
If I have someone round, it’s er trying to make sure my house is tidy, doesn’t smell 
I perhaps ate more than I normally would [ ] because everybody expects you to be 
eating, because that’s a normal situation, so I think sometimes you overcompensate 
for that 
It’s quite lonely as well because you think you’re the only person who feels like that,  
[ ] so [ ] by its nature, I think you cut yourself off from a lot of people 
Going into make-up feeling very aware that everyone else [her wedding party] is very 
normal, and I’m not normal 
My colleagues not liking me. I worry about what other people think a lot 
 
1.9.2 
2.2.3 
 
3.3.2 
 
4.4.17 
5.5.4 
 
 
6.1.3 
 
7.7.1 
 
8.1.10 
c. Helpfulness of support  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
Chloe 
It [GAD] needs to be dealt with [ ] in a lot more in-depth way rather than, you know, 
six counselling sessions and: ‘oh yeah, you’ll be fixed. Oh, deal with it yourself’ 
He’s [partner] not been there [ ] all he’s done is shun me away, and been very erm 
dismissively ridiculous 
I was put on venlafaxine [ ] if you’ve got that [GAD] in your medical history, [ ] it’s 
almost as if the doctors go: ‘it’s that again’ 
The CBT changed my life. [ ] now, I’m a lot more upbeat, a lot more erm flowy with 
how I move 
They [long-term friends] come round like to see me, and to spend time with my son, 
erm and maybe take my son out 
Thank God for her [physician] because I dread to think. I honestly, I couldn’t have 
carried on as I was 
They’re [physicians] just there to diagnose you. [ ] They don’t have an interest in you 
personally 
He [father] was very soft on me [ ] he was like: ‘if you get too nervous, just come 
home’, and I did 
 
1.3.3 
 
2.5.1 
 
3.5.4 
 
4.6.3 
 
5.4.1 
 
6.6.5 
 
7.1.4 
 
8.3.2 
d. Concern for others’ welfare  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
My daughter’s going back to school on Tuesday, and I’m worried that she’s not going 
to have any friends, that she won’t settle in, that she won’t like her lunch 
I wouldn’t wanna talk to friends that have had a tough time cos I don’t want them to 
feel they’re taking a burden of my issues on 
If me saying that this is happening to me helps at least one other person, then it’s, 
it’s, it’s ok because I think a, a lot of it is, a lot of people suffer in silence 
I try not to push my anxieties on ‘em [her children], but I’m tryna also protect ‘em as 
well [ ] cos I know children can be cruel 
My sister has to take my son to the farm because I … stop him from doing things 
there [ ] even though it’s a petting zoo [ ], I worry that he might get bitten and 
seriously hurt 
I didn’t want him [her son] to [ ] see me worry about going out because then he would 
probably worry about it too. [ ] I was really determined to try and get better for him 
It’s nice now, sort of being on the other side of it. Being able to say to people like: ‘I 
know it’s really rough but there is a way out, and you know, you just have to kind of 
find your way’ 
 
1.9.1 
 
2.3.4 
 
3.6.6 
 
4.4.13 
 
5.8.1 
 
 
6.12.7 
 
7.4.3 
4 The need to create meaning amid uncertainty and loss: GAD is an eye-opener 
a. Learning to ride with GAD (I suppose) 
Transcript 
location 
Emma 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
Marie 
It’s one of those things. You gotta learn to … ride with it I s’pose 
I’ve had to ride it [ ], I’ve had really bad times [ ] I’ve had to say to myself: ‘just ride it 
out’ 
I think I’ve kind of working on the techniques to just try and [ ] understand it and work 
with it 
I have to just ride it [anxious thoughts] out and get through the other side 
1.4.34 
2.11.3 
 
3.1.2 
 
4.7.1 
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a. Learning to ride with GAD (I suppose) (cont.)  
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
 
 
Chloe 
 
Nobody can’t, just lives with everyday anxiety [GAD] and just says: ‘oh, that’s ok, like 
no problem’ 
I also learnt [ ] by avoiding things, [ ] I’m avoiding having the panic attack [ ]. Now I 
think I know that, I can try and work round it  
If we’re gonna have a baby, we’re gonna have a baby. If it heightens my anxiety, 
then we’ll deal with it [ ] but spending time obsessing over it [ ] and catastrophising … 
doesn’t do anything for me 
This is the first job where [in-breath] everyone knows about it [ ] I didn’t have to worry 
all the time about … hiding it 
 
5.7.1 
 
6.12.1 
 
7.2.4 
 
 
8.3.29 
b. Now I appreciate things more  
Emma 
 
Sandy 
 
Rob 
 
 
Marie 
 
Kirsty 
 
Shelley 
 
Sarah 
Chloe 
 
I’m very grateful that I’m still here and I’m still fighting it. [ ] Now I appreciate things 
more 
I have some time there [at café]. [ ] I’ve built that into my week so that I completely 
give myself that time 
You never know what’s going on inside someone’s head. [ ] That person [ ] may be 
facing some real erm difficult times in their life and still trying to come to work, as I 
was 
As much as I do suffer with anxiety [in-breath] … I’m still here and [ ] I’ve still got a 
reason to smile every day 
It’s important to take some time out for yourself. [ ] For a long time I kind of stopped 
doing everything that I enjoyed. Erm I’ve recently started like reading again  
I like seeing people, and it’s not that I ever didn’t like that, so the fact I can now do 
that again [ ] makes you feel better, and that knocks on, I think, to the next thing 
I’m also really grateful for where I am at the moment 
I definitely like myself now. Before, I, I like despised who I was 
1.7.3 
 
2.4.13 
 
3.12.3 
 
 
4.6.1 
 
5.6.4 
 
6.4.8 
 
7.3.2 
8.2.2 
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Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
School of Arts and Social Sciences 
City University London                                                                            
                                                                           London EC1R 0JD  
 
25th April 2016 
 
Dear Laura Young and George Berguno 
 
Reference: PSYETH (P/F) 15/16 182 
 
Project title: The lived experience of individuals with generalised anxiety disorder 
 
 
I am writing to confirm that the research proposal detailed above has been granted approval 
by the City University London Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Period of approval 
Approval is valid for a period of three years from the date of this letter. If data collection runs 
beyond this period you will need to apply for an extension using the Amendments Form. 
 
Project amendments 
You will also need to submit an Amendments Form if you want to make any of the following 
changes to your research: 
 (a) Recruit a new category of participants 
 (b) Change, or add to, the research method employed 
 (c) Collect additional types of data 
 (d) Change the researchers involved in the project 
 
Adverse events 
You will need to submit an Adverse Events Form, copied to the Secretary of the Senate 
Research Ethics Committee  in the event of any of the 
following:  
 (a) Adverse events 
 (b) Breaches of confidentiality 
 (c) Safeguarding issues relating to children and vulnerable adults 
 (d) Incidents that affect the personal safety of a participant or researcher 
Issues (a) and (b) should be reported as soon as possible and no later than 5 days after the 
event. Issues (c) and (d) should be reported immediately. Where appropriate the researcher 
should also report adverse events to other relevant institutions such as the police or social 
services. 
 
Should you have any further queries then please do not hesitate to get in touch. 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
Hayley Glasford    Katy Tapper 
Course Officer    Chair  
Email:   Email:   
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Appendix 14:   Analysis chapter format 
 
Direct quotations from participants, including grammatical errors, are used throughout the 
Analysis chapter. Following each quote, the participant’s pseudonym and transcript location 
are included in parentheses (Emma: 1.1.1). Transcript location is depicted via a three-
number system; participant, question, and paragraph number respectively. Omitted material 
is indicated by: [ ]. Occasions requiring additional explanatory material to provide clarity, are 
indicated by italicised text in parentheses: [partner]. Non-verbal communications are also 
placed in parentheses: [laughter]. Pauses are indicated by: … and words in bold were 
emphasised by participants. In selecting material across themes, my aim was to capture the 
lived experiences of the whole group, whilst ensuring that each participant’s voice is present 
throughout the full analysis. In some themes, I felt it necessary to include a wider range of 
accounts that capture the various textures of experience. In other themes, I chose to select 
quotations from a smaller number of participants, whose narratives contain rich descriptions 
of the phenomenon, or evoke striking insights. A full set of quotes for each theme is included 
within the table of group super-ordinate themes (Appendix 12). 
 
I found that the four resultant super-ordinate themes were able to contain the range of 
idiosyncratic experiences across the group. My aim in creating these themes was to ground 
my psychological interpretations of the data in the participants’ words, thus maintaining 
connection between the ‘I’ and ‘P’ in IPA (Smith et al., 2009). Theme titles consequently 
marry my own interpretations; including psychological language, with participant quotations. 
Most subordinate theme titles also derive from participants’ accounts.  
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Section B: Combined Case Study and Process 
Report 
 
 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Exaggerated 
Fatigue and Anxiety: Forming a New Relationship 
With Anxiety 
 
 
This section of the portfolio has been omitted for confidentiality 
purposes. It can be consulted on application at the Library of City, 
University of London 
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Section C: Journal Article 
 
 
The Lived Experience of Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder: Battling With Uncertainty and the Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The full text of this article has been 
removed for copyright reasons 
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Appendix 15:   Journal of Phenomenological Psychology instructions for 
authors 
 
Instructions for Authors  
Last revised on 1 February 2018  
  
Scope  
 
The peer-reviewed Journal of Phenomenological Psychology (JPP) publishes 
articles that advance the discipline of psychology from the perspective of the 
Continental phenomenology movement. Within that tradition, phenomenology is 
understood in the broadest possible sense including its transcendental, existential, 
hermeneutic, and narrative strands and is not meant to convey the thought of any 
one individual. Articles advance the discipline of psychology by applying 
phenomenology to enhance the field’s philosophical foundations, critical reflection, 
theoretical development, research methodologies, empirical research, and 
applications in such areas as clinical, educational, and organizational psychology. 
Over its four decades, the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology has 
consistently demonstrated the relevance of phenomenology for psychology in areas 
involving qualitative research methods, the entire range of psychological subject 
matters, and theoretical approaches such as the psychoanalytic, cognitive, 
biological, behavioral, humanistic, and psychometric. The overall aim is to further 
the psychological understanding of the human person in relation to self, world, 
others, and time. Because the potential of continental phenomenology for 
enhancing psychology is vast and the field is still developing, innovative and 
creative applications or phenomenological approaches to psychological problems 
are especially welcome.  
 
Ethical and Legal Conditions  
 
Please note that submission of an article for publication in any of Brill’s journals 
implies that you have read and agreed to Brill’s Ethical and Legal Conditions. The 
Ethical and Legal Conditions can be found here: brill.com/downloads/conditions.pdf.  
 
Online Submission  
 
JPP uses online submission. Authors should submit their manuscript online via the 
Editorial Manager (EM) online submission system at: editorialmanager.com/jppbrill. 
First-time users of EM need to register first. Go to the website and click on the 
"Register Now" link in the login menu. Enter the information requested.  
When you register, select e-mail as your preferred method of contact. Upon 
successful registration, you will receive an e-mail message containing your 
Username and Password. If you should forget your Username and Password, click 
on the "Send Username/Password" link in the login section, and enter your first 
name, last name and email address exactly as you had entered it when you 
registered. Your access codes will then be e-mailed to you.  
Prior to submission, authors are encouraged to read the ‘Instructions for Authors’. 
When submitting via the website, you will be guided stepwise through the creation 
and uploading of the various files.  
A revised document is uploaded the same way as the initial submission. The system 
automatically generates an electronic (PDF) proof, which is then used for reviewing 
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purposes. All correspondence, including the editor’s request for revision and final 
decision, is sent by e-mail.  
 
Double-blinded Peer Review  
 
JPP uses a double-blind peer review system, which means that manuscript 
author(s) do not know who the reviewers are, and that reviewers do not know the 
names of the author(s). When you submit your article via Editorial Manager, you will 
be asked to submit a separate title page which includes the full title of the 
manuscript plus the names and complete contact details of all authors. This page 
will not be accessible to the referees. All other files (manuscript, figures, tables, etc.) 
should not contain any information concerning author names, institutions, etc. The 
names of these files and the document properties should also be anonymized.  
 
Contact Address  
 
For any questions or problems relating to your manuscript please contact the Editor 
at: jmorley@ramapo.edu. For eventual questions about Editorial Manager, authors 
can also contact the Brill EM Support Department at: em@brill.com.  
 
Submission Requirements  
 
Language  
 
Manuscripts should be written in English. Spelling (British or American) should be 
consistent throughout.  
 
Manuscript Structure  
 
All submissions must be double spaced and fully justified. The beginning of each 
new paragraph should be announced by an indentation of one tab.  
 
Abstract and Keywords  
 
Each submission should include a 100-150-word abstract in block paragraph form 
and 2-6 keywords.  
 
Headings  
 
Headings should be flush left. First level headings are bold, second level headings 
should be in bold italics.  
 
Block Quotes  
 
Quotations longer than 40 words should be placed in an indented block paragraph.  
 
Citation in the Text  
 
In the body of the text, use the author-date method of in-text citation: Surname, 
2009.  
 
References and Footnotes  
 
References and footnotes should follow APA guidelines. References are listed in 
alphabetical order.  
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Journal Article  
 
Author, A.A., Author, B.B., & Author, C.C. (2009). Title of the article. Journal Title, 
Vol. 12 (4), 1-10.  
 
Books  
 
Author, T.H.E. (2008). The title of the book. Location: Publisher.  
 
Edited Book  
 
Author, T.H.E., & Author, A. (Eds.) (2009). The title of the book. Location: Publisher.  
 
Article in Edited Book  
 
Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (2009). Title of chapter. In A. Editor & B. Editor (Eds.),  
Title of the book, (pp. 1-10). Location: Publisher.  
 
Electronic Sources (Periodicals)  
 
Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (2009). Title of article. Title of Online Periodical, volume 
number (issue  
number if available). Retrieved month day, year, from 
http://www.someaddress.com/full/url/.  
 
Electronic Sources (Non-periodicals)  
 
Organization XYZ (2008). Title of article. Retrieved month day, year, from: 
http://www.someaddress.com/full/url/  
 
Newspaper Article  
 
Author, A. (2009, January 6). The title of the article. Newspaper Title. Retrieved 
http://www.someaddress.com/full/url/  
Author, A. (2009, January 6). The title of the article. Newspaper Title, pp. 3.  
 
Figures  
 
References to figures should consist of the complete word only at the beginning of a 
sentence and in the figure captions; otherwise the abbreviations “Fig.” or “Figs” are 
used. Figure captions should not be attached to the figures but should be included 
as a separate page at the end of the manuscript.  
Figures should be submitted as separate source files in .eps, .tif, or .jpg format, in a 
size suitable for the typesetting area of the journal which is 115 x 180 mm; space 
should also be left for the figure caption. The resolution of these files should be at 
least 300 dpi for half-tone figures, and 600 dpi for line drawings. Number the files 
and indicate in the manuscript where they are to appear (Fig. 1 about here).  
The text in a figure must be legible and should not be smaller than corps 8. The size 
of this lettering for any text in a figure should be the same for all figures in the 
manuscript.  
Greyscale graphics must be provided as monochrome images. To guarantee good 
resolution in printing, figures must be original TIF or EPS (no PDF) files with a 
minimal resolution of 300 dpi for half-tone figures, and 600 dpi for line drawings. 
Diagrams, maps, drawings, charts, and photographs should be free of charge and 
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copyright, or permission for publication has to be obtained by the manuscript author 
from the original copyright owner(s).  
 
Publication  
 
Proofs  
 
Upon acceptance, a PDF of the article proofs will be sent to authors of articles, 
discussions, and book reviews by e-mail to check carefully for factual and 
typographic errors. Authors are responsible for checking these proofs and are 
strongly urged to make use of the Comment & Markup toolbar to note their 
corrections directly on the proofs. At this stage in the production process only minor 
corrections are allowed. Alterations to the original manuscript at this stage will result 
in considerable delay in publication and, therefore, are not accepted unless charged 
to the author. Proofs should be returned within 4 working days of receipt to the 
Editor.  
 
E-offprints  
 
A PDF file of the article will be supplied free of charge by the publisher to authors for 
personal use. Brill is a RoMEO yellow publisher. The Author retains the right to self-
archive the submitted (pre-peer-review) version of the article at any time. The 
submitted version of an article is the author's version that has not been peer-
reviewed, nor had any value added to it by Brill (such as formatting or copy editing). 
The Author retains the right to self-archive the accepted (peer-reviewed) version 
after an embargo period of 24 months. The accepted version means the version 
which has been accepted for publication and contains all revisions made after peer 
reviewing and copy editing but has not yet been typeset in the publisher’s lay-out. 
The publisher’s lay-out must not be used in any repository or on any website 
(brill.com/resources/authors/publishing-books-brill/self-archiving-rights).  
 
Consent to Publish  
 
Transfer of Copyright  
 
By submitting a manuscript, the author agrees that the copyright for the article is 
transferred to the publisher if and when the article is accepted for publication. For 
that purpose the author needs to sign the Consent to Publish which will be sent 
with the first proofs of the manuscript.  
 
Open Access  
 
Should the author wish to publish the article in Open Access he/she can choose the 
Brill Open option. This allows for non-exclusive Open Access publication under a 
Creative Commons license in exchange for an Article Publication Charge (APC), 
upon signing a special Brill Open Consent to Publish Form.  
More information on Brill Open, Brill’s Open Access Model and the Brill Open 
Consent to Publish Form can be found on brill.com/brillopen. 
 
 
 
 
